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Abstract
This thesis develops and applies methodological approaches for the analysis of intra-
day markets for electricity which are organised as continuous double auctions. The
focus is to improve the understanding of how balancing forecast errors fromweather-
dependent renewable energy sources influences the outcomes of continuous intraday
markets. This is important as it helps to assess how large amounts of renewable
capacity can be utilised cost-efficiently and without stressing security of supply. In
a first step, the thesis proposes a (non-mathematical) model of a continuous intraday
market to show how the direction of the forecast error determines transactions
betweenmarket participants, how these transactions relate to the formation of prices,
and how the market integration of renewables can be improved. In a second step,
the thesis provides a foundation for quantitative market analyses by modelling price-
setting decisions for power generators and electricity demanders. This makes it
possible to show that information on market participants’ technical characteristics
enables informed predictions of their market behaviour. In a third step, the thesis
presents a computer simulation of a continuous intraday market. Implementing the
simulation approach for the German power system allows calculation of the costs
associated with the uncertain feed-in from renewables.
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Introduction and overview
W
hen Thomas A. Edison opened the world’s first central power station on 4th
September 1882 on Pearl Street, New York, he most likely would not have
believed the eagerness at the beginning of the 21st century to bring back
the technology of the windmill used extensively in the dark ages. Yet he would also
not have believed that burning fossil fuels for only one hundred years could threaten
the quality of life on earth. Opposing climate change, together with reducing the
dependency on depleting natural, non-renewable resources, is one main argument
for introducing large amounts of renewable energy sources to energy systems.Making
use of wind power and solar radiation is of particular relevance in this context since
their technical potential is great enough to cover the global energy demand. However,
using wind turbines and photovoltaic installations has the disadvantage that their
output depends on the state of the environment, which is both variable and uncertain.
This downside is relevant because of twomain aspects. First, the operational stability
of the transmission network depends on ensuring a permanent balance of supply
and demand. Not maintaining this equilibrium adequately can result in supply
interruptionswhich induce damage to an economy thatwas built around the promise
that electricity can be consumed at all times. Second, it is cost-intensive to store large
amounts of electricity and the potential of current storage technologies is limited.
As a consequence, providing instruments to ensure a well-functioning integration of
the feed-in from weather-dependent renewables into power systems is of significant
importance.
An intraday market for electricity can be understood as such an instrument. By
giving market participants the possibility to trade electricity close to its physical
delivery (“within the day”), intraday markets are of high relevance for managing the
uncertainty of the output from weather-dependent renewable energy sources. This
uncertainty manifests itself in the form of forecast errors which can be measured
by the difference between the expected feed-in at the closure of the day-ahead
market and the actual feed-in. Thus, the amount of electricity sold in the day-ahead
market, which allocates quantities to buyers and sellers for each hour of the following
day, generally does not equal the amount actually produced by wind turbines and
photovoltaic installations. The intraday market permits reaction to new information
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emerging after the closure of the day-ahead market and therefore allows market
participants to balance forecast errors. For example, a wind power manager receives
a short-term forecast of the average wind speed for an hour in the future. This new
forecast implies that the electricity output will be higher than the amount sold in
the day-ahead market. The intraday market then gives the wind power manager the
option of selling the anticipated overproduction in order to avoid an unbalanced
position in the future hour. A continuous intraday market—as operated in e. g.
Germany, France, and Scandinavia—organises such trading activities by delegating
the clearing process to the market participants. In simple terms, this means that they
can place bids for buying and asks for selling electricity in an open order book at any
time within a specified trading period. If a bid price is equal to or exceeds the price
of an ask, a corresponding transaction between the involved parties takes place on
a bilateral (but anonymous) level. Hence, this kind of auction design provides a high
level of flexibility to market participants and is therefore well suited to manage the
uncertainty of renewables.
Providing a better understanding of the relationship between (continuous) intra-
day markets and the integration of renewable energy sources is especially impor-
tant for evaluating how large amounts of renewable capacity can be utilised cost-
efficiently and without stressing security of supply. To contribute in this respect, the
main purpose of this thesis is to develop and to apply methodological approaches
for the analysis of how balancing forecast errors from renewables influences the
outcomes of continuous intraday markets. This requires explaining how the char-
acteristics of power generators and electricity demanders determine their market
activity, how this market activity can be modelled, and how it is connected to the cor-
rection of forecast errors. More specifically, Chap. 2 first discusses the characteristics
of weather-dependent renewable energy sources, how they affect power systems, and
why intraday trading can contribute to managing these impacts. Chap. 3 proceeds
by presenting the design and the functionality of intraday markets for electricity
and by introducing the most relevant arrangements in Europe. While Chap. 4 gives
insights into the related literature and clarifies the contribution of this thesis, Chap. 5
proposes a non-mathematical model of a continuous intraday market. This model
provides a simple market representation, which makes it possible to carry out a
very general analysis of how changingmarket conditions influencemarket outcomes.
In fact, Chap. 6 uses this representation to discuss options for improving the in-
tegration of renewables. To build a foundation for modelling continuous markets
quantitatively, Chap. 7 formalises price-setting decisions of power generators and
electricity demanders. Chap. 8 uses these formalisations together with the insights
from the model in Chap. 5 to present a computer simulation for continuous intraday
markets. Implementing the simulation approach for theGermanpower systemallows
calculation of market prices and the costs of balancing forecast errors, for example,
and thus gives more concrete insights into the impact of renewables on intraday
markets. Chap. 9 concludes by summarising the main findings of this thesis and by
highlighting the need for further research.
2
Renewable energy sources and intradaymarkets
This chapter deals with fundamental aspects relating to the integration of the feed-in
from weather-dependent renewable energy sources. Whereas Sect. 2.1 discusses the
characteristics of renewables, Sect. 2.2 and Sect. 2.3 show how these characteristics
affect power systems. The chapter closes by discussing why intraday markets can be
understood as an integration instrument (Sect. 2.4).
2.1 The characteristics of renewable energy sources
The electricity production of weather-dependent renewable energy sources, such
as output from wind turbines and photovoltaic installations, has three essential
characteristics.
Figure 2.1: Output from wind turbines and photovoltaic installations in Germany for two
days in 2013 as well as the difference between their day-ahead forecasted and their delivered
output on 18.04.2013. Data from EEX Transparency (2014).
3
CHAPTER 2. RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND INTRADAY MARKETS
First, the output from renewables is produced with (basically) zeromarginal costs
and without greenhouse gas emissions. This implies that cost-efficient operation of
a power system will aim at maximising the feed-in of the installed capacity, given
that supply security is ensured. As a consequence, the main purpose of dispatchable
power generators, such as coal, gas, and oil-fired power plants, has been reduced to
cover the remaining difference between the electricity demand and the feed-in from
renewables. This “crowding out” is intended by policy makers since it contributes to
the reduction of carbon emissions and the dependency on the import of fossil fuels.
Second, the output from renewables is variable. Fig. 2.1 shows the feed-in
from wind turbines and photovoltaic installations in Germany for two days in
2013. Whereas the generation from noon to 1p.m. was 4,100 megawatts (MW)
on 16.01.2013, the output amounted to 35,741MW on 18.04.2013 during this hour
(approx. half of the electricity demand). This implies that the conventional power
plant portfolio has to cover nearly the entire electricity demand in some hours and
only a small fraction in others. The variability of the feed-in also reflects its volatility.
On 18.04.2013, the renewables output increased by 4,077MW between 11 a.m. and
noon, in the next hour by 1,243MW, then dropped by 340MW, slightly increased
again by 219MW, and then dropped by 2,625MW in the following hour. Hence, the
required output from thermal power plants can vary significantly within a few hours.
Third, the output from weather-dependent renewables is uncertain. This means
that it is not known a priori to what extent the expected electricity production from
renewables matches the quantities that can actually be delivered. This uncertainty
is attributable to the fact that production from wind turbines and photovoltaic
installations depends on the natural environment and that the future states of this
environment cannot be forecasted perfectly. In this context, Fig. 2.1 shows the fore-
cast error—the difference between the day-ahead forecasted and the actual output
from renewables—for 18.04.2013. We can see that the actual electricity production
was significantly higher than the anticipated output; between 11 a.m. and noon,
the overproduction amounted to 3,562MW. Such deviations are relevant since the
conventional power plant portfolio is typically dispatched according to the day-
ahead forecast of the feed-in from renewables. If the production that can actually
be delivered the next day deviates from the anticipated output level, thermal power
generators or electricity demanders have to respond to this under- or overproduction
from renewables accordingly.1
2.2 Effects in the power system – zeromarginal costs
The fact that renewables require high investments and do not have (relevant) variable
production costs implies that their output should be used whenever possible. As
1Note that the uncertainty of weather-dependent renewables is not the only reason for adjustment
needs. Especially load forecast errors and unexpected power plant outages require the response of the
entities in a power system.
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already discussed, fossil-fuelled power plants thus have to cover the remaining
difference between the electricity demand and the feed-in from renewables. This
difference is typically termed “residual load”.
Figure 2.2: Residual Load Duration Curves for the German electricity market in the years
2010, 2020, and 2030 considering installed capacities of 36.5GW (2010), 86GW (2020), and
119.8GW (2030) for weather-dependent renewables. Data from Gunkel et al. (2012).
To show the relevance of this term, Fig. 2.2 sorts hourly residual loads for the
years 2010, 2020, and 2030 in descending order to create Residual Load Duration
Curves (RLDCs) for the German electricity market. As indicated by the area under the
curves, the utilisation of the conventional power plant portfolio will decrease with
an increasing share of renewables. In this context, the ends of the three curves are
of particular interest. The left ends show that the highest required output during one
year stays almost constant. This is because even in a power systemwith a high share of
weather-dependent renewables, their output can be close to zero (compare Fig. 2.1).
At their right ends, the RLDCs differ from each other. More renewable capacity results
inmore hours with a higher feed-in and thus low residual loads. In fact, the curves for
2020 and 2030 show that the output fromwind turbines and photovoltaic installations
can be expected to exceed the electricity demand in a few number of hours.
Whereas the residual load and its evolution over time show to what extent and in
which situation conventional power plants are crowded out, Fig. 2.2 does not provide
concrete insights into themarket impact of renewables. Inmost electricitymarkets in
Europe, a uniform-price day-ahead auction builds the foundation for organising the
exchange between buyers and sellers of electricity. More specifically, the intersection
of the supply and demand curves gives the clearing price at which all quantities are
traded for a given hour. In simple terms, the supply curve—called “merit order”—is
constructed by the power exchange by sorting the submitted sell offers in ascending
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order with respect to their price. Since market participants are expected to offer their
short-runmarginal costs of production, the “order ofmerit” is strongly determined by
the technology-specific fuel prices. For example, lignite is less expensive than natural
gas so that, undermost conditions, themarginal costs of lignite-fired power plants are
lower than the marginal costs of gas-fired power stations. As a consequence, a lignite
plant will be positioned before a gas plant on the merit order and is therefore more
likely to be dispatched.
Figure 2.3: Simplified illustration of the merit order effect induced by renewable energy
sources.
Since the feed-in from renewables is produced with zero marginal costs, offering
the forecasted output in the day-ahead market shifts the thermal merit order to the
right (see Fig. 2.3). The consequences of this shift are summarised as the “merit order
effect of renewable energy sources” and are mainly twofold. First, given a certain
level of demand, some power plants are shifted behind the intersection of the supply
and demand curves and are thus not dispatched any more (note the connection
to analysing the residual load). They lose the opportunity to produce and therefore
do not earn profits to amortise investments. This is especially relevant for gas-fired
power plants as they are often positioned around the intersection of the market
curves.2 Second, the right-shift of the merit order lowers the clearing price of the
day-ahead auction. On the one hand, this means that electricity demanders have
to pay less for consuming electricity so that there is a gain in consumer surplus. On
the other hand, all dispatched power plants earn less profit as the producer surplus
2The merit order effect can induce a significant reduction of full-load-hours of gas-fired power
plants. This is problematic because they are relatively flexible and can hence adjust output fast and
at short notice. This flexibility is lost or reduced if these plants are dispatched in fewer hours and, in
the long run, investments in gas-fired generation capacity become unprofitable. However, note that the
aim of introducing renewable energy sources is to crowd out fossil-fuelled generation. Yet from a system
perspective it would be preferable if renewables would predominantly replacemore inflexible andmore
carbon-intensive production options. Policy makers can address this issue by increasing the costs for
carbon emissions as this increases the relative competitiveness of gas-fired generation.
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decreases. Regarding the supply side, the incentive to invest in generation capacities
becomes weaker in the long run. This is generally not objectionable since a higher
capacity of renewables should give information to market participants that fewer
(conventional) capacities are needed. However, this substitution also means a loss
in flexibility because the output of fossil-fuelled power plants is controllable and thus
relevant for ensuring system stability.3 For more detailed analyses of the impact of
renewables on day-ahead electricity markets, see Sensfuß et al. (2008), Nicolosi and
Fürsch (2009), de Miera et al. (2008), andWeigt (2009).
2.3 Effects in the power system – variability and uncertainty
The fact that the feed-in from renewables is variable and uncertain raises challenges
to the power system mainly because its stability depends on ensuring a permanent
equilibrium of supply and demand. Not maintaining this equilibrium adequately
can cause supply interruptions which pose significant costs to an economy. Hence,
large weather-induced output changes require corresponding adjustments either on
the supply or the demand side. To a large extent, electricity demanders align their
consumption to their activities and not to the current level of electricity supply.
This is not only because they do not favour postponing or avoiding their electricity-
consuming activities; in most electricity markets, especially the residential sector
does not receive any price information that reflects the current state of the power
system.4 This means that the demand side is highly inflexible in responding to
changing and unexpected injections into the electricity grid. As a consequence,
predominantly controllable electricity generators, such as coal, gas, and oil-fired
power stations, have to balance the variable and uncertain feed-in. Hence, they have
to reduce and increase output within short periods of time and at short notice. As
a consequence, thermal power generators may not only have lower full-load-hours
and lower revenues due to the feed-in from renewables (recall the merit order effect);
they will also have costs for adjusting their output. As these adjustment capabilities
are often offered and procured via markets, however, generators get compensated for
these costs and also have the possibility to earn additional profit.
Researchers are interested in quantifying the impacts of the uncertain and vari-
able feed-in from renewables because it allows the evaluation of the “true costs” of
renewables. Whereas variability costs mainly result from having to perform frequent
load changes, uncertainty costs predominantly stem from a power plant dispatch
which is inefficient given the actual production from renewables. In this context,
3Note that the price reduction due to the merit order effect also influences the profit for renewable
producers. For more insights, see Hirth (2013).
4Demand response (DR) measures aim at providing information to electricity consumers which
reflects the current level of supply and demand. As a consequence, consumers are given the incentive
to respond to this information by either shifting or shedding load. This allows them to reduce electricity
costs and enhances the contribution of the demand side to react to changes on the supply side. Formore
information on DRmeasures, see e. g. Strbac (2008) and Paulus and Borggrefe (2011).
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Müsgens and Neuhoff (2006) presented a linear optimisation model to analyse how
wind generation affects thermal power generators. They calculated the impact on
generation costs, costs due to partial load operation, and start-up costs. Using data
from the German electricity market for the year 2003, they found that wind uncer-
tainty had significant effects on the volatility of electricity prices. Yet the additional
costs from this uncertainty were not as high as the costs associated with the volatility
of the wind feed-in. Especially partial load costs and start-up costs increased with
higher volatility. Zipf and Möst (2013) used a stochastic electricity market model to
calculate the indirect system costs resulting from the uncertain and volatile feed-in of
wind turbines and photovoltaic installations. They assessed how the characteristics
of renewables induce costs for the conventional power plant portfolio (e. g. start-
up and partial load costs). Using data from the German electricity market, their
results support the finding of Müsgens and Neuhoff (2006) that the volatility of
the feed-in can contribute substantially to total indirect system costs. However,
Zipf and Möst (2013) concluded that the costs resulting from uncertainty would
increase significantly with the share of renewables in the power system. Especially the
introduction of large amounts of photovoltaic capacity would reduce total volatility
costs and make uncertainty costs more relevant. For the year 2013, they calculated
indirect system costs of approx. EUR1.25 for each megawatt hour (MWh) of feed-in
from photovoltaic installations and approx. EUR2.25 for eachmegawatt hour of feed-
in from wind turbines.
2.4 Integration instruments and intradaymarkets
The expression “integration of renewables” can be understood as the process of
utilising the output from renewable energy sources in a power system. This integra-
tion must deal with the previously discussed characteristics of weather-dependent
renewables. The reason is that the aim should be themaximisation of the infeed from
a given production capacity while considering its “externalities” (e. g. volatility and
uncertainty costs). In fact, cost-efficient integration should make use of the output
from renewables as long as its marginal system value is higher than its marginal
system costs (compare Jacobsen and Schröder, 2012; Finon and Perez, 2007). As a
consequence, reducing the negative impacts of the non-dispatchable feed-in affects
this trade-off so that a higher utilisation of the installed capacity becomes optimal.
Integration instruments, such as transmission expansion and storage power plant
investments, contribute in this respect (compare Boie et al., 2014).
The transmission network allows the disaggregation of the sites where electricity
is produced from the locations where it is consumed. This local shifting of electricity
production has several benefits regarding the integration of renewables. For example,
the power plant portfolio can be operated more efficiently. In Germany, a large part
of the installed wind capacity is located in the north. However, the regions with the
highest loads are located in the west and south of Germany. Inadequate transmission
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capacity between the centre of wind production and high demand may not allow
utilisation of the entire wind turbines’ output where it is needed. As a consequence,
output generated with zero marginal costs may have to be curtailed and a fossil-
fuelled power plant located near the load centre may have to operate instead (see
Weigt et al., 2010). Similarly, adequate interconnector capacity betweenmarket areas
can permit use to be made of excess production in the case of negative residual loads
(recall Fig. 2.2). Formore information on the relevance of transmission expansion, see
e. g. Schaber et al. (2012), Gunkel andMöst (2014), and Fürsch et al. (2013).
Whereas transmission lines make it possible to shift electricity production spa-
tially, storage power plants enable the shifting of output in time (see Beaudin et al.
(2010) and Connolly et al. (2011) for an overview of storage technologies and their
relevance). In a liberalised electricity market, this shifting works via the price mech-
anism as the business model of storage plants is to exploit price differences; they aim
at buying electricity at low prices and selling the stored quantities when the electricity
prices are high (Loisel et al., 2010). Since low market prices typically emerge in times
of low residual loads (and thus in times of high renewables feed-in), storage plants
store electricity when the output from renewable energy sources is large. Following
this reasoning, storage power plants typically sell when the feed-in from renewables
is low because the residual load and hence the electricity price are likely to be high.
Intraday markets for electricity do not provide “physical capabilities” to deal with
renewables as transmission lines or storage plants do. Nevertheless, suchmarkets can
be understood as an instrument to contribute to the integration of renewables. This is
because they organise the interactions between entities in a power systemby allowing
market participants to buy and to sell electricity until close to physical delivery.
The possibility to trade “within the day” is important as most power exchanges
employ a day-ahead market for the allocation of quantities to buyers and sellers
of electricity. In simple terms, this means that market participants can submit buy
and sell offers for each hour of the following day. The power exchange constructs
hourly supply and demand curves based on these offers and determines the uniform
clearing price for each hour of the next day by finding their intersection point (recall
Fig. 2.3). However, new information—such as unexpected outages of power plants
and improved forecasts of the electricity demand and the feed-in from renewables—
emerges after the closure of the day-ahead market. Power generators and electricity
demandersmaywant to respond to this new information by adjusting their scheduled
production or consumption for one or more hours in the future. A continuous
intraday market allows them to do so; market participants can trade electricity for
each hour covered by the day-ahead auction from shortly after the closure of the
day-ahead market until close to real time (in Germany, for example, until 45 minutes
before physical delivery). Thismeans that the intradaymarket can be thought of as an
instrument for organising the reallocation of the outcomes of the day-ahead auction.
Consider, for example, that a wind power manager obtains a short-term forecast
of wind speeds which leads to the expectation that the electricity output for an
hour in the future will be higher than the amount sold in the day-ahead market.
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As a consequence, the manager wants to sell the anticipated overproduction in
order to avoid an unbalanced position in the future hour. In contrast, an operator
of a gas-fired power plant dispatched in the day-ahead auction for this hour may
want to earn additional profit by offering the flexibility to reduce output at short
notice. A continuous intraday market allows both entities to engage in a bilateral but
anonymous transaction so that the wind power manager avoids (costly) imbalances
and the plant operator can profitably exploit the advantage of being dispatchable.
From the point of view ofmarket participantswith unbalanced positions, the intraday
market can thus be understood as the access to a large pool of options for making use
of the flexibilities and capabilities the power system provides.
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Overview of intradaymarkets
This chapter provides a basic understanding of continuous intraday markets for
electricity. Whereas Sect. 3.1 shows the placement of intraday markets in liberalised
power systems, Sect. 3.2 discusses their design and functionality. The last part of the
chapter introduces the intraday markets in Spain, Scandinavia, and Germany as they
can be considered the most relevant arrangements in Europe and reflect the variety
of design choices (Sect. 3.3).
3.1 Intradaymarkets in power systems
The liberalisation of the electricity sector resulted in the unbundling of geographic
monopolies which integrated the production, transmission, distribution, and the
retail supply of electricity (see Joskow, 2008). This process of fragmentation required
instruments to organise the interactions of the now independently-acting entities.
As a consequence, wholesale markets emerged which allow electricity generators to
sell their output to electricity demanders.1 As Fig. 3.1 shows, these demanders can
be large consumers (e. g. companies from the industry sector) or retail companies
that use the wholesale market to supply electricity to small consumers (e. g. private
households).
Power exchanges have installed different types of markets to cover the need
of participants to buy or to sell electricity both in the long and in the short term
(compare Deng and Oren, 2006). Futures and forward markets allow electricity
trading for future months or years.2 This gives power generators the possibility to
create certain revenue streams for future points in time and thus helps to manage
price risks introduced by the liberalisation process (Ausubel and Cramton, 2010).
Similarly, retail companies participate in futures and forward markets to hedge their
1In most power systems, there is no obligation to participate in markets operated by power
exchanges. Hence, bilateral long-term contracts and privately negotiated “Over The Counter”
transactions are also instruments to organise the interactions betweenmarket entities (seeDuffie, 2012).
2While both futures and forwards are contracts to buy or to sell electricity for a specified price at a
specified time in the future, futures are more standardised (e. g. in terms of transaction and settlement
requirements). See Deng and Oren (2006) andMaurer and Barroso (2011) for more information.
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risks in the business with their customers. As the point of physical delivery comes
closer, market entities gain new information and need to adjust accordingly. For
example, a retail company has more accurate forecasts regarding the electricity
demand of private households and wants to update the general position taken
in the futures market. Due to such needs, power exchanges operate spot markets
where electricity can be traded close to real time. These markets (day-ahead and
intraday markets in Fig. 3.1) are of high importance because ensuring a permanent
equilibrium of supply and demand requires short-term interactions between the
entities in a power system.
Figure 3.1: A simple illustration of a liberalised power system with wholesale and retail
competition (based on Kirschen and Strbac, 2004).
Day-ahead markets allow the sale or purchase of electricity for each hour of the
following day. They can be considered the reference markets in most power systems
and result in an allocation which is close to the allocation at real time (compare e. g.
Viehmann, 2011). Nevertheless, new information can emerge within the time frame
between the closure of the day-aheadmarket and physical delivery. In a power system
with a high share of weather-dependent renewables, significant deviations can arise
between the forecasted and the actual feed-in (recall Sect. 2.1).3 Intraday markets
3Demand uncertainty and unexpected power outages also result in the need to adjust the positions
originating from participation in the day-ahead market.
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provide the possibility to react to such information by allowingmarket participants to
trade electricity close to physical delivery (in Germany, for example, until 45 minutes
before real time). This benefits the entities who have unbalanced positions and
gives additional profit opportunities to those market participants who can offer to
compensate for these imbalances.
Although intraday trading allows the update of day-ahead allocations subject
to new information, small deviations will nevertheless arise until physical delivery.
These mismatches between supply and demand generally require instant response
and are therefore not managed by trading via a power exchange. To counteract such
real-time deviations, prequalified power generators are committed to providing bal-
ancing services by adjusting their electricity output in order to allow stable operation
of the electricity network. For more information on the design and the operational
procedures of electricity markets, see Sioshansi (2008), Cochran et al. (2013), and
Hiroux and Saguan (2010).
3.2 The design of intradaymarkets
3.2.1 Auctions and their characteristics
An auction can be understood as a mechanism to exchange goods for money. The
characteristics of the mechanism for organising this exchange determine the type
of auction. For example, an open ascending-bid auction (“English auction”) allows
participants to openly submit bids for buying goods from a seller (for more informa-
tion see Milgrom, 2004; Klemperer, 1999). If no participant is willing to bid above
the highest price submitted so far, the auction ends and the goods are allocated to
the auction participant with the highest bid and thus the highest willingness to pay
(WTP). In contrast, the second-price sealed-bid auction (“Vickrey auction”) requires
that all bidders submit sealed bids simultaneously. The bidder who submitted the
highest bid wins the auction but does not pay his or her own but the second-highest
submitted bid for acquiring the goods. Both the English auction and the Vickrey
auction are one-sided auctions because there is a single seller and multiple buyers
competing against each other.
Day-ahead and intraday markets for electricity are organised as double auctions
since they allowbuyers and sellers to submit offers.4Double auctions canbe classified
as auctions with periodic or continuous clearing (Madhavan, 1992). Periodic auctions
typically rely on institutional trade determination and price setting. In the case of
electricity, this means that buyers and sellers submit offers to a power exchange.
The power exchange then determines which offers are successful and finds the price
at which transactions clear. To facilitate this institutional clearing process, periodic
double auctions are typically based on a uniform pricing rule (Parsons et al., 2008).
Hence, the power exchange uses the submitted asks to construct a supply curve
4Note that in this thesis, the term “offer” is used as a hypernym for “bid” and “ask”.
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and the submitted bids to find a demand curve for electricity. The intersection of
both curves determines the allocation of quantities as well as the uniform clearing
price; the quantities to the left of the intersection point are sold by the sellers to the
buyers at the clearing price (compare Fig. 2.3). Such discrete, uniform-price double
auctions constitute all major day-ahead markets but only few intraday markets
in Europe. In contrast to periodic auctions, continuous double auctions (CDAs)
generally rely on non-institutional trade determination and price setting. Hence,
market participants themselves are responsible for deciding which quantities are
traded at which price. Because there is no uniform pricing rule, a continuous double
auction is a discriminatory price auction (see Wurman et al., 1998).5 As this thesis is
concerned with intraday markets that are organised as continuous double auctions,
the following section discusses the design and functionality of these types of markets
in more detail.
3.2.2 Intradaymarkets as continuous double auctions
An intraday market organised as a continuous double auction delegates the clearing
process to the market participants. Hence, the power exchange needs to provide a
framework which gives information to the participants and allows them to engage
in transactions with each other. This framework is the “open order book”. As Fig. 3.2
shows, the open order book has a side where bids (buy offers) are collected and a side
where asks (sell offers) are collected. Market participants can thus submit offers to
the order book by specifying a quantity and a limit price. The limit price is either the
indicated maximum willingness to pay (bid) or the minimum willingness to accept
(ask) for each unit (megawatt hour) of the specified quantity. On the left-hand side of
the order book illustrated in Fig. 3.2, bids are sorted in descending order with respect
to their limit price. The right-hand side sorts the asks in ascending order. This means
that the current “best offers” are positioned at the top of the order book. If two or
more offers have the same limit price, their rank is decided by the time the order was
submitted (older first). Note that in the depicted order book, the highest limit bid
price is below the lowest limit ask price. The indicated willingness to pay of the buyer
is therefore not sufficiently high to engage a seller in a transaction. The magnitude of
this discrepancy between the prices at the top of the order book is measured with the
bid-ask-spread (compare Huang and Stoll, 1997).
Let us now assume that a seller submits an ask to sell 30MWh at a limit price
of e37.5/MWh. To follow the reaction of the order book illustrated in Fig. 3.2, note
that the limit price of the submitted ask is lower than the limit price of the two
best available bids. Furthermore, their combined quantity (25MWh) is lower than
the quantity of the submitted ask. As a consequence, the incoming sell offer can be
matched against the two bids, which are fully satisfied. Because only 25MWh of the
5Continuous double auctions are frequently applied in the financial sector (e. g. at the New York
Stock Exchange). In fact, they can be considered the most relevant market institution for the trading of
equities, commodities, and derivatives (Das et al., 2001).
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submitted 30MWhare sold, the remaining fivemegawatt hours are stored in the order
book. Since the submitted price of e37.5/MWh is lower than the limit prices of the
existing asks, the offer is positioned at the top of the order book.
Several possibilities exist to determine the clearing prices in a continuous double
auction. For example, the price at which two orders are matched can be found with
kpbid + (1−k)pask ,
where pbid is the bid price, pask is the ask price, and k can be chosen between
zero and one (see Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) for more information and
the implications of this price-setting rule). In intraday markets for electricity, it is
common to clear a transaction at the price of the offer first stored in the order book.
For the presented example, this means that the market participant sells 15MWh for
e40/MWh and 10MWh for e38/MWh. Hence, the buyers “pay as bid” and the seller
receives a higher price than the indicated minimum willingness to accept specified
by the limit price.
Figure 3.2: Simplified illustration of an open order book. The left-hand side contains bids
sorted in descending order with respect to their limit price. The right-hand side of the order
book contains the submitted asks sorted in ascending order.
Continuous intraday markets allow participants to use limit orders with different
execution restrictions. For example, it can be specified that non-executed parts of
an order are not stored in the order book. In the presented example, we would
have the same transactions but the remaining five megawatt hours would be deleted
immediately. Another example is that market participants can use the restriction that
orders are only executed if the specified quantity can be traded entirely.Whereas limit
orders require the specification of a limit price, there is no such need when trading
with market orders. Therefore, a market order trades a chosen quantity at the best
available prices in the order book. Although common in the financial sector, most
intradaymarkets for electricity do not offer the possibility to trade withmarket orders.
Note, however, that a limit order can be specified in such a way that it is equivalent to
a market order.
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3.2.3 Cross-border trading in continuous intradaymarkets
Market coupling refers to the integration of electricity markets by allowing transac-
tions between entities from different market areas. It is thus an important instrument
for increasing economic efficiency (seeMeeus et al., 2009; Hobbs et al., 2005). To allow
cross-border trading in continuous intraday markets, three fundamental require-
ments have to be met. First, there needs to be an adequate amount of transmission
capacity between the market regions. Second, a mechanismmust exist for allocating
this transmission capacity. Third, the infrastructure behind the order bookmust have
the capability to include offers from different market regions subject to the currently
available transmission capacity.
Figure 3.3: Simplified illustration of the mechanism for intraday implicit capacity allocation
(based on ENTSO-E, 2012).
The “implicit continuous capacity allocation method” is a well-suited approach
to respond to these requirements. It is the method preferred by power exchanges
operating continuous markets and has also been proposed for creating an integrated
European intraday market (ENTSO-E, 2012). Fig. 3.3 illustrates the workings of a
system which makes use of implicit continuous capacity allocation by showing the
interactions of itsmain elements. The central parts are the “SharedOrder Book” (SOB)
and the “Capacity Management Module” (CMM). The SOB builds the connection
between the order books of the involved power exchanges or market areas. The CMM
is managed by the involved Transmission System Operators (TSOs) as they use it to
announce the available transmission capacity. If a trader submits an order to the order
book in market area A (OOB-A), the SOB module recognises this activity and checks
the available transmission capacity via the CMM. Given that this capacity is sufficient
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to allow a cross-border transaction, the order is also shown in the open order book
in market area B (OOB-B). After each trade across market areas, the transmission
capacity available for intraday trades is updated; it decreases in the direction of
the transaction and increases for trades in the opposite direction. This interaction
between the Shared Order Book and the Capacity Management Module is instant. If
an order fromOOB-A is shown inOOB-B and the required transmission capacity is no
longer available, the order disappears in OOB-B. If a TSO releases more transmission
capacity, the interactions between the CMM and the SOB make the resulting cross-
border trading opportunities available to the market areas.
3.3 Intradaymarkets in Europe
3.3.1 The intradaymarket in Spain (OMIE)
OMI-Polo Español S.A. (OMIE) operates the intraday market for Spain and Portugal.
The process of matching the needs of buyers and sellers is organised not as a
continuous double auction with discriminatory pricing, but as multiple uniform-
price double auctions (for more information see OMIE, 2014a). This means that the
power exchange calculates supply and demand curves for each hour based on the
market participants’ offers. The intersection point of both curves determines the
hourly uniform clearing price and the allocation of quantities.
Figure 3.4: Volumes and prices from the Spanish intraday market. Data from OMIE (2014b).
The intradaymarket started operation in 1998 and allows the trading of electricity
at six auction sessions per day. The first session opens at 5p.m. and closes at 6:45p.m.
Within this time frame, market participants can submit offers to trade electricity for
27hours (from 9p.m. to midnight of the next day). As the last hour of the next day
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comes closer with every session, the sixth session opening at noon covers only nine
auctions (for the hours from 3p.m. to midnight).
Fig. 3.4 shows the traded volumes and the average market prices for the Spanish
intraday market. The market is relatively liquid as the volume amounts to approx. 20
percent of the volume traded on the day-ahead market (OMIE, 2014b). This shows
that market participants have a relevant need for adjusting their positions after
the day-ahead auction. As the installed capacity of weather-dependent renewables
amounted to 29.5GW in 2013 (ENTSO-E, 2014c), an important determinant of this
need should relate to balancing the uncertain feed-in from renewables. Nevertheless,
the day-ahead market must be considered the reference market and the average
intraday market price shown in Fig. 3.4 is very similar to the corresponding average
price of the day-ahead auction. For more detailed insights into the Spanish intraday
market, see Chaves-Ávila and Fernandes (2015).
3.3.2 The intradaymarket in Scandinavia (Nord Pool Spot)
Nord Pool Spot AS, which is owned by Nordic and Baltic Transmission System
Operators, manages the intraday market “Elbas” (Electricity Balance Adjustment
System). Elbas covers the Nordic region except Iceland (Denmark, Finland, Norway,
and Sweden), the Baltic region (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and Germany (for
more detailed information see Nord Pool Spot, 2014b).6 The intraday market is
organised as a continuous double auction. That is, market participants can trade
electricity continuously by submitting limit orders to an open order book. Limit
orders can be specified as “Fill” or “All-or-Nothing” (for more information see Nord
Pool Spot, 2013, 2012).Whereas a Fill-order allows partial execution, the classification
“All-or-Nothing” only results in a transaction if the entire volume can be traded.
In the order book, the bids and asks are sorted with respect to the limit price. If
two or more orders have the same price, they are ranked according to their time
stamp (oldest first). The price of a transaction is determined by the limit price of
the order first stored in the book. Regarding the connection of market areas, Elbas
allows implicit cross-border trading. As explained in Sect. 3.2.3, this implies the
existence of a Capacity Management Module and a Shared Order Book. Hence, the
available transmission capacity between market areas, which is updated after every
transaction, determines whether a submitted order is also shown in the books of
connected market regions.
Although Elbas covers many countries, the trading volume is relatively low
(3.2TWh in 2012 and 4.2TWh in 2013), especially in comparison to Nord Pool Spot’s
day-ahead market “Elspot” where 349TWh were traded in 2013 (Nord Pool Spot,
2014a). One plausible reason is that weather-dependent renewables do not play a
significant role in the core countries covered by Elbas. In 2013, the combined capacity
of wind turbines and photovoltaic installations in Denmark, Finland, Norway,
6The Elbas trading system is furthermore used by Belpex and APX to operate the intraday markets
in Belgium and the Netherlands.
18
3.3. INTRADAY MARKETS IN EUROPE
Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania amounted to 11.3GW; for comparison, the
capacity in Germany was nearly 71GW (ENTSO-E, 2014c).
3.3.3 The intradaymarket in Germany (EPEX SPOT)
EPEX SPOT SE was founded in 2008 to merge the spot market activities of EEX AG
(Germany) and Powernext SA (France).7 Themarket area comprises Germany, France,
Austria, and Switzerland and is embedded into price coupling with North-Western
and South-Western Europe. EPEX SPOT operates a day-ahead as well as an intraday
market. The day-ahead auction is a uniform-price double auction, takes place at noon
(11 a.m. in Switzerland) and allocates quantities to buyers and sellers for every hour
of the following day.
Figure 3.5: Intraday trade volumes, average intraday prices, and average day-ahead prices
from the German electricity market. Data from EPEX SPOT (2014); EEX (2014c).
The intraday market, which is organised as a continuous double auction, opens
at 3p.m. and thus gives market participants the possibility to adjust their day-ahead
position from shortly after the day-ahead auction to close before physical delivery.
The lead time between the closure of the intraday market and physical delivery was
reduced from 75minutes to 45minutes in 2011 for the intraday markets in Germany
and France. These two markets were complemented by continuous intraday markets
in Austria in 2012 and Switzerland in 2013 (both with 75 minutes lead time). EPEX
SPOT uses implicit intraday trading to manage cross-border trades between market
regions. The interactions between the Capacity Management Module and the Shared
Order Book hence enable a connection to be established between the order books
7The intraday market was established in September 2006 under the responsibility of EEX AG.
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of different market regions. This means, for example, that an order submitted in
the German market becomes visible in the order book of the French market if the
available transmission capacity allows this trade.
In Germany and Switzerland, market participants can not only trade single
hours (and blocks of hours) but also quarter-hours. These 15-minute contracts were
introduced in December 2011 to provide more flexibility in responding to the feed-in
of renewables. This is especially relevant for photovoltaic installations as their output
can increase or decrease significantly during an hour.
Figure 3.6: Comparison of the average price of the 100 lowest-price hours and the average
price of the 100 highest-price hours. Data from EPEX SPOT (2014); EEX (2014c).
To interact with the open order book, market participants can use limit orders
and market sweep orders. A market sweep order is a block order which is matched
with one-hour contracts and is executed immediately as far as possible. Limit orders
can be submitted with execution restrictions “All-or-None” (AON), “Immediate-or-
Cancel” (IOC), “Fill-or-Kill” (FOK), or “Iceberg”. The AON restriction prevents partial
execution of an order. This means that the offer remains in the order book until the
specified quantity can be matched entirely or until it is cancelled by the trader. An
IOC order is either executed immediately or deleted immediately. This implies that
the order, or a part of it, are not stored in the book. Specifying a limit order with “Fill-
or-Kill” requires that the order has to be matched entirely and immediately. If these
two conditions cannot be fulfilled, it is immediately cancelled and thus not stored in
the order book. Note that a limit order with the restriction “IOC” or “FOK” combined
with a very high bid price or a very low ask price can be considered equivalent to
a buy or sell market order. An Iceberg order divides the total quantity into smaller
orders. These smaller orders are entered in the order book successively until the entire
quantity is traded.
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Fig. 3.5 presents the intraday trade volume, the average intradaymarket price, and
the average day-ahead price for various years and shows that the traded quantity
has increased significantly since 2010 (from 9.9TWh to 25.2TWh in 2013). One
important reason is that, in the same time frame, the total installed capacity of
weather-dependent renewables in France and Germany increased from 49.6GW to
83.5GW (ENTSO-E, 2014c). The higher feed-in resulting from this increase not only
induced higher intraday market activity. As illustrated in Fig. 3.5, the average day-
ahead price level decreased from e44.5/MWh in 2010 to e37.8/MWh in 2013. This
is especially due to the merit order effect discussed in Sect. 2.2; the feed-in from
renewables crowds out thermal power plants so that the clearing price is set by a
generator with lower per-unit costs of production. Fig. 3.5 furthermore shows that the
average intraday market price is very close to the average day-ahead price. This is
not surprising as the day-ahead auction can be considered the reference market—in
2013, the trading volume for themarket area “Germany/Austria” was 245.6TWh (EEX,
2014c)—and relatively small price deviations between the two markets average out
over the time frame of one year.
Figure 3.7: Intradaymarket prices for each hour of 1st December 2013. “Intraday price” refers
to the volume-weighted average intraday market price. “Intraday price low” is the clearing
price of the transaction with the lowest price and “Intraday price high” is the clearing price of
the transaction with the highest price. Data from EPEX SPOT (2014); EEX (2014c).
However, Fig. 3.6 shows that intraday market prices can be clearly distinguished
from day-ahead prices if we compare the average price of the 100 hours with the
lowest or the average price of the 100 hours with the highest price. The activity
in the intraday market results in more prices which are further away from the
yearly average. This reflects the fact that the standard deviation of the intraday
price time series is higher (ID2010: e17.05/MWh, DA2010: e13.97/MWh; ID2013:
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e17.98/MWh, DA2013:e16.46/MWh). Furthermore, the hourly intraday prices used
for the preceding analysis are hourly, volume-weighted average prices. This means
that the clearing price of transactions can deviate significantly from this average as
well as from the day-ahead price. Although the characteristics of individual market
transactions are not publicly available, EPEX SPOT publishes the lowest and the
highest price of a transaction along with the volume-weighted average for each hour
of the year (see Fig. 3.7). The following chapters will help to give an understanding of
how these deviations can be explained with the uncertain feed-in from renewables.
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Related literature and contribution
This chapter first discusses literature on continuous double auctions in two parts
(Sect. 4.1). The first part focuses on the modelling of limit order books and distin-
guishes equilibrium models from stochastic models of order book dynamics. The
secondpart introduces relevantworks onbuilding and analysing trading strategies for
participation in CDAs. The chapter then continues with the literature on (continuous)
intradaymarkets for electricity (Sect. 4.2) andhighlights the contribution of this thesis
in Sect. 4.3.
4.1 Research on continuous double auctions
4.1.1 Modelling limit order books
Due to the complexity of capturing the most relevant aspects of continuous double
auctions in one type ofmodel, existing theoretical research on limit order books splits
into two general approaches.
The first line of research uses equilibrium models for describing how the in-
teraction of market agents determines the formation of prices. Parlour (1998), for
example, presented a model where each agent knows that its market activity affects
the trading strategy of all other agents. The analysis shows that, in equilibrium, this
strategic feedback can result in systematic price patterns (e. g. prices of successive
transactions are positively correlated). Foucault et al. (2005) presented an equilibrium
model which considers the level of impatience of market agents to analyse the
decision about whether to place a limit order or a market order. They found that
patient traders, compared to impatient ones, are more likely to submit limit orders
and that the proportion of patient traders in the population strongly influences the
dynamic of the order book. Similar to Parlour (1998) and Foucault et al. (2005), Ros¸u
(2009) proposed a model where agents can choose between limit and market orders,
but furthermore have the possibility to modify or cancel submitted limit orders. He
showed that introducing this complication simplifies finding the equilibrium as the
agents’ ability to modify limit orders allows better anticipation of their behaviour.
Ros¸u (2009) concluded inter alia that the instantaneous price impact induced by
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market orders is larger than the permanent one. The main disadvantage of using
agents’ order placement strategies to gain insights into continuous double auctions
is that the characteristics of these agents are not known. Due to such unobservable
parameters in equilibrium models, the first line of research gives only incomplete
insights into the statistical properties of limit order books (Luckock, 2003).
The second line of research can perform better in this respect by using stochastic
models of order book dynamics to analyse continuous double auctions. This ap-
proach does not aim at formulating the behaviour of each agent, but assumes that the
combined activity of all market participants drives the evolution of the order book. As
a consequence, most of the models make use of queueing techniques. For example,
Cont et al. (2010) used independent Poisson processes to describe the occurrences of
limit and market orders as well as the cancellations of orders. As their model is built
entirely around observable quantities, themodel’s parameters can be estimated from
empirical data. Luckock (2003) also used Poisson processes to model the arrival of
new orders. Given the assumption that these arrivals are independent of the state of
the order book, he computed stationary distributions for the best bid and ask prices.
The model shows that these prices lie within a “competitive window” outside which
low-priced bids and high-priced asks accumulate. Luckock (2003) concluded that
continuous double auctions would be driven by both the adjustment forces between
supply and demand and the flow of new information relevant for these figures.
4.1.2 Modelling trading strategies
Research on continuous double auctions inherently requires some sort of representa-
tion of howmarket participants interact with the order book. Yet the studies discussed
in the following do not primarily use this representation to analyse limit order books,
but to evaluate how these strategies perform in the market. Since there is no known
dominant strategy for participating in a CDA, researchersmainly focus on developing
heuristics and algorithms to build and analyse trading strategies (Vytelingum et al.,
2008).
Gode and Sunder (1993) presented experiments where machine traders with
“zero intelligence” participated in a continuous double auction. These programs do
not observe market information, cannot learn from past trades, and do not seek
to maximise profits. That is, their bids and asks are generated randomly by using
a uniform distribution over a specified range of trading prices. However, a budget
constraint was used to ensure that they do not trade at a loss. The agents transact
when the price of an incoming bid is higher than the price of an existing ask or
an incoming ask price is lower than an existing bid price. Gode and Sunder (1993)
compared themarket results of themachine traders with the results of human traders
to assess the relevance of intelligence and profit motivation. As the performance
of zero-intelligence traders was very similar to the performance of human traders,
they concluded that “the primary cause of the high allocative efficiency of double
auctions is the market discipline imposed on traders; learning, intelligence, or profit
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motivation is not necessary” (p. 134). Cliff andBruten (1997) challenged the generality
of this assertion. They showed that the shape of the supply and demand curves signif-
icantly influences the market outcomes of the zero-intelligence traders considered
by Gode and Sunder (1993). Given that supply and demand are asymmetric (e. g.
downward sloping demand and flat supply curve), the analysis by Cliff and Bruten
(1997) revealed that the average price of the machine traders’ transactions deviate
from the theoretical equilibrium price. Because the magnitude of this deviation
can be calculated a priori, they attributed the high allocative efficiency of zero-
intelligence traders to the specific design of the experiment by Gode and Sunder
(1993). To show that informed decision making indeed matters in continuous double
auctions, Cliff and Bruten (1997) proposed “zero-intelligence-plus” traders. These
traders also submit stochastic bid and ask prices but have the ability to react tomarket
price information by adjusting their profit margins. If a machine seller, for example,
observes that its last transaction would have been successful even at a higher ask
price, the seller increases the profit margin by raising its next offer price. The agents
that use such an adaptation process outperform zero-intelligence traders as their
activity is more likely to converge to an equilibrium, responds better to changes in
supply or demand, and is closer to the activity of human traders.
Compared to the strategy of zero-intelligence-plus traders presented by Cliff and
Bruten (1997), Gjerstad and Dickhaut (1998) proposed an approach to model the
behaviour of machine traders more explicitly. Based on observed market activity—
frequencies of accepted and rejected bids and asks—they formulated belief functions.
These functions give the probability that an offer will be acceptable to another
market participant and allow agents to submit orders whichmaximise their expected
profit. Gjerstad and Dickhaut (1998) showed that a trading strategy which is based
on forming beliefs regarding the likelihood of a successful transaction allows quick
responses to changes in supply and demand and, not surprisingly, outperforms a
zero-intelligence strategy.
More recently, Vytelingumet al. (2008) presented a trading strategy for continuous
double auctions which considers both short-term and long-term learning. After an
order appears in the market, the short-term learning adjusts the “aggressiveness” of
the agent’s trading behaviour. The level of aggressiveness determines the trade-off
between profit and risk; according to the definition of Vytelingum et al. (2008), an
aggressive trading agent focuses on transacting with a high probability, whereas a
trader adopting a passive strategy submits more risky offers to earn higher profits.
The long-term learning responds to the volatility of transaction prices and adjusts the
rule which governs how the level of aggressiveness determines the submitted offers.
This approach thus allows adaptation to rapid market fluctuations as well as to more
fundamental changes in the market environment. Vytelingum et al. (2008) showed
that this ability outperforms the zero-intelligence-plus strategy proposed by Cliff and
Bruten (1997) as well as a trading strategy based on the belief functions of Gjerstad
and Dickhaut (1998) in both static and dynamic market conditions. Despite this
relative superiority, the three strategies performed similarly as all of them achieved
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a market efficiency close to 100 percent.1 However, Vytelingum et al. (2008, p. 1703)
noted with reference to the financial sector that “in real markets, [...] fine-tuning is
today’s norm in a very competitive environment where improvements of the order of
0.01% are highly desirable.”
4.2 Research on intradaymarkets for electricity
4.2.1 Market design
Aspects of the structure and operation of intraday markets are often discussed in the
context of the general design of electricity markets with a high share of renewable en-
ergy sources (compare Newbery, 2012; Borggrefe and Neuhoff, 2011). Smeers (2008),
for example, argued that the time horizons “day-ahead”, “intraday”, and “real-time”
should be different steps of a single trading process. Intraday markets should hence
be designed compatibly to day-ahead markets—especially regarding the handling of
transmission property rights—because arbitrage between these two markets would
otherwise be prevented. More generally, Smeers (2008, p. 3) highlighted that:
The common view in Europe is that day-ahead, possibly extended to
intra-day, but not real-time, are the appropriate periods for trading. Still,
there are compelling physical and economic reasons for considering
real-time as an effective trading period. The physical reason is that
electricity is not storable and that real-time is the only moment when the
commodity effectively flows from producers to consumers.
In contrast, Weber (2010) stated that an efficient market design should favour the
intraday market over real-time balancing to perform adjustments of the electricity
generation. The reason for the different perceptions of the authors seems to relate to
the characteristics of the power plants that participate in a real-timemarket. Whereas
Weber (2010, p. 3158) argued that “[...] the use of more expensive flexible resources
in real-time balancing” should be avoided, Smeers (2008, p. 57) emphasised that
“there is certainly no economic reason for making balancing more expensive than its
marginal cost and hence for discouraging procuring electricity in real-time.” In this
context, Vandezande et al. (2010) discussed the interactions between intraday and
balancing markets and highlighted the importance of fully cost-reflective imbalance
prices. If these prices are too low, there would be a stronger incentive to rely on
balancing services and a weaker incentive to trade in the intraday market. The work
by Vandezande et al. (2010) thus supports the perception that the intraday market
should be the preferable instrument for correcting imbalances.
1Following the definition by Vytelingum et al. (2008), a market efficiency of 100 percent means
that the market participants’ surplus from participating in a CDA is identical to the maximum possible
surplus that would result from an allocation where their profits are maximised.
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4.2.2 Trading strategies
Research on trading strategies in the context of intraday markets focuses on optimal
offer decisions for wind power producers (compare Moreno et al., 2012; Usaola
and Angarita, 2007; Morales et al., 2010; Pinson et al., 2007). Such strategies are
especially determined by the available wind output, day-ahead, and intraday, as
well as imbalance prices. Hence, models deriving offer strategies for wind power
producers need to represent expectations regarding these uncertain parameters.
In terms of forecasting wind generation, Pinson et al. (2007) highlighted that
information on the uncertainty of point predictions—in the form of probabilistic
forecasts—affects optimal trading strategies. Wind power producers may not offer
expected wind production but a quantile of the distribution of their output. The
quantile which maximises revenue would be a function of spot and imbalance prices
(Zugno et al., 2013). In this context, Moreno et al. (2012) gave further insights in a
case study for the Spanish electricity market. They derived optimal offer strategies
in the intraday market for a wind power producer using deterministic forecasts for
intraday prices and probabilistic forecasting techniques for wind output as well as
imbalance prices. By comparing the optimal strategy to a strategy based on point
forecasts, Moreno et al. (2012) showed that total revenue for the wind power producer
increased. They concluded from this comparison that the wind power producer can
have incentives for placing offers strategically—sellingmore energy than forecasted in
the intradaymarket can increase revenue, although costs formaking use of balancing
services are higher.
Garnier and Madlener (2014) combined option valuation techniques and dy-
namic programming to model balancing decisions of an agent correcting forecast
errors in a continuous intraday market. Their model allows solving the trade-off
between trading early in order to benefit fromhighermarket liquidity and postponing
trades to make use of more accurate forecasts. Garnier and Madlener (2014) con-
cluded that high price volatility would favour early trading and high forecast volatility
should be counteracted by balancing forecast errors closer to real time.
4.2.3 Modelling intradaymarkets
The modelling of intraday markets for electricity predominantly rests on math-
ematical optimisation methods. These optimisation models typically draw on the
use of a “rolling planning procedure” (see Zipf and Möst, 2013; Barth et al., 2006).
Such an approach organises the interactions between a day-ahead market model
and a representation of an intraday market by allowing the sequential clearing of
both markets. More specifically, the day-ahead market model determines the unit
commitment and the dispatch of power plants for the 24 hours of the following
day.2 The intraday model is then applied for each of these hours to perform a re-
2Whereas the term “unit commitment” refers to the decision as to which power plant is committed
to produce, the dispatch determines the specific level of output each committed plant has to deliver.
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dispatch while considering the state of the power system as given by the day-ahead
model. The intraday adjustment of the electricity production is the consequence of
modelled demand uncertainty or uncertainty in terms of the feed-in from renewables.
At a predefined time step within the clearing process of the intraday market that
corresponds to the gate closure of the day-ahead market, the current state of the
power system is forwarded to the day-ahead model. Given this information, the day-
ahead market model is solved for the 24 hours of the next day. This procedure is
repeated accordingly.
Barth et al. (2006) applied a rolling planning procedure for a stochastic unit-
commitment model that includes a day-ahead and an intraday market, as well as
mechanisms for providing reserve power. Stochasticity is introduced by a scenario
tree which considers three stages and allows adjustment of electricity generation to
suit the changing wind feed-in. More recently, Abrell and Kunz (2012) implemented
a rolling planning procedure in a stochastic electricity market model that takes the
characteristics of a physical transmission network into account. By applying the
model to the German power system, Abrell and Kunz (2012) showed how a stochastic
wind feed-in affects the intraday market; instead of using more flexible gas-fired
power plants, the forecast error is mainly balanced by the commitment of coal-fired
power stations that operate at partial load.
So far, the focus of existing research with mathematical optimisation models
has been more on incorporating the “technical” complexities of power systems
rather than on accurately representing the design of a continuous double auction.
Only recently have the characteristics of continuous intraday markets and their
consequences been discussed more explicitly.
Henriot (2014) proposed an analytical model to analyse intraday markets in
general and in particular the trading strategies of an agent that balances wind power
forecast errors. This wind power manager was given the option of adopting either
a passive or an active strategy. The passive strategy implies that the agent does not
participate in the intradaymarket. As a consequence, the difference between the day-
ahead forecasted wind production and the actual feed-in has to be compensated
by making use of balancing services, which is costly for the wind power manager.
Adopting the active trading strategy induces the agent to directly respond to short-
term forecasts regarding the expected wind production at real time. Hence, the
wind power manager trades electricity at each considered trading opportunity in the
intraday market to correct for the current imbalance. Henriot (2014) found that the
decision about which type of strategy to use depends on the extent to which the
power plant portfolio loses flexibility when real time approaches, as well as on the
evolution of the forecast error. Therefore, situations could exist where the passive
strategy is beneficial to an active participation in the intraday market. Henriot (2014)
furthermore assessed the relevance of the flexibility to trade electricity continuously
and concluded that discrete double auctions would lead to lost trading opportunities
and hence inefficiencies.
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Hagemann and Weber (2013) empirically analysed liquidity provision in the
German intradaymarket. To do so, they proposed two different frameworks to explain
the trading in continuous intradaymarkets and thus the level of market liquidity. The
first framework assumes that power plants offer their flexibility at marginal costs and
that market participants with imbalances only trade with market orders due to their
risk-aversion. Hence, traders with imbalances consume the liquidity provided by the
power plants. For the second framework, they assumed that all agents aim at profit
maximisation. As a consequence, power plants do not necessarily offer marginal
costs and traders with imbalances also use limit orders. Hagemann andWeber (2013)
proposed various hypothesis testable with data from the German electricity market
to assess which of the two frameworks can better explain the provision of liquidity.
They found that this is the case for the framework where traders focus on profit
maximisation and concluded that the market participants’ trading preferences—e. g.
whether or not they balance forecast errors within their own portfolios—have a
significant impact on liquidity in the German intraday market.
Using a similar approach as in Hagemann and Weber (2013), Hagemann (2013)
analysed determinants of the volume-weighted average price on theGerman intraday
market. He considered forecast errors from weather-dependent renewables, power
plant outages, and the possibility of cross-border trading. Hagemann (2013) found
that wind power forecast errors have a higher impact on the average price compared
to imbalances stemming from photovoltaic installations. One important reason is
that wind power forecast errors also arise in off-peak hours (from 8p.m. to 8 a.m.)
where the market liquidity is lower so that correcting for imbalances can be more
costly.
4.3 Contribution to the literature
Despite the highly valuable insights of theoretical, empirical, and experimental re-
search on continuous double auctions, some of which were outlined in this chapter,
three main aspects lead to the necessity of addressing continuous intraday markets
explicitly. First, given a power systemwith a large share of weather-dependent renew-
able energy sources, responding to their uncertain output constitutes a dominant
market force. This means that information about the direction and magnitude of the
forecast error can help to explain and predictmarket results. Second, the behaviour of
market participants is substantially determined by their technical characteristics. For
example, a power generator will generally not sell an additional unit of output below
themarginal costs of producing it. As thermal power plants use different types of fuels,
per-unit costs of production differ between themand thus allow informedpredictions
to bemade regarding their price-setting decisions. Third, a close connection between
different types of electricity markets exists. Information revealed in the day-ahead
market, for example, can help to explain the activity in the intraday market.
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Such “fundamental” specifics distinguish intraday markets for electricity dis-
tinctly from financial markets, for example, and therefore require different methodo-
logical approaches. Although recent research in the electricity context—in particular
by Hagemann and Weber (2013), Hagemann (2013), Henriot (2014), and Garnier
and Madlener (2014)—has recognised this fact, especially the understanding of the
relationship between continuous intraday markets and the uncertain feed-in from
renewables must be considered very incomplete. In this context, the superordinate
contribution of this thesis is to develop and to apply instruments for improving this
understanding while making use of the three specifics outlined previously.
More concretely, the first contribution is that Chap. 5 proposes a simple (non-
mathematical) model of a continuous intraday market in a power system with a high
share of renewables. The basic idea of the model is to use the day-ahead auction as
a reference framework for providing a very general representation of a continuous
market. This is relevant since an open order book gives all relevant information to
traders but is not well suited for fundamental market analyses. In the day-ahead
auction, in contrast, supply and demand curves, which are compiled by the energy
exchange, “represent” the market. These curves provide a familiar understanding of
its functioning and give a basic framework for analysing aspects of market structure
and price formation. In this context, the model makes it possible to avoid using the
open order book as a tool for market analyses and simplifies the evaluation of how
the uncertainty of renewables influences intraday transactions.
The second contribution, presented in Chap. 6, is to use the model of Chap. 5 for
evaluating how the integration of renewables can be improved in intraday markets.
Although most of the options to be discussed have been extensively studied, their
relevance for balancing forecast errors in continuous intraday markets has not been
explicitly addressed so far. The chapter explains, for example, how market coupling
and a more flexible power plant portfolio benefit intraday trading. Such an under-
standing is especially relevant for evaluating energy policy strategies that deal with
the cost-efficient integration of renewables.
The third contribution of this thesis is to provide a mathematical formalisation
of the price-setting decisions of power generators and electricity demanders that
participate in a continuous intraday market (Chap. 7). This formalisation includes
the analysis of the economic effects of output adjustments and the description of the
trade-off betweenprofit and risk inherent in continuous double auctions. The chapter
thus proposes instruments that help to model intraday markets quantitatively and
highlights the connection betweenmarket participants’ technical characteristics and
their market behaviour.
The fourth contribution, presented in Chap. 8, is a computer simulation of a
continuous intraday market for electricity. This simulation is based on the analytical
model in Chap. 5 and uses the mathematical formulations from Chap. 7. The focus
is to model the market participants’ opportunity to trade multiple times and to act
strategically in terms of pricing buy and sell offers. This is especially relevant as the
existing cost-minimising optimisation models for imaging intraday markets cannot
30
4.3. CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE
address these aspects. Implementing the simulation approach for the German power
system allows calculation of intraday market prices, the costs of balancing forecast
errors, and the impacts of different balancing profiles. Hence, the market simulation
captures the insights from the previous chapters to deepen the understanding of
continuous intraday markets for electricity.
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A simplemodel of a continuous intradaymarket
The idea of this chapter is to analyse continuous intraday markets by using the
day-ahead auction as a reference framework. To do so, we shall clarify the model’s
setup in Sect. 5.1, discuss the day-ahead market in more detail (Sect. 5.2), analyse
the price-setting decisions of market participants (Sect. 5.3), and give insights into
the possibility of trading multiple times in Sect. 5.4. The chapter closes by giving
empirical insights from the German electricity market (Sect. 5.5).
5.1 Setup and assumptions
The model considers a typical electricity market design with a day-ahead auction,
an intraday market, and the existence of balancing services. More specifically, a day-
ahead uniform-price double auction allocates quantities to bidders and sellers for
all hours of the following day. After this centralised clearing, continuous intraday
trading allows adjustment of the day-ahead positions before real time. This provides
the opportunity to react to new information concerning the feed-in from uncertain
renewables, for example.We shall consider a continuous double auctionwith an open
order book that allows limit orders (price-quantity bids or asks) as well as market
orders (quantity bids or asks executed at the best available price). The transaction
price is determined by the bid or ask first stored in the order book. The balancing
market is not explicitly considered because we shall assume that market participants
try to avoid making use of balancing services and therefore prefer to trade in the
intraday market.1
The model considers five types of agents. “Dispatched generators”, as opposed
to “non-dispatched generators”, are committed through the day-ahead auction to
producing their offered quantities. “Satisfied demanders”, as opposed to “unsatisfied
demanders”, obtain the quantities in the day-ahead market which are produced by
the dispatched generators. The fifth type of agent is an entity managing the uncertain
1While it is reasonable that agents prefer to participate in the intraday market rather than using
balancing energy, Möller et al. (2011) and van der Veen et al. (2012) showed that incentives to maintain
imbalances intentionally can exist.
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feed-in from weather-dependent energy sources. We shall call this agent “Central
Renewables Manager” (CRM). For simplicity, assume that it aggregates all renewable
producers and first balances forecast errors within the resulting portfolio internally.2
In the intraday market, the CRM wants to correct the remaining difference between
the portfolio’s day-ahead forecasted feed-in and the (most recent) expectation of the
actual delivered quantity.
Since we shall address a power systemwith a high share of renewables, themodel
neglects the influence of demand uncertainty and unforeseen outages of power
plants (for a discussion of these aspects see Weber, 2010). Therefore, assume that
the direction of the forecast error determines the transactions in the intraday market
between the CRM, the conventional generators, and the demanders as follows:
• If the output from renewables for a given hour in the futurewas underestimated,
the CRM needs to sell electricity for this hour in the intraday market. This
means that the generators can choose to replace parts of their own production
fixed in the day-ahead market with excess output from renewables. They
will hence reduce output and bid to buy corresponding quantities in the
intraday market. Unsatisfied demanders can buy electricity from the CRM in
the intraday market to obtain quantities not received in the day-ahead auction.
• If the output from renewables for a given hour in the future was overestimated,
the CRM needs to buy electricity for this hour in the intraday market. This
means that the non-dispatched generators can choose to increase output and
ask to sell electricity. As a consequence, they contribute to compensating the
difference between the forecasted and the delivered output from renewable
energy sources. Likewise, satisfied demanders can ask to sell quantities. This
implies that they withdraw from the purchase of (parts of) the quantities
obtained in the day-ahead auction.
Assume that these general dependencies are organised in the intraday market as
follows: The generators and demanders offer their flexibility via limit orders. They
hence place price-quantity bids and asks in the open order book. The CRM chooses
from these offers and prefers low over high prices in the case of buying and high over
low prices in the case of selling electricity. This corresponds to trading with market
orders where the specified quantity is traded at the best available prices in the order
book. Recall the definition that the offer first stored in the order book determines the
price of a transaction, as is the case at the European Power Exchange (EPEX SPOT),
2Although this is a strong assumption, it can to some extent be justified with the likely preference
of renewable producers to build large portfolios managed by only a few entities to first settle forecast
errors internally.
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for example. This means that under this setup, the generators and demanders set the
transaction price and incorporate this into their price-setting decision (pay-as-bid).3
5.2 The day-ahead auction as a reference framework
Fig. 5.1 shows stylised supply and demand curves for electricity in the day-ahead
auction for a given hour. In simple terms, the supply curve, or merit order, is
generated by ranking the price-quantity offers from power generators in ascending
order. Hence, generators with low per-unit costs (base-load plants such as nuclear or
lignite power stations) are typically positioned at the beginning of the merit order.
Mid-load power plants then follow before peak-load generators (e. g. gas and oil
turbines) with high per-unit costs step in.
Figure 5.1: Results of the day-ahead auction for a given hour. “Dispatched generators”,
as opposed to “non-dispatched generators”, are committed through the day-ahead auction
to producing their offered quantities. “Satisfied demanders”, as opposed to “unsatisfied
demanders”, obtained quantities in the day-ahead market.
The bids from demanders of electricity are arranged to generate a demand curve
and the electricity price is determined by finding the intersection of the merit order
3Although the restriction that the CRM only trades with market orders is a strong assumption, it
should reflect the CRM’s trading behaviour: The CRM has a strong incentive to avoid making use of
balancing services. Hence, it should be more risk averse than market participants who can choose to
trade and whose primary incentive is to make profit. Furthermore, the CRM sells electricity generated
with zero marginal costs and thus has a very “permissive” willingness to pay and to accept. In contrast,
power generators have to burn fuel for producing electricity and hence have a much more restricted
range of acceptable transaction prices. Due to these aspects, generators as well as demanders should be
the more dominant force in determining the prices of transactions.
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and the demand curve. Thus, the uniform clearing price equals the offer price of
the generator that produces the last quantity necessary to satisfy demand. Since this
implies that the price paid or received does not directly depend on the price bid or
asked, the general assumption is that market participants offer their true valuation
under competition.4 Thismeans that generators ask their short-runmarginal costs of
production, and demanders bid their willingness to pay.
To utilise the day-ahead auction for analysing the intraday market, Fig. 5.1 char-
acterises the four types of agents in the auction. Generators which contribute to
covering demand are dispatched according to their offered quantities and earn
the day-ahead clearing price (“dispatched generators”). The producers with ask
prices above the clearing price are labelled “non-dispatched generators”. Likewise,
demanders are characterised as “satisfied” and “unsatisfied”.5 The following assumes
that these four types of agents participate in the intraday market.
5.3 Price-setting decisions in the intradaymarket
To simplify the analysis of intradaymarkets using the information revealed by the day-
ahead auction, Fig. 5.2 groups the types of agents that buy and the types of agents that
sell electricity in the intraday market. This means that the part of the demand curve
below the clearing price (unsatisfied demand) is rotated to the part of the merit order
constituted by the dispatched generators. Likewise, satisfied demanders are grouped
with non-dispatched generators.
To give insights into the price-setting decision in a continuous intraday market
based on Fig. 5.2, we shall distinguish between the “indifference offer price” and
the “optimal offer price”. A power generator or electricity demander submitting and
earning the indifference pricewould notmake a profit from the transaction. The price
would ensure indifference between adjusting the current position and remaining in
this position. It can be thought of as the true valuation of the electricity bought or sold.
However, themarket participants do not just want to be indifferent, they want to earn
additional profit. In this context, the profit-maximising strategy can be understood
as a decision about a trade-off: In the case of buying intraday, moving closer to the
bid price that would ensure indifference reduces potential profits but increases the
likelihood of a successful transaction. In the case of selling intraday, moving away
from the indifference ask price increases potential profits but lowers the likelihood
of a successful transaction. This means that in a competitive, continuous intraday
4Cramton (2004) criticised the generality of this assumption and argued that offering above
marginal costs can reflect non-manipulative, profit-maximising behaviour in competitive wholesale
electricity markets. Moreover, see Möst and Genoese (2009) and Weigt and von Hirschhausen (2008)
for analyses of market power in electricity markets.
5It would be more precise to speak of dispatched/non-dispatched generation and satisfied/unsatis-
fied demand; we shall neglect this for ease of argumentation.
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market, power generators and electricity demanders bid below their true valuation
for quantities they buy and ask above their true valuation for quantities they sell.6
Figure 5.2: Framework for analysing intraday markets. An underestimation of the feed-
in from renewables requires selling the overproduction. In the case of an overestimation,
balancing the forecast error requires buying missing quantities in the intraday market.
Using these insights together with the general setup of themodel, we can see from
Fig. 5.2 that in terms of an underestimation of the output from renewables the CRM
sells electricity, and the agents to the left of Q∗ bid to buy quantities in the intraday
market. To make a profit from such a transaction, they have to bid below their day-
ahead offer price as indicated by the arrows in Fig. 5.2 for one dispatched generator
and one unsatisfied demander. By offering to buy at low prices, the generator can
obtain the corresponding quantities more cheaply than through self-production.
Similarly, the demander profits frombuying electricity for prices below themaximum
willingness to pay. Regarding an overestimation of the production from renewables,
the agents to the right ofQ∗ profit frommisstating the true valuation of the quantities
they are selling (see Fig. 5.2). By asking above their indifference offer price (which
is close to the price of their unsuccessful day-ahead offer), the non-dispatched
generators not only cover their per-unit costs of production but also earn some profit.
Satisfied demanders at least want to get paid their true valuation in order to step back
from the quantities they obtained in the day-ahead market. Selling at a higher price
gives them additional profit.
6Note that placing strategic offers is not “objectionable” but a direct consequence of the design of a
continuous double auction. Indeed, Zhan and Friedman (2007) showed thatmark-ups andmark-downs
are important for the coordination in CDAs and contribute to efficient market outcomes.
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5.4 Continuous trading
So far, we have neglected the essential characteristic of continuous intraday markets,
namely that participants can trade electricity for a given hour in the future multiple
times. In the context of the model, the CRM may choose to respond to oscillating
short-term forecasts, for example.
Figure 5.3: Continuous trading illustrated with the help of ovals marking regions of potential
bid and ask prices. Market participants who bought (sold) quantities have the opportunity to
sell (buy) them back.
Given the current imbalance determined by the new information, the CRM will
then try to sell (present underestimation) or buy (present overestimation) electricity
for a given hour in the future. This activity implies that the generators and demanders
have the opportunity to adjust their intraday position as well.7 Day-ahead dispatched
generators and unsatisfied demanders which bought quantities from the CRM can
now try to sell electricity back to the CRM (see Fig. 5.3).8 They will aim at earning
additional profit over maintaining their position. Likewise, non-dispatched genera-
tors and satisfied demanders can try to buy back quantities from the CRM. As Fig. 5.3
7There is, of course, the possibility that generators and demanders trade with each other. However,
Fig. 5.3 indicates that the variety of such transactions should be limited. For example, the willingness to
accept of a generator not dispatched in the day-ahead auction is higher than the willingness to pay of a
dispatched generator because of their different per-unit costs of production.
8Note that in Fig. 5.3, the dashed oval marking the area of potential ask prices by dispatched
generators should, for example, be positioned above the solid oval (area of potential bids by these
generators) in order to respect a strict reference to the day-ahead offers. Fig. 5.3 groups bid and ask areas
solely for clarity in interpretation.
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indicates, they will place bid prices in an area below their true valuation to earn
additional profits. Because their willingness to pay is relatively high, they should be
able to outbid generators dispatched in the day-ahead auction.
5.5 Empirical insights
Fig. 5.3 indicates that the direction of the forecast error is a fundamental variable in
explaining transactions and their prices in a continuous intraday market. In the case
of an underestimation of the output from renewables, most transactions for a given
hour in the future should clear at prices which are lower than the corresponding
price of the day-ahead auction. In the case of an overestimation, the prices of most
transactions are expected to be higher than the clearing price of the day-ahead
auction. Fig. 5.3 illustrates the general dynamics behind the intuitive result that
higher supply reduces and higher demand increases intraday market prices.
Figure 5.4: Spread “day-ahead price – intraday price” subject to forecast error and residual
load from the German electricity market. Data from EEX (2014c); EPEX SPOT (2014); EEX
Transparency (2014).
To give first empirical insights in this respect, Fig. 5.4 shows the spread between
the day-ahead clearing price and the volume-weighted average price of the transac-
tions in the continuous intraday market for each hour in 2011, 2012, and 2013. This
spread is illustrated by a contour diagram subject to the forecast error and the residual
load. For this figure, the residual load is defined as the day-ahead trading volume
net of the day-ahead forecasted feed-in from renewables. The day-ahead prices refer
to the market area Germany/Austria (EEX, 2014c). The average intraday prices are
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from themarket area of Germany taking into account the connectionwith the French,
Austrian (since October 2012), and Swiss (since June 2013) market areas (EPEX SPOT,
2014). The residual loads and the forecast errors are from the German electricity
market (EEX, 2014c; EEX Transparency, 2014). Fig. 5.4 shows a separation between
positive and negative spreads. A significant underestimation predominantly results
in average hourly intraday prices which are lower than the corresponding clearing
prices of the day-ahead auction (positive spread). A significant overestimationmainly
results in negative spreads. This corresponds to the insights of the presented model
(compare Fig. 5.3) and shows that the direction of the forecast error is a key aspect in
understanding and potentially forecasting outcomes of continuous intraday markets.
Fig. 5.4 furthermore illustrates regions where the spread between the day-ahead
and the average intraday price is either very high or very low. As expected, very
high positive spreads (deep dark grey area: spreads higher than e20/MWh) can be
observed if there is the need to sell large amounts of overproduction from renewables.
Note, however, that low residual loads seem to make it more likely that the average
intraday price is substantially lower than the day-ahead clearing price. Sect. 6.3
will show that this can be explained with the inflexibility of the power generators
positioned at the beginning of the merit order. Spreads below negative e20/MWh
emerge if the feed-in from renewables is substantially lower than the expectation, so
that power generators and electricity demanders have to provide large amounts of
additional quantities.
Underestimation [GW] 2–4 4–6 6–8
IDpriceaverage [e /MWh] 33.4 28.1 26.0
Spreadaverage [e /MWh] 7.4 12.9 17.0
Count of hours 1,181 158 31
Share of hours with positive spread [%] 85.3 96.2 100
Overestimation [GW] 2–4 4–6 6–8
IDpriceaverage [e /MWh] 51.8 52.4 68.7
Spreadaverage [e /MWh] -7.5 -13.0 -37.9
Count of hours 1,767 213 18
Share of hours with negative spread [%] 84.8 92.5 94.4
Table 5.1:Market results for three intervals of forecast errors from the German power system.
Data from EEX (2014c); EPEX SPOT (2014); EEX Transparency (2014).
Based on the same data as used for Fig. 5.4, Tab. 5.1 shows the average intraday
price, the average spread between the day-ahead and the intraday price, the count
of hours in which the forecast error was within the interval, and the share of these
hours in which the spread had the expected sign for three intervals of forecast errors.
As the magnitude of the underestimation becomes larger, the average intraday price
declines and the average spread increases. This is in line with the insights provided
by Fig. 5.4. We can furthermore see from Tab. 5.1 that underestimations between
four and eight gigawatts were seldom events. If the forecast error was within this
interval, however, the intraday price was lower than the corresponding day-ahead
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price almost every time. In the case of an overestimation, Tab. 5.1 confirms that
larger forecast errors imply higher intraday prices and higher (negative) spreads.
Moderate overestimations—the forecast error was between two and four gigawatts
in 1,767 hours—were more frequent than moderate underestimations (1,181 hours).
If the forecast error was between six and eight gigawatts, an overestimation was less
frequent and the impact on the volume-weighted average price was higher.
Although the market data behind Fig. 5.4 and Tab. 5.1 provide relevant insights
into how the uncertainty of renewables shapes the price formation in continuous
intraday markets, profound empirical analyses should give more detailed insights in
this respect.
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Options to improve the balancing of forecast errors
This chapter analyses five options for improving the integration of the feed-in from
renewable energy sources in continuous intraday markets. In this context, the term
“improvement” shall refer to three aspects. First and most important, it means the
enhancement of the possibility to increase the revenue of selling overproduction
from renewables and to lower the costs of buying missing quantities. Second, it
means making it more likely that market participants trading forecast errors find
counterparties, especially in situations where large forecast errors have to be traded.
Third and following from the first two aspects, it means to better the opportunity of
executing optimal trading strategies.1 While all five options are well known in the
context of the transition to a renewable-based power system, the following clarifies
their influence and benefit for trading in a continuous intraday market and gives
some policy conclusions.
6.1 Reducing forecast errors
The most obvious option for improving the integration of the feed-in from weather-
dependent renewables in the intraday market is to reduce the magnitude of the
forecast errors. With reference to the presented analytical model, this means that the
“movement” away from the equilibrium of the day-ahead auction declines (compare
Fig. 5.2). In terms of an underestimation of the output from renewables, this implies
that fewer quantities have to be sold for relatively low selling prices. In terms of an
overestimation, fewer quantities have to be purchased at high prices. However, we
can also find from Fig. 5.2 that the benefits due to smaller forecast errors are likely to
be higher in the case of buying electricity (overestimation). This is because the slope
of the merit order steepens significantly as more electricity production is demanded.
In a continuous intraday market, such fundamental characteristics will be imaged
by the composition of the order book; for this given example, ask prices by power
1Note that these aspectsmay also be subsumed as “increasing the liquidity provision”. However, not
all options to be discussed relate directly to the liquidity of the intradaymarket. Furthermore, separating
the benefits of a larger number of market participants from the benefits of stronger competition among
a fixed number of participants is more natural if the reference to market liquidity is avoided.
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generators will be higher and will increase more rapidly. Hence, avoiding buying an
additional unit of electricity becomesmore andmore beneficial. That is, themarginal
cost savings increase. This implies that reducing the magnitude of the forecast error
not only lowers total but also average integration costs. Furthermore, the marginal
cost savings depend on the outcome of the day-ahead auction: Consider that the
electricity demand for a given hour is very high. This means that the demand curve
intersects the merit order to the right of the equilibrium illustrated in Fig. 5.2. As a
consequence, marginal cost savings increase earlier and more strongly compared to
a situation where the “starting point” for intraday adjustments refers to a lower point
on the merit order.
Several possibilities exist to reduce the magnitude of forecast errors of the feed-
in from renewables. For example, the accuracy of the forecasts can be improved by
advances in the provision of weather data and forecasting models (see Foley et al.,
2012). Another possibility is to postpone the gate closure of the day-ahead market
in order to reduce the time span between the auction and the next day. This would
allow market participants to include more accurate information about the hours of
the following day in their offers and thus to reduce forecast errors (compare Weber,
2010). Furthermore, large, centrally managed portfolios to first settle imbalances
within such portfolios can be formed. This internal balancing does not reduce the
total amount of forecast errors but lowers the necessity to perform corrections in the
intraday market.
6.2 Increasing the number of market participants
An important option for improving the balancing of forecast errors in continuous
intraday markets is to increase the number of market participants. Since the con-
ventional power plant portfolio and the number of electricity demanders within one
market area can be seen as fixed in the short- to mid-term, allowing cross-border
trading is the easiest way to achieve this. As a consequence, e. g. forecast errors
emerging in the German power system can be balanced by power generators in
France, given that this is feasible from a technical point of view.2 To see the general
effects, imagine “including” power generators located in France into the sketched
merit order in Fig. 5.2. This wouldmake the supply curve less steep. As a consequence,
moving away from the day-ahead equilibrium to balance forecast errors results
in intraday transactions with prices that deviate less strongly from the day-ahead
clearing price. In a continuous intraday market, this will be imaged in the order book
as it contains a higher number of offers and, more importantly, a higher number
of offers for a given price level range. More specifically, market coupling introduces
additional buyers with relatively high willingness to pay and additional sellers with
relatively lowwillingness to accept. Furthermore, the introduction of a higher number
2As discussed in Sect. 3.2.3, orders from other market areas are only integrated in the open order
book if the transmission capacity is sufficient to allow a cross-border transaction.
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of market participants enhances the competition among them and changes their
trade-off between profit and risk. That is, a higher number of competitors makes it
more risky to deviate from the indifference offer price in order to earn additional
profit in the intraday market. Market coupling should hence result in an order book
which contains more prices that are closer to the corresponding true valuations.
As a consequence of these effects, cross-border trading increases market liquidity
and improves the integration of renewables.3 This is because higher prices can be
obtained when selling overproduction from renewables (underestimation) and lower
prices have to be paid when buying missing quantities (overestimation).
Furthermore, a continuous intraday market provides agents that want to balance
forecast errors with the opportunity to execute optimal trading strategies. They can
decide very flexibly when and how to react to short-term forecasts, for example.
As Henriot (2014) showed, this can be beneficial for agents trading in intraday
markets to balance forecast errors. However, a trade-off exists between the gains from
utilising the flexibility of continuous markets by trading multiple times and the costs
of repeatedly engaging in transactions profitable for the counterparty. These costs
mainly arise from two sources. First, a continuousmarket—compared to a centralised
auction, for example—“spreads” liquidity over time. Agents that balance forecast
errors may therefore want to avoid trading in off-peak hours where less market
participation can be expected, for example. Second, much of the liquidity in intraday
markets is provided by agents with balanced positions. That is, they can choose to
participate in the market and are profit motivated; this is why such types of agents
are often labelled “patient traders” (see e. g. Pascual and Veredas, 2009; Hagemann
and Weber, 2013). As discussed in Sect. 5.3, generators and demanders do not bid
or ask their true valuation of the quantities they buy or sell. As a consequence, they
only engage in transactions which increase their profit. This can be understood as a
premium for offering their flexibility. Therefore, responding to short-term forecasts—
that is, trading quantities multiple times—can be costly because patient traders want
to profit from each transaction. Both aspects have to be incorporated into optimal
trading strategies and indicate that it can be reasonable to substantially restrict
trading activities with respect to the number of trades and the period of activemarket
participation. Therefore, increasingmarket liquidity by allowing cross-border trading
also expands the corridor for finding and executing trading strategies and thus allows
better use to be made of the flexibility provided by a continuous double auction.
6.3 Improving the flexibility of the power plant portfolio
The flexibility of the power plant portfolio should not be limiting if the time span
between trading and physical delivery is large. As real time approaches, however,
3For more information on market liquidity and the relevance of its dimensions in the electricity
context, see Hagemann andWeber (2013).
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the ability to adjust output at short notice can influence intraday transactions sub-
stantially.4 In this context, Fig. 6.1 shows a small part of the day-ahead merit order.
Possible intraday bids and asks of various power generators are referenced to their
corresponding day-ahead offers. Now consider that not all generators have the ability
(or the incentive) to adjust output in the intraday market. In Fig. 6.1, a resulting
open spot is “filled” by a generator with the next highest bid price or the next lowest
ask price. As a result, intraday bids and asks further depart from the merit order
in this simple understanding. This means that as real time comes closer, balancing
forecast errors becomes more costly since inflexible power generators withdraw
their liquidity support and bid prices decrease and ask prices increase more rapidly.
As a consequence, agents that correct for the uncertain feed-in from renewables
may choose to avoid trading large quantities close to physical delivery although
trading earlier comes at the disadvantage of having to use more inaccurate short-
term forecasts. In this context, see Henriot (2014) for an analysis on how wind
power producers can respond accordingly and Garnier andMadlener (2014) for more
detailed insights into the trade-off between trade timing and trade volume.
Figure 6.1: The effects of inflexibility. On the left-hand side, all generators participate in
the intraday market (no inflexibility, e. g. many hours before physical delivery). On the right-
hand side, some generators had to drop out of the market (inflexibility, e. g. close to physical
delivery).
So far, the discussed effects of inflexibility referred to the consequences of power
generators dropping out of the market. However, the term “inflexibility” can also be
understood as the general preference to not adjust output although the ability to do
so exists. This understanding is especially relevant for the intraday participation of
base-load power plants and producers of Combined Heat and Power (CHP).5 Their
preference to remain at the day-ahead position can lead them to require high spreads
4Although electricity demanders may drop out of the market over time, we shall focus on power
generators in the following.
5Since the provision of heat is technically connected to the electricity generation, CHP plants can
be significantly restricted in their output decisions (compare Vasebi et al., 2007).
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between their day-ahead and their intraday offer price. Hence, they may bid very low
or negative prices in the intraday market. This lowers the probability of a successful
transaction (and therefore the likelihood of having to reduce scheduled output) but
ensures adequate compensation if respective transactions come about.
Figure 6.2: Average difference between the day-ahead and the intraday market price for
hours with an underestimation of the feed-in from renewables subject to different intervals
of residual load. Data from EEX (2014c); EPEX SPOT (2014); EEX Transparency (2014).
To give first empirical insights in this context, Fig. 6.2 shows average spreads
(“day-ahead – intraday price”) resulting from an underestimation of two and four
gigawatts subject to various intervals of residual load. Here, the residual load is
the electricity demand in the day-ahead market minus the day-ahead forecasted
output from renewables. The figure uses data from the German electricity market
(EEX, 2014c; EPEX SPOT, 2014; EEX Transparency, 2014) and comprises the years
2011, 2012, and 2013. We can see that the need to sell electricity in hours where the
residual load is very low results in high positive spreads. These spreads are the result
of low or negative day-ahead clearing prices and even lower prices in the intraday
market. Recall that low residual loads imply that only a few thermal power generators
are dispatched in the day-ahead auction. In such a situation, few generators have
the ability to reduce output in the intraday market. As a consequence, the order
book contains less buying orders so that the (very) low bid prices of base-load
and CHP plants, for example, are more likely to be successful. Hence, the intraday
participation of generators which have the ability to reduce output but incorporate
their preference to remain at the day-ahead position into their bidding strategy is a
plausible explanation for very low or negative intraday prices at low residual loads.
As an increasing share of renewables in the power system results in more hours with
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low residual loads and high underestimated renewables output, negative prices in the
intraday market are likely to becomemore frequent.
Although the (in-)flexibility of power generators trading in continuous intraday
markets is an important aspect, there is currently no meaningful, direct possibility
for policy makers to influence the characteristics of the power plant portfolio.6 The
most accessible option is therefore to reduce the impact of the given inflexibility
by fostering the integration of intraday markets to increase the number of active
market participants (see Sect. 6.2). However, the market mechanismmay provide the
incentive to build and operate power plants which can reduce and increase output
at short notice. This is because participants in an intraday market may learn that
providing liquidity close to physical delivery or at low residual loads allows them to
earn above-average profits (weak competition can make it possible to move further
away from the true valuation of the electricity sold or bought). Plant operators may
therefore take measures to exploit such situations.
6.4 Making the demand sidemore flexible
To show how the slope of the day-ahead demand curve relates to the integration of
the uncertain feed-in from renewables, Fig. 6.3 illustrates a demand curve which is
steeper than the one drawn for explaining the basic framework (compare Fig. 5.2).
After the opening of the intraday market, unsatisfied demanders (to the left of Q∗)
bid to buy electricity. However, their willingness to pay is low compared to the WTP
of the dispatched generators. As a consequence, transactions with these demanders
become less attractive because their bid prices will be relatively low. Initially, satisfied
demanders (to the right of Q∗) ask to sell electricity. They require relatively high
prices in order to be willing to step back from the quantities obtained in the day-
ahead auction. Balancing forecast errors thus becomes more costly if quantities
have to be purchased from satisfied demanders. We shall therefore conclude that
a day-ahead demand curve with a high negative slope—compared to a less steep
demand curve—makes balancing forecast errors more costly (overestimation) or less
profitable (underestimation).
However, this proposition is opposed by the fact that continuous intradaymarkets
give participants the opportunity to trade multiple times. This means that once un-
satisfied demanders have been able to obtain quantities, their low willingness to pay
transforms into a relatively low willingness to accept. As a consequence, buying from
unsatisfied demanders can be less costly than buying from other market participants.
Similarly, the high willingness to accept of satisfied demanders transforms into a
relatively high willingness to pay once they have been able to sell quantities in the
intradaymarket. This means that selling overproduction from renewables to satisfied
6Note, however, that policy makers can provide incentives (e. g. subsidies) for supporting the
construction of more flexible power plants. Furthermore, capacity markets may allow the definition of
certain standards regarding the characteristics of the installed capacity.
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demanders is likely to be profitable. Being aware of this, unsatisfied demanders
should move further away from their true valuation when placing asks as should
satisfied demanders when placing bids (as indicated in Fig. 6.3 by the length of the
arrows).
Figure 6.3:Market representation with a steep day-ahead demand curve.
Demand response measures can contribute to changing the slope of the demand
curve by increasing the flexibility of the demand side (see e. g. Albadi and El-Saadany,
2008). If firms and households have the ability and the incentive to either shift or
shed load, their demand curves become flatter. This is because they do not have
such a strong preference for a certain quantity. Furthermore, the gain in flexibility
induced by demand response measures can contribute to ensuring that the slope
of the day-ahead demand curve does not become significantly steeper as real time
approaches. Hence, maintaining the flexibility existent at the day-ahead market
closure for intraday activities is as important as flattening the day-ahead curve.
Making the demand sidemore flexible is a costly, long-term process. For example,
installing smart meter in households and small businesses is cost-intensive and
conventional electricity tariffs do not allow savings that would justify large-scale
investments (compare Gottwalt et al., 2011). Firms can have significant opportunity
costs by interfering in production processes so that they require relatively high
compensation for providing flexibility (see Paulus andBorggrefe, 2011). These aspects
are the reason why investments in demand response measures are often evaluated in
the context of increasing the level of security of supply. Because of high welfare losses
due to electricity supply interruptions and the cost-intensity of themeasures to avoid
such interruptions, investments can be valuable in this regard (Strbac, 2008). Yet the
preceding analysis shows that responsive electricity demanders can also contribute to
49
CHAPTER 6. OPTIONS TO IMPROVE THE BALANCING OF FORECAST ERRORS
improving the integration of renewables in intradaymarkets and it therefore provides
an additional argument for introducing demand response programmes.
6.5 Introducingmore capacity to store electricity
The importance of the possibility to store electricity in a power system with a
high share of weather-dependent renewables has been extensively studied (see e. g.
Gunkel et al., 2012; Loisel et al., 2010; Muche, 2009). Because their business model is
to exploit price differences over time, storage plant operators want to buy and store
electricity at low prices and sell when the electricity price is high. As a consequence,
correcting for an underestimation of renewables output (low intraday prices) makes
it more likely that storage plants buy and store electricity. They can thus contribute
to consuming the overproduction from renewables. In the case of an overestimation,
intraday transactions are expected to clear at relatively high prices (recall Fig. 5.3) and
storage plants can contribute to the balancing of forecast errors by selling electricity.
In this context, the incentive to actively participate in the intraday market should
increase with larger deviations from the day-ahead clearing price and therefore with
the magnitude of the forecast error. There are two main benefits if storage plant
operators submit limit orders to the order book in situations where the forecast error
is large. First, it becomes less likely that entities trading to correct the uncertain feed-
in from renewables fail to find a counterparty and have to make use of balancing
services. Second, it contributes to avoiding engaging in transactions with market par-
ticipantswho prefer to remain at their day-ahead position and therefore demandhigh
compensation for being willing to depart from this preference (compare Sect. 6.3).
Since with an increasing share of renewables large forecast errors will become more
frequent, increasing storage capacities provides some support in improving the
integration of renewables in such situations.
6.6 Some policy conclusions
The term “options” should not imply that the discussed possibilities for improving the
integration of renewables in intraday markets are mutually exclusive. Furthermore,
most of them are generally recognised as being indispensable for the transition
to a renewable-based power system. In this context, the analysis of this chapter
shows how these options benefit continuous intraday markets concretely and gives
a first indication that some of them are likely to be more powerful and more easily
addressable by policy makers than others. For example, making the demand side
more flexible could introduce significant potential to consume and release electricity
at short notice. Furthermore, promoting demand responsemeasures can be governed
relatively effectively. However, improving demand side flexibility is a costly, long-
term process and residential customers particularly have little incentive to relocate
their electricity-consuming activities. In contrast, policy strategies generally cannot
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directly affect the characteristics of the power plant portfolio in a liberalised market
(only indirectly by imposing a price on carbon emissions, for example). Yet improving
the flexibility of the thermal power plant portfolio is highly relevant and technically
feasible. These difficulties may be one important reason why energy policy related
strategies concentrate on fostering market integration. Indeed, intraday market cou-
pling has important benefits as liquidity and competition among the market par-
ticipants increase without requiring high implementation costs. Nevertheless, the
analysis in this chapter exemplifies that continuous intraday markets are touched by
many more measures which should not be neglected.
Moreover, policy strategies for managing the transition towards a renewable-
based power system should avoid supporting investments to prevent the trading of
forecast errors at intraday markets. This includes, for example, generally subsidising
decentralised options to balance forecast errors such as micro-storages or small
back-up power stations. The reason is not necessarily that the utilisation of such
installations can reduce liquidity in intraday markets.7 The main reason is that
balancing forecast errors at an (adequately liquid) intraday market will be less
costly than decentralised balancing. This is because the intraday market can be
understood as a very large pool of options for adjusting positions. On average, the
costs of using these options through trading should be well below the average costs
of decentralised installations such as micro-storages, even if the higher need for
transmission investments is taken into account.
In this context, a comparison with an emission trading system can be made:
Every entity should pay for its external effect (carbon emissions / forecast errors)
but is given the possibility (carbon market / intraday market) to find the entity
that can remove the externality at least cost. An emission trading system is efficient
precisely because not every entity has to deal with reducing carbon emissions. The
same is true for forecast errors and intraday markets. Nevertheless, future research
should evaluate the interactions between the different possibilities to improve the
integration of renewables in more detail.
7If agents balancing forecast errors predominantly trade with liquidity-consuming market orders,
reducing the magnitude of the forecast error can even increase market liquidity.
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Price-setting decisions in continuous intraday
markets
This chapter is concerned with formulating price-setting decisions for power gener-
ators (Sect. 7.1) and electricity demanders (Sect. 7.2) in continuous intraday markets.
In a first step, this requires deriving the economic effects of output adjustments and
showing how they relate to the true valuation for buying or selling electricity. We shall
then formulate and solve the trade-off between profit and risk to calculate optimal
offer prices.1
7.1 Price-setting decisions for power generators
7.1.1 General framework
Consider an exemplary power generator which participated in a uniform-price day-
ahead auction for a given hour in the future and is willing to trade electricity with
limit orders for this hour in a continuous intraday market. We shall assume that this
generator adjusts its scheduled output for the future hour to “hedge” each trade in the
intraday market. That is, it reduces scheduled output to buy electricity and increases
scheduled output to sell electricity. This rules out strategies where the generator sells
more electricity than it can actually produce and tries to buy back quantities later on,
for example.2 More specifically, the generator has the possibility to trade electricity
for an hour in the future at time ti ∈ {t1, t2, ..., tn−1, tn , tn+1, ...,T }. Time t0 refers to the
clearing of the day-ahead auction and t1 provides the first and T the last opportunity
1Note that this chapter is not concerned with the decision of how much electricity should be sold
or bought. The determinants of this decision differ significantly from situation to situation and from
market participant to market participant so that it would be very difficult to model them adequately.
2For clarity in argumentation, we shall also assume that the generator only submits offers when the
outcomes of all previous trades are definite (the previous offers either were successful, expired, or were
cancelled).
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to trade electricity for a given hour in the future in the intradaymarket before physical
delivery. We are interested in the transaction for a given time tn .
pitn
(
pb/atn ,Gtn
)
= pt0Gt0 −C
(
Gt0 +
n∑
i=1
(
Gti −Gti−1
))+ n∑
i=1
(
Gti −Gti−1
)
pb/ati (7.1)
Eq. (7.1) gives the profit for a given hour in the future for time tn . The first term
of the profit function is the revenue from the uniform-price day-ahead auction with
Gt0 being the dispatched quantity and pt0 the market clearing price. BothGt0 and pt0
are given constants when the generator can decide to adjust output in the intraday
market starting from t1.3 Note that for a non-dispatched generator,Gt0 is zero.
The second term of Eq. (7.1) is a cost function C which maps the output level for
the given hour in the future as scheduled at time tn , given byGt0 +
∑n
i=1
(
Gti −Gti−1
)=
Gtn , to the variable costs of producing this output. If the generator does not adjust
output intraday, C gives the variable costs for producing the quantity dispatched in
the day-ahead auction (Gt0).
If the generator schedules a reduction of output for the future hour at time tn (that
is, Gtn < Gtn−1), it wants to offset this reduction to have a balanced position. Hence,
|Gtn −Gtn−1 | also gives the amount of electricity the generator wants to buy in the
intraday market. With pbtn = pbtn (·) being the per megawatt hour bid price, the last
term of Eq. (7.1) determines the costs of doing so (the superscript “b” thus stands for
“bid”).
If Gtn >Gtn−1 , the generator schedules to increase output for the future hour and
asks to sell Gtn −Gtn−1 in the intraday market. Now patn = patn (·) is the per megawatt
hour ask price and the last term of Eq. (7.1) gives the revenue from this sale (the
superscript “a” thus stands for “ask”).
Because the power generator can choose to participate in the intraday market,
it will require that this participation will not make it worse off. In terms of buying
electricity, this means that the generator will choose pbtn so that the savings from
not producing a certain quantity in the future are (at least) as high as the costs
for obtaining this quantity in the intraday market. If the generator sells electricity,
the resulting revenue needs (at least) to balance the increase in production costs as
measured by C . This shows that the mechanisms behind Eq. (7.1) allow us to derive
how a power generator should price offers to buy or to sell electricity in the intraday
market.
7.1.2 Economic effects of output adjustments
As the trading of power generators in intraday markets can be connected to the
adjustment of their (scheduled) level of electricity generation, it is necessary to
3Assume that the generator considers the strategy for trading in the day-aheadmarket separate from
the decision about output adjustments in the intraday market.
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understand the economic effects of increasing and reducing output as well as how
these effects relate to price-setting decisions. Given Eq. (7.1), we can analyse the
reaction of the generator’s profit to changes in the (scheduled) output level. To do
so, consider that the generator increases output slightly (by onemegawatt). We hence
have
∂pitn
(
patn ,Gtn
)
∂Gtn
=−∂C
(
Gtn
)
∂Gtn
+patn . (7.2)
As Eq. (7.2) shows, increasing the output by one megawatt has two effects. First, the
generator has to produce the additional unit of electricity (in the future) so that its
profit decreases as measured by the derivative of the cost function C . Second, the
generator can sell the additional megawatt hour in the intraday market so that the
profit increases by the selling price patn . Ensuring indifference between increasing
output and remaining in the current position requires that the profit is not affected by
the output adjustment (∂pi/∂Gtn = 0). Hence, we have that the generator is indifferent if
the megawatt hour is sold at a price that equals the marginal costs of producing it.
Figure 7.1: Illustration of Eq. (7.3) with Gre f =100MW and ηre f =0.5. Minimum load
constraints are neglected to improve the visualisation.
For providing further insights into the economic effects of output adjustments, we
have to specify the cost functionC . This functionmust consider that the efficiency of
the conversion of fuel to electricity depends on the generator’s output.4 Abstracting
4SeeDíaz (2008) for an analysis onwhy representing the efficiency function adequately is important.
Other effects from cycling a power plant, e. g. costs due to creep-fatigue damage (compare Lew et al.,
2012), are neglected.
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from the technical characteristics of fossil-fuelled power plants, Eq. (7.3) describes
this relation for output levels above minimum load.
η
(
Gt0
)= ηre f −ηre f (Gre f −Gt0Gre f
)β
κ (7.3)
Hence, the efficiency factor η for producing the day-ahead allocated quantity de-
pends on the efficiency at a reference capacityGre f ≥Gt0 (e. g. nominal capacity), the
day-ahead output levelGt0 , and on two generator-specific, constant parametersκ and
β. The parameterκdetermines, in a linear relationship, howchanging the output level
affects the conversion efficiency. We have κ = 0.2 if adjusting electricity production
by 10 percent alters the efficiency of a fossil-fuelled power plant by two percent (see
Leuthold et al. (2012) for estimations regarding the effects of partial load conditions
on the efficiency of power plants). The parameter β allows adjustment of this linear
trend and makes η concave with β > 1. This means that the conversion efficiency
increases less strongly as Gt0 becomes closer to the reference capacity (compare
Fig. 7.1 for illustrations).
η
(
Gtn
)= ηre f −ηre f (Gre f −GtnGre f
)β
κ (7.4)
The efficiency at output level Gtn can be described with Eq. (7.4). However, this
expression relates to the efficiency factor at the reference capacity (Gre f ). We are
interested in expressing intraday adjustments with reference to the day-ahead merit
order and therefore to the day-ahead offer price. This allows a clearer evaluation of
how intraday offer prices deviate from the offer price in the day-ahead auction. We
hence write Eq. (7.4) as the efficiency at Gt0 minus the change in efficiency due to
moving toGtn :
η
(
Gtn
)= η(Gt0)− [η(Gt0)−η(Gtn )] .
After some manipulation, the efficiency factor subject to the output level Gtn can be
expressed as
η
(
Gtn
)= η(Gt0)
(
1− ηre f
η
(
Gt0
)κ[(1− Gtn
Gre f
)β
−
(
1− Gt0
Gre f
)β])
. (7.5)
We can now calculate the per-unit costs of production at Gtn subject to the
fuel price p f , the price for emission allowances pc , the emission factor ec , and the
efficiency factor as
c
(
Gtn
)= p f +pcec
η
(
Gtn
) = cda
1−ρtn
= cda
(
1+ ρtn
1−ρtn
)
, (7.6)
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while defining ρtn = ρtn
(
Gtn
) = ηre f
η
(
Gt0
)κ
[(
1− GtnGre f
)β− (1− Gt0Gre f )β
]
which follows from
Eq. (7.5).5 Eq. (7.6) implies that output levels below Gt0 result in per-unit costs that
are higher than the costs at the day-ahead production, which are given by cda =
cda
(
Gt0
) = (p f +pcec)/η(Gt0 ). For the sake of simplicity, assume that cda approximates
the generator’s offer price in the day-ahead auction.6 We can now write cost function
C as
C
(
Gtn
)= cda (1+ ρtn1−ρtn
)
Gtn . (7.7)
Given Eq. (7.7), we can specify Eq. (7.2) by calculating the derivative of C . Using
the product rule, we have
∂C
(
Gtn
)
∂Gtn
= cda +cda
(
∂
∂Gtn
{
ρtn
1−ρtn
}
Gtn +
ρtn
1−ρtn
)
.
Since ρtn is a function of the output levelGtn , using the quotient rule gives after some
manipulation:
∂C
(
Gtn
)
∂Gtn
= cda + cda
 ∂ρtn∂Gtn(
1−ρtn
)2Gtn + ρtn1−ρtn
 .
As we can see, the above expression contains the derivative of ρtn (recall that ρtn is
specified in the context of Eq. (7.6)). After somemanipulation, we can find
∂ρtn
∂Gtn
=− ηre f
η
(
Gt0
) κ
Gre f
β
(
1− Gtn
Gre f
)β−1
and complete the calculation of the derivative of the cost function C . Inserting it
into Eq. (7.2) then gives the response of the profit function if the generator increases
output slightly:
∂pitn
(
patn ,Gtn
)
∂Gtn
=−cda
(
1+ ρtn
1−ρtn
)
+ cda
ηre f
η
(
Gt0
) κ
Gre f
β
(
1− GtnGre f
)β−1
(
1−ρtn
)2 Gtn +patn . (7.8)
Having specified the marginal costs at Gtn , Eq. (7.8) now reveals that we can distin-
guish three economic effects of output adjustments. The first term corresponds to the
per-unit costs the generator has to pay for producing the additionalmegawatt hour of
5For a non-dispatched generator, Gt0 in Eq. (7.6) has to be thought of as the quantity of the
generator’s unsuccessful day-ahead offer. This allows referencing the generator’s intraday bids and asks
to its submitted day-ahead offer price and thus to its position on the merit order.
6Since the conversion efficiency of fuel to electricity increases with output under the setting of the
presented framework, the generator’s marginal cost function lies slightly below its average variable cost
function.
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electricity (recall Eq. (7.6)). However, increasing output also has a cost-reducing effect.
This effect is measured by the second term of Eq. (7.8) and considers that the slight
output increase improves the efficiency of the conversion of fuel to electricity. Hence,
all units generated after the adjustment of output can be produced more efficiently
and therefore more cheaply.7 As a consequence, ensuring indifference requires that
the selling price in the intraday market equals the costs of producing the additional
unit of electricity net of the total cost reduction due to producing all units more
efficiently.8 This insight allows the derivation of power generators’ true valuations
when selling an additional unit of electricity in the intraday market.
7.1.3 Calculation of indifference offer prices
While the previous section gave insights into how power generators should price
slight output adjustments in order not to be worse off, most transactions in the in-
tradaymarket refer to quantities greater than onemegawatt hour. Thus, the following
calculates indifference offer prices for larger output adjustments. We can set
pitn =pitn−1 , (7.9)
where pitn−1 is given by profit function (7.1) if substituting n by n−1. Solving Eq. (7.9)
for pb/atn gives the price that ensures indifference between changing output and
remaining in the position at tn−1 for buying (Gtn < Gtn−1) or selling (Gtn > Gtn−1)
electricity as
p¯b/atn =
C
(
Gtn
)−C (Gtn−1)
Gtn −Gtn−1
. (7.10)
Not surprisingly, Eq. (7.10) shows that the indifference offer price is the change in
(future) variable production costs induced by an output adjustment divided by the
magnitude of this adjustment.9With the specification of the cost function as provided
by Eq. (7.7), we then have
p¯b/atn
(
Gtn
)= cda − cda [ ρtn−11−ρtn−1
(
Gtn−1
Gtn −Gtn−1
)
− ρtn
1−ρtn
(
Gtn
Gtn −Gtn−1
)]
, (7.11)
where ρtn−1 = ρtn−1
(
Gtn−1
)
is defined as ρtn in Eq. (7.6) if substitutingGtn withGtn−1 .
7This is one reasonwhypower generators have the incentive to offer their entire production capacity
in the day-ahead auction.
8Note that Eq. (7.8) implies that only the units before the output increase can be produced more
efficiently. AppendixA shows that this is due to the nature of the derivative of the cost function and that
the difference quotient provides a more precise interpretation of the effects of adjusting output.
9Note that participation and transaction costs are neglected. Participation costs comprise costs for
gaining access to the trading platform and costs for monitoring the market, for example. Transaction
costs are trading fees paid to the power exchange, for example. Market participants will internalise such
cost components in their indifference offer prices by adjusting themaccordingly. However, participation
costs can be sunk and are therefore not decision-relevant.
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To have a more clear interpretation of Eq. (7.11), consider the following example:
A generator adjusts output in the intradaymarket for the first time after the day-ahead
auction by scheduling a reduction of the output level for the future hour at t7. We thus
have n = 7,Gt7 <Gt6 ,Gt6 =Gt0 , and, as a consequence, ρt6 = 0. Eq. (7.11) reduces to
p¯bt7
(
Gt7
)= cda +cda ρt71−ρt7
(
Gt7
Gt7 −Gt0
)
. (7.12)
Due to the fact that Gt7 < Gt0 , the indifference bid price p¯bt7 will lie below the day-
ahead offer price cda . The intuition behind this is that reducing output lowers the
conversion efficiency of fuel to electricity. This means that it becomes more costly
to produce the quantity remaining after the output reduction. To balance these
additional costs through the transaction in the intraday market, the generator needs
to choose a bid price below the day-ahead offer price. This shows that, in general, the
true valuation of the electricity traded in the intradaymarket does not equal the price
of the day-ahead offer.
Figure 7.2: Illustration of the indifference offer price subject to the magnitude of the output
reduction for a generator with a concave efficiency function. Minimum load constraints are
neglected.
To give deeper insights in this respect, Fig. 7.2 illustrates how themagnitude of the
output reduction causes the indifference price p¯bt7 to differ from the day-ahead offer
price cda .We can see that p¯
b
t7
(
Gt7
)
is close to cda for small and large output reductions.
To explain why this is the case, Fig. 7.2 also illustrates howmuch the power generator
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can pay for replacing an additional unit of the (scheduled) output with a unit from
the intraday market without being worse off (p¯b
′
t7
(
Gt7
)
). This means that p¯b
′
t7
shows
for each output level what variable production costs can be saved if an additional
megawatt hour of output is not produced (recall Sect. 7.1.2, which discussed this
subject in detail for the case of increasing output). As a consequence, the area under
the curve p¯b
′
t7
(
Gt7
)
between Gt0 and a given output level divided by the magnitude
of this reduction gives the corresponding p¯bt7 . We can see from Fig. 7.2 that there is
a region where p¯b
′
t7
is higher than the day-ahead offer price. Hence, the generator
can pay more than cda for purchasing an additional megawatt hour in the intraday
market without being worse off. This is due to a trade-off between the two effects that
result from the response of the cost function to a slight output reduction (compare
Eq. (7.8)). The first effect is that reducing electricity generation by one additional
megawatt lowers the efficiency factor so that the per-unit costs for producing the
remaining output increase. However, the resulting negative impact on the generator’s
profit declines as electricity production decreases. This is because the output affected
by higher per-unit costs becomes smaller with every megawatt hour not produced.
The second effect is that reducing electricity generation by one additional megawatt
means that the power generator saves the variable costs for providing it. These savings
increase as output decreases since it is more costly to produce with low efficiency. At
a certain output level, the benefit of avoiding the generation of a megawatt hour with
lower efficiency equals the disadvantage of increasing per-unit costs for the units
still produced. At this level of output, we have p¯b
′
t7
= cda . Further reductions by one
megawatt therefore imply feasible indifference prices above cda . The upward sloping
part of p¯b
′
t7
(
Gt7
)
thus “pulls up” the indifference offer price p¯bt7 so that it is close to the
day-ahead offer price at low output levels. Nevertheless, Fig. 7.2 shows that we always
have p¯bt7 ≤ cda ; that is, the per-unit intraday price to balance an output reduction
starting fromGt0 must be below the day-ahead offer price in order not to be worse off
(p¯bt7 = cda if the entire output is replaced with quantities from the intraday market).
We can hence also understand p¯bt7
(
Gt7
)
—and therefore p¯b/atn
(
Gtn
)
in general—as a
“boundary” dividing profitable from unprofitable transaction prices.
So far, we have studied indifference offer prices for an exemplary power generator.
The following shall outline, very generally, how the characteristics of base-load, mid-
load and peak-load generators determine their true valuations for the electricity they
buy or sell. To gain first insights, consider the comparative-static analysis with respect
to Eq. (7.12):
∂p¯bt7
∂cda
= 1+ ρt7
1−ρt7
(
Gt7
Gt7 −Gt0
)
> 0, (7.13)
∂p¯bt7
∂κ
= cda
 ∂ρt7∂κ(
1−ρt7
)2
( Gt7
Gt7 −Gt0
)
< 0. (7.14)
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As Eq. (7.13) shows, higher day-ahead offer prices (and therefore higher per-unit costs
of production) result in higher indifference bid prices (ρt7 > 0 and small; Gt7 < Gt0).
The reason is that own production is more cost-intensive, which allows paying more
for quantities that replace parts of it. As a consequence, a gas-fired power generator—
compared to a lignite power plant with lower per-unit costs—can offer to buy at
higher prices. Furthermore, Eq. (7.13) implies that an increase of cda by one euro per
megawatt hour, for example, increases the additional willingness to pay by less than
this amount; except the entire day-ahead output is replaced with quantities from the
intraday market (Gt7 = 0). As already discussed, this is because the lower efficiency
at output level Gt7 needs to be offset by reducing the indifference bid price. We can
see from Eq. (7.14) that a power generator with higher partial load effects (a higher
value for κ) lowers the indifference bid price. This gives the generator more revenue
to compensate for the (now higher) negative effects of reducing output.
Base-load Mid-load Peak-load
Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell
Per-unit costs (cda ) low mid high
Impact of PLC (κ) low low–mid high
Indiff. price (p¯b/atn ) low mid high
Spread (|cda − p¯b/atn |) low low–mid high
Table 7.1: Evaluation of how the characteristics of base, mid, and peak-load generators (per-
unit costs of production, impact of partial load conditions) determine their indifference offer
prices.
These first insights by the comparative-static analysis are generalised in Tab. 7.1
for base, mid, and peak-load generators. The first two rows evaluate their level of
per-unit costs and to what extent they are affected by partial load conditions (PLC).
The bottom two rows of the table indicate, in tendency, the level of the generators’
indifference offer prices as well as their difference to the day-ahead offer prices. Base-
load generators—especially nuclear and lignite-fired power plants—are expected to
have low indifference prices which do not deviate much from the per-unit costs at
the day-ahead output level. In contrast, peak-load power plants have high per-unit
costs and thus demand high compensation for producing electricity but also have
a high willingness to pay for replacing parts of this production. Their true valuation
for selling and buying electricity in the intraday market can therefore expected to be
high. Although peak-load generators are used to perform frequent load changes, the
influence of partial load conditions is higher than for base andmid-load power plants
(compare e. g. Leuthold et al., 2012; Schröder et al., 2013). As a consequence, their
indifference prices generally deviate more strongly from cda (compare Tab. 7.1).
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7.1.4 Calculation of optimal offer prices
7.1.4.1 The trade-off between profit and risk
While indifference offer prices constitute an essential aspect in discussing price-
setting decisions for continuous intradaymarkets, power generators not only want to
be indifferent, they alsowant to earn additional profit. The profit-maximising strategy
of a market participant can be understood as a decision about a trade-off: In the
case of buying intraday, moving closer to the bid price that would ensure indifference
reduces potential profits but increases the likelihood of a successful transaction. In
the case of selling intraday, moving away from the indifference ask price increases
potential profits but lowers the likelihood of a successful transaction.
We shall now analyse this trade-off in more detail. The following uses the ex-
ample of a risk-neutral power generator and assumes a pay-as-bid setting (compare
Sect. 5.1). For describing the power generator’s decisionmathematically, consider the
expected profits
E
(
pibtn
)
=
(
1−F
(
pbtn
))
pitn−1 +F
(
pbtn
)
pitn
(
pbtn ,Gtn
)
bid ,
E
(
piatn
)
=
(
1−S
(
patn
))
pitn−1 +S
(
patn
)
pitn
(
patn ,Gtn
)
ask,
(7.15)
where the profit functions pi refer to Eq. (7.1), F is a continuous cumulative distri-
bution function (CDF), and S a continuous survival function (SF), which can also
be written as S = 1 − F . The function F gives the probability that a transaction
takes place which fully satisfies the demanded quantity associated with pbtn . Thus,
F gives the probability that the bid is successful and the generator earns the profit
determined by Eq. (7.1). If the bid is not successful—the probability for this event is
given by 1− F
(
pbtn
)
—the generator’s profit does not change and hence amounts to
the profit at time tn−1. This profit is described by Eq. (7.1) if substituting n with n−1.
Similarly, in the case of selling electricity, the survival function S gives the probability
that the generator’s ask is successful and the offered quantity associated with patn is
fully consumed. In this context, we shall assume that the generator uses all available
information from the open order book to construct and update the functions F and S
and that the generator neglects the impact of its ownoffer on the order book (compare
Friedman, 1991).
7.1.4.2 Modelling the success probability
To provide more information on the distribution and survival function in Eq. (7.15),
recall from Sect. 3.2 that the open order book of a continuous intraday market sorts
bid prices in descending and ask prices in ascending order. The bid at the top of the
order book is called “market bid” and the ask at the top of the order book “market
ask”. Now consider that a limit buy order is submitted to the market. We can then
distinguish three main situations: i) The limit price of the bid is higher than or equal
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to the price of the market ask. If this is the case, the bid can be matched immediately.
Note that its price must also be higher than the price of the market bid; otherwise
this bid would have already been matched with the market ask. ii) The submitted
bid price is higher than the price of the current market bid but below the price of
the market ask. Hence, the offer cannot be matched immediately and is stored in
the order book. Then, the stored bid is not necessarily involved in a transaction if
a submitted ask price is equal to or below its limit price. This is because the bid
may have been suppressed by offers with higher purchase prices and the quantity
of the submitted ask may not be sufficiently large to “reach” the bid. This is especially
relevant in the context of market orders. An ask market order can be understood as
an ask limit order with a price below the lowest bid price stored in the order book.
However, because a market ask order only trades a specified quantity, the rank of an
offer on the order book’s bid side is important for its prospect of success. iii) The price
of the submitted bid is below the price of the market ask as well as below the price of
the current market bid. The consequences are as discussed for ii).
Drawing from these conclusions, we shall model that the generator considers a
submitted bid to be successful within a given time period if the market bid price
drops below its price at least once in this time period. If this is the case, at least
one seller was willing to sell at or below the submitted bid price and the amount
asked was sufficient to clear the bid. The evolution of the market bid price over
(continuous) time can be described with a stochastic process, referred to as {MB (t )}.
A stochastic process is a family of random variables (see e. g. Lindgren et al., 2014).
These random variables are the values of the process at each instant in time, which
we shall denote with MB (t ). The probability that a bid with price pbtn is successful
for time t is FMB(t )
(
pbtn
)
= P
(
MB (t )< pbtn
)
. To find the probability that the offer is
successful within a time period [0,T ] chosen by the generator, a new random variable
can be defined as B = min
t∈[0,T ]
{MB (t )}, which gives the lowest MB (t ) within [0,T ]. If
the price of the submitted bid is higher than the lowest market bid observable in the
given timeperiod, the bid is successful. The probability for this event canbe described
with the distribution function FB
(
pbtn
)
= P
(
B < pbtn
)
, which is written as F
(
pbtn
)
in
Eq. (7.15).10 Similarly, in the case of submitting an ask, the generator considers it to
be successful if the market ask price rises above its price at least once in the specified
timeperiod. The value of the stochastic process of themarket ask price at an instant in
time is the random variableMA (t ). The probability that a submitted ask is successful
for time t is then SMA(t )
(
patn
)
= P
(
MA (t )> patn
)
. We can describe the probability that
the ask is successful within [0,T ] with the survival function SA
(
patn
)
= P
(
A > patn
)
,
where A = max
t∈[0,T ]
{MA (t )}. This function is written as S
(
patn
)
in Eq. (7.15).
10Compare Lo et al. (2002) for a similar approach where the dynamic of a stock price process
is described with a geometric Brownian motion with drift. Given this process, the order execution
probability can be derived explicitly.
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7.1.4.3 Solving the decision trade-off
For solving the trade-off imaged by Eq. (7.15), it is important to recognise the in-
fluence of varying the offer price on the generator’s expected profit. In the case
of bidding to buy electricity intraday, for example, increasing the bid price slightly
has three general effects. First, it becomes more unlikely that the generator has to
remain at profit level pitn−1 . This is because the probability for the bid being successful
increases. Second, by the same amount it becomes more unlikely that the generator
remains at profit level pitn−1 , it becomes more likely that the transaction is successful
and the generator reaches the (higher) profit level pitn . However, the third effect
recognises that increasing the bid price diminishes this profit to some extent in the
case that the bid is accepted. The reason is that it becomes more costly to replace
scheduled production with quantities from the intraday market (compare Eq. (7.1)).
To find the optimal “composition” of these three general effects, we have to
maximise Eq. (7.15) with respect to pbtn and p
a
tn
. This yields after some simplification:
∂pitn/∂pbtn
pitn−1−pitn =
f
(
pbtn
)
F
(
pbtn
) bid ,
∂pitn/∂patn
pitn−pitn−1 =
f
(
patn
)
S
(
patn
) ask.
(7.16)
In terms of bidding, the right-hand side of Eq. (7.16)—the ratio of the probability den-
sity function (PDF) to the cumulative distribution function—is called the “reversed
hazard rate”, which is more and more often addressed in reliability research (see
Finkelstein, 2002). Following Nakagawa (2008), this rate can be expressed in the form
rh
(
pbtn
)
= lim
∆pbtn→0
F
(
pbtn
)−F (pbtn−∆pbtn )
∆pbtn
F
(
pbtn
) . (7.17)
For an interpretation of Eq. (7.17) it is helpful to note that it contains the expres-
sion
(
F
(
pbtn
)−F (pbtn−∆pbtn ))/F (pbtn ), which is a conditional probability. Thus, the product
rh
(
pbtn
)
∆pbtn is the probability that the bid is successful in (p
b
tn
−∆pbtn ,pbtn ] given that
we know it is successful for bid prices lower than or equal to pbtn . Despite the relevance
of this understanding, there is amore accessible interpretation of the reversed hazard
rate in the context of Eq. (7.16): The numerator of Eq. (7.17), which is a backward
difference quotient, measures the average rate of change of the success probability
with respect to pbtn on the interval from p
b
tn
−∆pbtn to pbtn . This rate of change is
positive as F is non-decreasing. Because the denominator of Eq. (7.17) gives the
success probability for pbtn , the reversed hazard rate can be understood as measuring
the relative contribution of a slight increase of pbtn to the probability that the bid is
successful. In the context of the presented framework, we shall define that rh is a
decreasing function of the bid price. This implies that the relative contribution due to
an increase of pbtn is more significant if p
b
tn
is low; the “effectiveness” of being willing
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to pay more diminishes. From Eq. (7.16), for the case of bidding, we can see that its
left-hand side is a rate which measures how a slight increase of the bid price lowers
the additional profit from the intraday transaction. Since ∂pitn/∂pbtn does not change for
different levels of pbtn but the difference between pitn and pitn−1 becomes smaller as
pbtn increases, this rate is an increasing function of the bid price. As a consequence,
the generator will choose pbtn according to Eq. (7.16) for solving the trade-off between
profit and risk in a profit-maximising way.
In the case of selling electricity, the right-hand side of Eq. (7.16) is a hazard rate
that can be written as (compare Pham, 2006)
h
(
patn
)= lim
∆patn→0
F
(
patn+∆patn
)−F (patn )
∆patn
S
(
patn
) . (7.18)
Similarly to the interpretation of the reversed hazard rate, h
(
patn
)
∆patn is the prob-
ability that the ask is not successful in (patn ,p
a
tn
+∆patn ] given success for ask prices
lower than or equal to patn . Moreover, note that the numerator of Eq. (7.18) is a
forward difference quotient which considers that increasing the ask price makes it
more unlikely that the offer is successful. Because the denominator is the success
probability for patn , the hazard rate can be interpreted as the rate at which success
probability is lost due to a slight increase of patn . We shall define that h is an increasing
function of the ask price. This implies that the relative loss of success probability due
to increasing patn slightly is more severe if p
a
tn
is high. For the case of asking to sell
electricity, the left-hand side of Eq. (7.16) gives the rate at which the additional profit
increases due to a variation of the ask price. Since ∂pitn/∂patn is constant for different
levels of patn but the difference between pitn and pitn−1 becomes larger as p
a
tn
increases,
this rate is a decreasing function of the ask price. Hence, optimality requires that
the rate at which additional profit increases is equal to the rate at which success
probability is lost.
From Eq. (7.16) we can find for bidding (Gtn <Gtn−1) and asking (Gtn >Gtn−1) that:
pbtn =
C(Gtn )−C
(
Gtn−1
)
Gtn−Gtn−1 −
F
(
pbtn
)
f
(
pbtn
) bid ,
patn =
C(Gtn )−C
(
Gtn−1
)
Gtn−Gtn−1 +
S
(
patn
)
f
(
patn
) ask.
(7.19)
Note that the first term of Eq. (7.19) is the indifference offer price as specified by
Eq. (7.11). In the case of bidding, the spread p¯btn −pbtn needs to equal the ratio of the
distribution to the density function. In the case of selling, the spread between the
optimal and the indifference ask price needs to equal the inverse hazard rate.11 This
implies that the generator will not bid or ask its true valuation.
11Compare Federico and Rahman (2003) for a very similar result in the case of an electricity pay-as-
bid auction and note the close connection to the concept of “virtual valuation” in auction theory (see
e. g. Bulow and Roberts, 1989).
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7.2 Price-setting decisions for electricity demanders
7.2.1 Calculation of indifference offer prices
Consider an exemplary electricity demander willing to trade in a continuous intraday
market with limit orders after having participated in a uniform-price day-ahead
auction.12 We shall assume that the demander “hedges” each trade in the intraday
market by increasing scheduled consumption to buy electricity and lowering sched-
uled consumption to sell electricity.13 Note that this is inverse to the case of the
power generators where buying implies reducing and selling implies increasing the
scheduled output. The demander has the possibility to trade electricity for an hour
in the future at time ti ∈ {t1, t2, ..., tn−1, tn , tn+1, ...,T }. Time t0 refers to the clearing of
the day-ahead auction and t1 provides the first and T the last opportunity to trade
electricity for a given hour in the future in the intraday market before real time. The
profit for time tn can be described with
pitn
(
pb/atn ,D tn
)
=
D t0∫
0
(a−bD)dD−pt0D t0
+
n∑
i=1

D ti∫
D ti−1
(a−bD)dD−pb/ati
(
D ti −D ti−1
) . (7.20)
The first part of Eq. (7.20) forms the surplus from consuming the amount of electricity
obtained in the day-ahead auction (D t0) at the day-ahead clearing price (pt0). This
surplus is equal to the area under the linear inverse demand curve up to D t0 net
of the costs for purchasing this quantity (a is the prohibitive price and b is the
slope parameter of the demand curve). The second part images the net benefit from
potential transactions in the intradaymarket. If the demander buys quantities at time
t1 (D t1 > D t0), for example, it can consume more electricity in the future hour and
thus will receive a future gross benefit. This gross benefit is measured by the area
under the demand curve between D t0 and D t1 ; the demander hence “moves further
down” the demand curve. However, increasing electricity consumption necessitates
that the demander pays for the corresponding amount of electricity. The resulting
costs aremeasuredby the last termof Eq. (7.20)where, for the given example, pbt1 is the
per-unit bid price. Selling electricity at time t1 (D t1 <D t0) implies that the demander
steps back from the purchase of some quantities initially obtained in the day-ahead
market. As a consequence, the demander loses some gross benefit. This is measured
12Since the general procedure and results are similar to the insights presented for the power
generators, the following focuses on the most important aspects.
13As for the case of the power generator, we shall assume that the demander is risk neutral and only
submits offers when the outcomes of all previous trades are definite (the previous offers either were
successful, expired, or were cancelled).
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in the second part of Eq. (7.20) as the sign of the integral changes if the upper bound
is below the lower bound of integration. To compensate for the (future) loss in gross
benefit, the demander receives revenue from selling the quantities at ask price pat1 .
Because profit function Eq. (7.20) keeps track of these effects until a given time tn , we
can also write more compactly:
pitn =
D t0∫
0
(a−bD)dD−pt0D t0 +
D tn∫
D t0
(a−bD)dD−
n∑
i=1
pb/ati
(
D ti −D ti−1
)
. (7.21)
The profit for the future hour at tn thus equals the day-ahead surplus plus the change
in gross benefit due to moving fromD t0 toD tn minus the total expenditures and plus
the total revenues from intraday transactions until tn .
We shall now calculate offer prices that ensure indifference between adjusting
future electricity consumption at tn and remaining in the position held at tn−1. To
do so, we have to set pitn =pitn−1 and can find after somemanipulation that
p¯b/atn =
∫ D tn
D tn−1
(a−bD)dD
D tn −D tn−1
. (7.22)
Hence, the indifference offer price is the change in (future) gross benefit induced
by the adjustment of electricity consumption divided by the magnitude of this
adjustment. Plugging in the antiderivatives and simplifying results in
p¯b/atn = a−b
D tn +D tn−1
2
. (7.23)
Not surprisingly, Eq. (7.23) shows that the indifference offer price depends on the
prohibitive price a, the slope parameter b, and on the magnitude of the adjustment
of electricity consumption.
7.2.2 Calculation of optimal offer prices
Finding offer prices which consider the trade-off between profit and risk is analogous
to the case of power generators presented in Sect. 7.1.4.3. Applying the introduced
procedure results in
pbtn =
∫ Dtn
Dtn−1
(a−bD)dD
D tn−D tn−1 −
F
(
pbtn
)
f
(
pbtn
) bid ,
patn =
∫ Dtn
Dtn−1
(a−bD)dD
D tn−D tn−1 +
S
(
patn
)
f
(
patn
) ask,
(7.24)
for buying (D tn > D tn−1) or selling (D tn < D tn−1) electricity. Note that the first term
is the indifference offer price as given by Eq. (7.23). As the conditions in Eq. (7.24)
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only differ in terms of the indifference price from the conditions derived for power
generators, see Eq. (7.19), a solution procedure for deriving optimal offer prices is
valid for both power generators and electricity demanders.
7.3 Specifying optimal offer prices
7.3.1 Weibull distribution and Newton’s method
We shall now specify Eq. (7.19) and Eq. (7.24) by using the Weibull distribution to
calculate optimal offer prices. The Weibull distribution is well suited for this purpose
because it allows modelling cumulative distribution functions with various shapes
and enables relatively easy calculations. The three-parameter cumulative distribution
function F is
F
(
pbtn
)
=
 1−exp
{
−
(
pbtn−θ
λ
)γ}
0
pbtn −θ ≥ 0
pbtn −θ < 0,
where parameter γ > 0 determines the shape and parameter λ > 0 the scale of the
distribution. Parameter θ is the location parameter and makes it possible to “slide”
the function on the abscissa (for more insights see e. g. Rinne, 2009).
Figure 7.3: Illustration of theWeibull cumulative distribution function for various parameter
specifications.
Fig. 7.3 shows how these parameters determine the Weibull CDF. With reference
to Sect. 7.1.4.2, we shall assume that the cumulative distribution and the survival
function (S = 1−F ) image how a market participant evaluates the probability that an
offer will be successful within a specified time period. Take the distribution function
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with γ=2, λ=e20/MWh, and θ =e40/MWh in Fig. 7.3 as an example: The market
participant believes that submitting a bidwith a price below and includinge40/MWh
will be unsuccessful. Submitting higher priced bids then increases the probability of
success until at approx. e80/MWh a successful transaction is expected with near
certainty within the specified time period. For all following evaluations, we shall
define that γ is greater than one. The reason is that a shape parameter greater than
one implies a hazard rate which increases and a reversed hazard rate which decreases
with the offer price (compare e. g. Todinov, 2005). This accounts for the definitions in
Sect. 7.1.4.3.
With
f
(
pbtn
)
=

γ
λ
(
pbtn−θ
λ
)γ−1
exp
{
−
(
pbtn−θ
λ
)γ}
0
pbtn −θ ≥ 0
pbtn −θ < 0
being the derivative of the cumulative distribution function and therefore the prob-
ability density function, we can specify Eq. (7.19) as well as Eq. (7.24) and find after
somemanipulation
p¯btn −pbtn +
λγ
γ
(
pbtn −θ
)1−γ (
1−exp
{(
pbtn −θ
λ
)γ})
= 0 (7.25)
for bidding to buy electricity. The optimal bid price pbtn has to be found by choosing its
value so that Eq. (7.25) is fulfilled. Note that it is only meaningful to calculate optimal
bid prices if the indifference price p¯btn is above the location parameter θ. Otherwise, an
offer priced at p¯btn and below is believed to have zero success probability so that there
is no trade-off between profit and risk. Following from this understanding, Eq. (7.25)
is only defined for pbtn > θ.
For asking to sell electricity, we have from Eq. (7.19) or Eq. (7.24) together with the
specification of the Weibull hazard rate that the optimal ask price can be calculated
with
p¯atn −patn +
λγ
γ
(
patn −θ
)1−γ = 0. (7.26)
In contrast to bidding to buy electricity, Eq. (7.26) can be used to find optimal prices
even if the indifference offer price is below θ. This is because the location parameter
has a different interpretation in the case of submitting ask prices; it defines the
boundary where the market participant believes offers to become risky. Hence, the
survival function S equals one (100 percent success probability) for ask prices lower
than and equal to θ and starts to slope downwards after passing θ. Since we are
interested in solving the trade-off between profit and risk as imaged in the form of
Eq. (7.19), Eq. (7.26) is only defined for patn > θ. Analogue to the case of calculating bid
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prices, the optimal ask price has to be chosen so that the left-hand side of Eq. (7.26)
yields zero.14
Figure 7.4: Illustration of the procedure behind the Newton-Raphson method (based on
Dennis Jr. and Schnabel, 1996).
To solve Eq. (7.25) and Eq. (7.26), we shall use the Newton-Raphson method,
which allows approximation of the root of a function by iteration. The following shows
the procedure—based on Dennis Jr. and Schnabel (1996)—for function g = g
(
pbtn
)
,
which is defined by Eq. (7.25). The first step of the Newton-Raphson method is to
choose an initial estimate for pbtn , preferably close to the value which results in
g
(
pbtn
)
= 0. To improve the approximation of the root, we have to find the tangent
line to the point determined by the initial estimate. As Fig. 7.4 shows, the point where
the tangent line intersects the abscissa provides a better estimation of the root. If we
denote the current estimate
{
pbtn
}
N
and the new estimate
{
pbtn
}
N+1, Fig. 7.4 provides
the following two relations: {
pbtn
}
N+1 =
{
pbtn
}
N
+∆pbtn ,
g
′ ({
pbtn
}
N
)
=−
g
({
pbtn
}
N
)
∆pbtn
.
14If we choose γ = 2, Eq. (7.26) reduces to a quadratic equation and we have an algebraic solution
with
patn =
1
2
(
p¯atn +θ
)
+
√(
−1
2
(
p¯atn +θ
))2
− p¯atnθ+
1
2
λ2.
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Combining these equations makes it possible to find the new estimate subject to the
current estimate, its associated function value, and the derivative of g at the current
estimate with
{
pbtn
}
N+1 =
{
pbtn
}
N
−
g
({
pbtn
}
N
)
g ′
({
pbtn
}
N
) . (7.27)
Using Eq. (7.27) multiple times to iteratively improve the current estimate allows
us to approximate the root of g and hence the optimal offer price with high accuracy.
For bidding to buy electricity, Eq. (7.27) becomes
{
pbtn
}
N+1 =
{
pbtn
}
N
−
p¯btn −
{
pbtn
}
N
+ λγγ
({
pbtn
}
N
−θ
)1−γ
−1−λγ
(
γ−1
γ
)({
pbtn
}
N
−θ
)−γ · · ·cont. · · ·
· · ·
(
1−exp
{( {
pbtn
}
N
−θ
λ
)γ})
−exp
{( {
pbtn
}
N
−θ
λ
)γ}[
1−λγ
(
γ−1
γ
)({
pbtn
}
N
−θ
)−γ] , (7.28)
and for asking to sell electricity, we have
{
patn
}
N+1 =
{
patn
}
N
−
p¯atn −
{
patn
}
N
+ λγγ
({
patn
}
N
−θ
)1−γ
−1−λγ
(
γ−1
γ
)({
patn
}
N
−θ
)−γ . (7.29)
The (correct) convergence of the Newton-Raphson method depends on the first
estimate of the root (see Dennis Jr. and Schnabel, 1996; Kelley, 2003). To determine
such an adequate starting point for approximating the optimal bid price, we have to
investigate the function g in detail. To begin with, note that the optimal bid price
(and therefore the root of the function) must lie between θ and the indifference price
p¯btn . This is because submitting a bid price less than or equal to the Weibull location
parameter θ has zero success probability and thus does not generate additional
profit (compare Fig. 7.3). Although choosing a bid price higher than or equal to the
indifference price may result in a successful transaction, it either does not increase
the market participant’s profit (pbtn = p¯btn ) or even lowers it (pbtn > p¯btn ). Consider, in
this context, the value of g as pbtn approaches θ from the right:
lim
pbtn→θ+
p¯btn −pbtn +
λγ
γ
(
pbtn −θ
)1−γ (
1−exp
{(
pbtn −θ
λ
)γ})
= p¯btn −θ > 0.
Due to the fact that p¯btn > θ by definition, the function value is positive. Investigating
the value of g at the indifference offer price with
71
CHAPTER 7. PRICE-SETTING DECISIONS IN CONTINUOUS INTRADAY MARKETS
g
(
p¯btn
)
= λ
γ
γ
(
p¯btn −θ
)1−γ (
1−exp
{(
p¯btn −θ
λ
)γ})
< 0
indicates that the function slopes downwards, intersects the abscissa to the right of
θ, and has a negative value at p¯btn . To verify this, we can check if the derivative of
Eq. (7.25)
∂g
(
pbtn
)
∂pbtn
=−1−λγ
(
γ−1
γ
)(
pbtn −θ
)−γ
−exp
{(
pbtn −θ
λ
)γ}[
1−λγ
(
γ−1
γ
)(
pbtn −θ
)−γ]
(7.30)
is negative for pbtn > θ given that γ > 1. Out of one million computer evaluations,
∂g
(
pbtn
)
/∂pbtn was indeed always negative.
15 This means that the function g defined
by Eq. (7.25) decreases monotonically and has only one root to the right of θ. As a
consequence, we shall choose 1/2
(
θ+ p¯btn
)
as the initial estimate of the function’s root.
In terms of selling electricity, we know that the optimal ask price must be higher
than both θ and the indifference price p¯atn . Hence, the root of the function g = g
(
patn
)
defined by Eq. (7.26) does not lie in an interval which is bounded by the location
parameter and the indifference offer price. For a situation where p¯atn > θ, we have
that
g
(
p¯atn
)= λγ
γ
(
p¯atn −θ
)1−γ
is positive. For a situation where p¯atn ≤ θ, the location parameter constitutes the
relevant boundary and
lim
patn→θ+
p¯atn −patn +
λγ
γ
(
patn −θ
)1−γ
results in a positive function value (γ should be well above one). Because of
lim
patn→∞
p¯atn −patn +
λγ
γ
(
patn −θ
)1−γ =−∞,
g has at least one root. Due to the fact that the derivative
15Each of the one million computer computations was performed as follows: The required
parameters were specified with the help of uniformly distributed random numbers while choosing 1
< γ ≤ 5, 0 < λ ≤ e100/MWh, and -(e50/MWh) ≤ θ ≤ e100/MWh (the limits were chosen arbitrarily
but are more extreme than the values that should emerge during actual price-setting decisions). Given
these specifications, the value of Eq. (7.30) was calculated for offer prices above θ with a step size of
e0.1/MWh.
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∂g
(
patn
)
∂patn
=−1−λγ
(
γ−1
γ
)(
patn −θ
)−γ
is negative for all patn greater than θ given that γ > 1, the function decreases mono-
tonically and the root is unique. As a consequence of these insights, we shall choose
θ+|θ| as the initial estimate of the function’s root.
Although 1/2
(
θ+ p¯btn
)
and θ+|θ| can be expected to be adequate initial estimates,
they do not guarantee that the Newton-Raphsonmethod finds the optimal offer price.
For example, it may be that the functions defined by Eq. (7.25) and Eq. (7.26) have a
root to the left of θ. This means that the iteration proceduremay not always converge
to the root which corresponds to the optimal offer price (the root to the right of θ).
To address this fact, the Newton-Raphsonmethod is complemented in three respects
(compare in this context Dennis Jr. and Schnabel, 1996). First, the initial estimate is
corrected before the iteration procedure starts if it results in a high absolute function
value. Given that g
(
pb/atn
)
is high and positive, the value of the initial estimate is
increased until the corresponding function value is sufficiently low and thus closer
to the function’s root. If g
(
pb/atn
)
is high and negative, the root is located to the left of
the initial estimate so that the starting value is lowered. Second, if a current estimate{
pb/atn
}
N
results in a new estimate
{
pb/atn
}
N+1 which is lower than or equal to θ, the
current estimate is adjusted with{
pb/atn
}
N
← 1
2
(
θ+
{
pb/atn
}
N
)
until it results in a new estimate of the root that is above θ. This excludes a potential
root to the left of θ as a solution. Third, if a new estimate
{
pb/atn
}
N+1 calculated with
Eq. (7.28) or Eq. (7.29) is greater than θ but results in an absolute function value
which is higher than the one corresponding to the current estimate
{
pb/atn
}
N
, the
new estimate is rejected (see Dennis Jr. and Schnabel, 1996, p. 26). By replacing the
rejected estimate with {
pb/atn
}
N+1←
1
2
({
pb/atn
}
N
+
{
pb/atn
}
N+1
)
until g
(
pb/atn
)
is not higher than the function value resulting from the current estimate,
we can ensure that an iteration step does not worsen the approximation of the root.
AppendixB and AppendixC show how this adapted Newton-Raphsonmethod can be
implemented in MATLAB.
To verify that optimal offer prices can be calculated reliably, the program doc-
umented in AppendixD chooses the required parameter values (e. g. the Weibull
parameters) randomly at specified intervals, applies the Newton-Raphson method
as implemented in AppendixB, and then validates whether the approximated root
is higher than θ and results in a function value which is sufficiently close to zero.
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Furthermore, the program uses the calculated optimal offer price to determine the
corresponding expected profit and checkswhether nohigher profit level canbe found.
Out of one million evaluations, the adapted Newton-Raphson method converged to
the root located to the right of θ every time and this root maximised the expected
profit function (7.15) globally.
7.3.2 Evaluation of the probability of success
So far, we have not explicitly discussed how to construct a cumulative distribution
or a survival function which reflects the market expectation of a power generator or
electricity demander bymapping offer prices to their probability of success. Following
the approach presented in Sect. 7.1.4.2, thismarket expectation can be describedwith
a probability density function for the lowest (highest)market bid (ask) price emerging
within a specified time period.
Figure 7.5: Construction of a probability density function and a cumulative distribution
function for the random variable B with bh =e50/MWh, Fh =0.9, bl =e40/MWh, Fl =0.1, and
γ=3.
To find explicit expressions for the Weibull parameters that determine the PDF of
the random variable B (lowest market bid price), consider
Fh = 1−exp
{
−
(
bh−θ
λ
)γ}
,
Fl = 1−exp
{
−
(
bl−θ
λ
)γ}
,
where Fh is the probability mass to the left of bh and Fl the probability mass to the
left of bl . The subscript “h” stands for “high” and the subscript “l” for “low” so that
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bh > bl and Fh > Fl . Note that by treating bh/l , Fh/l , and γ as given parameters, we
have a system of equations in two variables. For the case of asking to sell electricity,
Sh is the probability mass to the right of ah and Sl is the probability mass to the right
of al (ah > al and Sh < Sl ):
Sh = exp
{
−
(
ah−θ
λ
)γ}
,
Sl = exp
{
−
(
al−θ
λ
)γ}
.
Again, we have a system of equations in two variables whichwe shall first solve for the
location parameter as
θ = bh [− ln(1−Fl )]
1
γ −bl [− ln(1−Fh)]
1
γ
[− ln(1−Fl )]
1
γ −[− ln(1−Fh)]
1
γ
bid ,
θ = ah [− ln(Sl )]
1
γ −al [− ln(Sh)]
1
γ
[− ln(Sl )]
1
γ −[− ln(Sh )]
1
γ
ask.
(7.31)
Using Eq. 7.31, we can now calculate θ with bh/l (ah/l ), Fh/l (Sh/l ), and the shape
parameter γ. This is also the case for the scale parameter:
λ= bl−bh
[− ln(1−Fl )]
1
γ −[− ln(1−Fh)]
1
γ
bid ,
λ= al−ah
[− ln(Sl )]
1
γ −[− ln(Sh)]
1
γ
ask.
(7.32)
Hence, a market participant can construct a probability density function for the
lowest market bid price (the random variable B), for example, by deciding about the
values for bh/l , Fh/l , and γ. Assume in this context that a power generator expects
B to be below e50/MWh with a probability of 90 percent and below e40/MWh
with a probability of 10 percent (bh =e50/MWh, Fh =0.9, bl =e40/MWh, Fl =0.1)
and chooses γ=3 to model convex hazard and reversed hazard rate functions. This
gives θ =e34.43/MWhandλ=e11.79/MWhand the functions illustrated in Fig. 7.5.16
Themarket participant may obtain the information for constructing distribution and
survival functions by forming beliefs, using market data, or by a combination of the
two.
7.3.3 Insights into price-setting decisions
The following shall show that the presented approach to modelling price-setting
decisions in a continuous intraday market can indeed reflect reasonable strategies.
To do so, the derived equations for finding the optimal offer price, Eq. (7.28) and
16Note that the underlying assumption of using this approach to model how market participants
evaluate the probability of success is that the “belief functions” are continuous. The model of Cohen
et al. (1981) implies that probability jumps can exist at certain offer price levels.
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Eq. (7.29), are used to solve the trade-off between profit and risk numerically. In this
context, Fig. 7.6 shows a cumulative distribution function which maps bid prices to
their probability of success. Assume for the following analysis that the characteristics
of this function—and hence its parameters—are determined by a power generator
participating in a continuous intraday market with the help of market data and
trading experience. As the CDF shows, this generator expects that only prices above
e30/MWh have a chance of success. Submitting higher priced offers then increases
the success probability until at approx.e55/MWh a transaction is expected with near
certainty within a specified time period.
Figure 7.6: Optimal bid prices subject to the corresponding indifference prices and the
market environment as imaged via a cumulative distribution function.
We can now analyse how the generator responds to the CDF with the help of
three indifference bid prices (labelled P ,M , and B). As explained in Sect. 7.1.3, these
prices indicate how much a generator can pay for quantities in the intraday market
which replace own production without being worse off. Given an indifference price
of e65/MWh (P ), Fig. 7.6 illustrates that the risk-neutral power generator will bid
significantly less to maximise expected profit (e48.2/MWh at a success probability
of 83.2 percent). This is because moving away from P is associated with a relatively
small decrease in success probability. Put differently, the generator expects to have a
willingness to pay higher than nearly all of its competitors. That is, it can “close the
gap” (the flat section of the CDF) to the other buyers without taking a high risk of not
transacting with a seller. This emphasises that position P is highly desirable for the
generator because it implies a competitive advantage. As given by theCDF, submitting
the indifference price labelled M is evaluated to be successful with a probability of
47.8 percent. The generator hence believes that there is a relatively high likelihood
that the price of the market bid will not drop below the price of its offer. The CDF
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also reveals that bidding below M comes with a high loss of success probability. As
a consequence, the profit-maximising strategy is to choose an optimal price close to
the true valuation. The fact that the generator has to take a high risk if moving away
fromM only slightly underlines the profitability of the starting positionP . If the power
generator can only pay e35/MWh (B) or less in order not to be worse off in a market
environment imaged by the CDF, there is no relevant potential tomove away from the
indifference price. This is because submitting an offer with zero success probability
is profit-equivalent to transacting at the indifference price. As a consequence, the
generator chooses an optimal bid price very close to B .17
Figure 7.7: Optimal ask prices subject to the corresponding indifference prices and the
market environment as imaged via a survival function.
Fig. 7.7 shows how a market participant responds to a survival function which
maps ask prices to their probability of success. If a generator can produce electricity
at low per-unit costs (B), it can ask substantially above this indifference price. The
competitive advantage makes it possible to charge a high mark-up on per-unit costs
without increasing the risk of not transactingwith a buyer significantly. ForM ,moving
away from the indifference price is much riskier so that the optimal price is chosen
close toM . If a generator has high per-unit costs (P ), themarket environment imaged
by the survival function does not allow charging a relevant mark-up.
The above analysis not only shows that we can model reasonable price-setting
decisions but also makes it possible to give very general insights into the market
behaviour of different types of power generators. This is because the indifference
17As already explained, Eq. (7.28) only uses the price range above θ (in Fig. 7.6 above e30/MWh) to
find optimal bid prices. If an offer at the indifference price is believed to have zero success probability
(is equal to or below θ), a trade-off between profit and risk does not exist.
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Base-load Mid-load Peak-load
Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask
Per-unit costs (cda ) low mid high
Impact of PLC (κ) low low–mid high
Indiff. price (p¯b/atn ) low mid high
Spread (|cda − p¯b/atn |) low low–mid high
Opt. price (pb/atn ) low low–mid mid mid mid–high high
Spread (|p¯b/atn −p
b/a
tn
|) low high low low high low
Table 7.2: Evaluation of how the characteristics of base, mid, and peak-load generators (per-
unit costs of production, impact of partial load conditions) determine their indifference and
their optimal offer prices.
prices illustrated in Fig. 7.6 and Fig. 7.7 can be referenced to base, mid, and peak-
load generators. As base-load generators (e. g. lignite power plants) have low per-unit
costs of production, they also have low true valuations for the electricity they sell or
buy. We can hence consider their indifference prices to be represented by the prices
labelled “B”. For the reasons already explained, base-load generators should therefore
be able tomove further away from the indifference pricewhen asking to sell electricity.
This is indicated in Tab. 7.2 which extends Tab. 7.1 by the insights of this section. The
indifference offer prices labelled “M” can be referenced to mid-load generators (e. g.
coal-fired power plants). They should therefore often find themselves in a situation
where moving away from the indifference price is risky in the sense that a submitted
offer may not be successful. Peak-load generators (e. g. gas-fired power stations) have
high per-unit costs so that their true valuations are best described with the prices
labelled “P”. In tendency, their decision about howmuch to move away from the true
valuation will hence be inverse to the decision of base-load plants. For the reasons
already explained, peak-load generators should thus be able to charge a high mark-
downwhen buying electricity and only a small mark-upwhen asking to sell electricity.
Hence, their high true valuation implies a competitive advantage when buying and a
competitive disadvantage when selling electricity (compare Tab. 7.2).
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A simulation for continuous intradaymarkets
This chapter presents a computer simulation of a continuous intraday market by
making use of themodel proposed in Chap. 5 and the formulation of the price-setting
decisions derived in Chap. 7. Sect. 8.1 gives an overview of the general simulation
structure and calculation procedure. To show how the modelling approach can be
used to analyse concrete market situations, Sect. 8.2 implements the simulation for
the German power system. The results of this case study, which mainly focus on the
costs of balancing forecast errors, are presented in Sect. 8.3.
8.1 Structure and calculation procedure
8.1.1 Overview and setup of the simulation
Reflecting the insights of Chap. 5, Fig. 8.1 shows that the simulation models the
intraday market activity for a given hour in the future by calculating the day-ahead
dispatch for this hour and then allowing for adjustments of this initial allocation.
To find the “starting points” for transactions in the intraday market through the
day-ahead dispatch, we have to specify the power plant portfolio, fuel and carbon
prices, and the residual load very similarly to the procedure for dispatch optimisation
models (compare e. g. Gunkel et al., 2012; Abrell and Kunz, 2012; Barth et al., 2006).
As Fig. 8.1 illustrates, the simulation abstracts from continuous intraday trading by
considering discrete time steps.1 At each of these trading opportunities, intraday
offers are calculated based on the results of the previous time steps to construct an
open order book (OOB) from which the Central Renewables Manager can consume
quantities to correct for the forecast error of the feed-in from renewables. Due to
reasons of analysability and computation time, the simulation considers 10 time steps
and thus 10 possibilities to balance a forecast error for a given hour in the future.
1Note that in real market situations trading should not be considered continuous in the sense that
there are no decomposable activities of market participants. They have to evaluate the order book,
decide about the type, the quantity, and the price of the offer, and potentially wait until the offer is
successful. Thus, “continuous trading” must be understood as discrete trading actions with no relevant
restrictions regarding the frequency and the timing of trades.
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Aggregating the results of this sequential adjustment procedure allows calculation
of the volume-weighted average intraday market price and the costs for balancing
forecast errors, for example.
Figure 8.1: Overview of the simulation structure.
Fig. 8.2 gives more detailed insights into how this general structure is imple-
mented in MATLAB by illustrating the simulation’s main components (compare the
source code in AppendixE). To find the initial position for intraday transactions, the
first step is to perform the day-ahead dispatch for power generators. This requires
the calculation of day-ahead offer quantities and prices, the construction of a merit
order, and the decision about which generator is needed to cover the residual
load. After having distinguished dispatched from non-dispatched generators and
having constructed day-ahead demand curves for electricity demanders, the program
decides for the first time step if a market participant offers to buy or to sell electricity
(“Determine offer type”) and if this decision is consistent with the output constraints.
Next, the simulation calculates intraday offer quantities and prices for each generator
and demander by making use of the formalisations derived in Chap. 7. The resulting
intraday offers are then used to create an order book for the first time step by sorting
bids in descending and asks in ascending order with respect to their price. As Fig. 8.2
shows, the CRM either sells or buys quantities and thus consumes either bids or
asks from the order book (“Determine trade quantity”). This decision depends on
the direction and the magnitude of the forecast error for the given hour and on the
strategy of how the required correction is distributed to the 10 trading opportunities.
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Figure 8.2: Overview of the simulation calculation procedure.
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The program then evaluates and stores which offers are successful and updates the
positions of the generators and demanders. To simulate the transactions for the
second time step, the program moves back to “Determine offer type” and proceeds
accordingly. Once the results for the tenth time step have been determined, the simu-
lation uses the results fromall trading opportunities to calculate the volume-weighted
average price and performs further data evaluations. The following discusses the
sketched procedure in more detail.
8.1.2 Calculation of day-ahead offers and day-ahead dispatch
Calculating a power generator’s day-ahead offer for a given hour first requires deter-
mining the amount of capacity this generator submits to themarket. The assumption
is that each generator wants to produce as many quantities as possible.2 As a con-
sequence, the simulation calculates the per-unit costs of production at the reference
capacity, compare Eq. (7.6), and we shall consider this price-quantity combination to
constitute the day-ahead offer.3
Determining the day-ahead dispatch for a given hour first requires the construc-
tion of the supply curve for electricity (merit order). To do so, the day-ahead offers are
sorted in ascending orderwith respect to their price. Given a fixed residual load for the
respective hour (perfectly inelastic residual load curve), the simulation then checks
for each offer on the merit order whether it is located to the left of the output level
which is required as the power plant portfolio’s contribution to covering the electricity
demand. If this is the case, the generator is dispatched to produce the offered quantity
for the given hour. The last offer on themerit order required to satisfy the residual load
(provided by the “marginal generator”) sets the uniform clearing price of the auction.
For simplicity, we shall assume that the marginal generator can produce its offered
quantity entirely and that the clearing price is the offer price at this level of output.
Every generator with per-unit costs higher than the costs of the marginal generator is
not dispatched and thus has zero output for the respective hour.
In contrast to the supply side, there is no publicly available information on
electricity demanders that would allow modelling the day-ahead allocation for de-
manders adequately. For example, there is lack of knowledge how many entities
participate in the auction and how their characteristics determine their offers. As
a consequence, the program calculates the day-ahead allocations for electricity
demanders separately from the day-ahead dispatch of the power generators. More
2Power plant operators want to maximise the income from participating in the (competitive) day-
ahead market by earning the difference between the uniform clearing price of the auction and the per-
unit costs of production for as many quantities as possible. They thus have the incentive to produce at
reference capacity. However, commitments in other markets (e. g. in the balancing market) can entail
withholding production potential.
3For generators also providing heat (CHP plants), a heat credit should be subtracted from the day-
ahead offer price to approximate their costs of only producing electricity (compare IEA and NEA, 2010).
Note that this reflects the incentive of CHP generators to increase the likelihood of being dispatched in
the day-ahead auction in order to satisfy the heat demand.
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specifically, the consumption at the day-ahead clearing price of each demander is
selected out of a specified interval. To define the linear (inverse) demand curve for
each demander, the program allows specification of the price elasticity of demand for
the level of consumption at the day-ahead clearing price.
8.1.3 Offer type decision and output constraints
For each time step in the intraday market, the program first decides which type of
offer a generator or demander submits to the order book. The assumption is that
every market participant submits a new offer for each trading opportunity. Hence,
unsuccessful offers do not remain in the order book but are replaced with new bids
or asks to make use of all information accumulated until the respective time step. As
we can derive from Fig. 8.3, the decision as to whether to submit a bid or an ask is
modelled to depend on three aspects.
First andmost importantly, the decision is subject to the scheduled output level at
the previous time step. If, for example, a generator’s currently scheduled production
is equal or close to its maximum capacity (within the grey area to the left of Gre f
in Fig. 8.3), the probability that the generator will submit a bid is 100 percent. The
reason is that offering an ask would not respect the assumption that each trade in the
intraday market is subject to an adjustment of scheduled output within the output
constraints of the generator. This also implies that a scheduled output level equal
to minimum load or slightly above Gmin forces a dispatched generator to submit an
ask. Because non-dispatched generators have zero output initially, they want to avoid
leaving the intradaymarket with a position that corresponds to an output level below
minimum load. Therefore, the simulation checks close to the last trading opportunity
(starting from the eighth time step) whether the output currently scheduled is closer
to zero or closer to minimum load. If the latter is the case, the generator is forced to
submit an ask at the indifference offer price to reach the minimum load in each of
the remaining trading opportunities until the offer is successful. Should the current
position be closer to zero output, the generator is forced to buy back the sold quantity
at the indifference price.4 If these “forced offers” have not been successful by the last
time step, the simulation does not consider any penalty payments.
Second, the offer type decision depends on the direction of the forecast error
given that the output constraints are not restrictive. This implies that market partic-
ipants have information about whether the CRM has to correct for an under- or an
overestimation for a given hour and can respond accordingly. As illustrated in Fig. 8.3,
this response refers to the probability that either a bid or an ask is submitted. If the
CRM has to balance an underestimation of the output from renewables, it becomes
more likely that market participants submit bids. Given an overestimation for the
4Note that it can bemeaningful, in this context, tomodel that power generators submit offers which
reduce their profit. This is because the inability to produce below minimum load may require making
use of costly balancing services.
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respective hour, market participants “align their supply” to the CRM’s demand for
additional quantities in the intraday market by predominantly submitting asks.
Figure 8.3: Illustration of offer type decisions for power generators subject to the current
level of output, the position on the merit order, and the direction of the forecast error. The
percentages in brackets are probabilities that the respective offer type is submitted.
Third, the decision whether to submit a bid or an ask is subject to the generator’s
position on the merit order. As shown in Sect. 7.3.3, dispatched generators tend
to have a competitive advantage when selling electricity. This is because they can
produce at relatively low per-unit costs, which allows them to solve the trade-off
between profit and risk by charging a relatively high mark-up.5 As a consequence,
generators committed in the day-ahead auction should prefer to submit asks given
the ability to increase scheduled output. Following this understanding, we shall
5Furthermore, asking to sell electricity brings dispatched generators closer to their initial day-ahead
position. This is beneficial for profit-oriented traders without an actual need to adjust the allocation
fixed in the day-ahead market.
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assume that the preference to submit sell offers decreases with the level of per-unit
costs. Hence, a power generator positioned at the beginning of the merit order has
a stronger incentive to submit asks compared to a generator positioned close to the
market equilibrium. As indicated in Fig. 8.3, the simulation distinguishes whether a
dispatched generator’s per-unit costs are slightly or significantly below the day-ahead
clearing price (“slightly”: above 2/3 of the day-ahead price; “significantly”: below 2/3
of the day-ahead price). In the latter case, the probability that the generator submits
an ask is defined to be 25 percent (underestimation) or 90 percent (overestimation).
Given a position close to the clearing price of the day-ahead auction, the probability
decreases to 20 percent (underestimation) or 75 percent (overestimation).6 Note that
these probabilities imply that the direction of the forecast error has a more dominant
influence on the offer type decision than the position on the merit order. As non-
dispatched generators have relatively high per-unit costs and thus high willingness
to pay for replacing own production, they tend to have a competitive advantage in
the case of bidding to buy quantities in the intraday market. Thus, the assumption is
that they prefer to submit buy offers given the ability to reduce scheduled output. As
the probabilities in Fig. 8.3 show, however, this preference is suppressed if the CRM
corrects for an overestimation and also depends on the level of per-unit costs.
Similar to the case of power generators, an electricity demander always submits a
bid if its scheduled consumption at the previous time step is equal to or close to zero,
and an ask if its scheduled consumption is equal to or close to the saturation quantity.
Given that these restrictions are not binding, the offer type decision depends on the
direction of the forecast error and the position on the demand curve at the previous
time step relative to the day-ahead clearing price. More specifically, if the demand
curve maps the currently scheduled consumption to a price which is below 2/3 of the
day-ahead price, the demander will submit an ask with a probability of 40 percent
(underestimation) or 90 percent (overestimation). Thus, the simulation considers
that electricity demanders should prefer to reduce scheduled consumption in this
situation. The reason is twofold. First, the indifference ask price will be relatively low
so that the demander has more potential to charge a significant mark-up on this
price. Second, asking to sell electricity contributes to a return to the initial position
fixed in the day-ahead auction, which is beneficial for profit-oriented traders. If the
scheduled level of consumption corresponds to a price which is higher than 11/3
times the day-ahead price, the probability of submitting a bid shall amount to 90
percent (underestimation) or 40 percent (overestimation). Given such a position
on the demand curve, the resulting relatively high indifference bid price can mean
a competitive advantage and the demander moves closer to the initial day-ahead
position when offering to increase scheduled consumption. However, if the CRM has
to correct for an overestimation, the assumption is that the electricity demanders
suppress their preference to submit bids to some extent and align their offer type
6While the probabilities are chosen arbitrarily considering the general insights of Sect. 7.3.3, they
may be estimated empirically given adequate data availability.
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decision to the CRM’s need for buying additional quantities in the intraday market.
If the demand curve maps the scheduled consumption at the previous time step to a
price close to the day-ahead clearing price, the likelihood of submitting a bid shall be
70 percent (underestimation) or 30 percent (overestimation).
8.1.4 Calculation of intraday offers and open order book
After deciding about the type of offer to be submitted by the market participants,
the simulation calculates the quantity and the price for each limit order. Regarding
the amount of electricity to be bought or sold, the program makes use of uniformly
distributed random numbers to choose a quantity greater than or equal to one
megawatt hour and smaller than or equal to 50MWh while respecting the output or
consumption constraints. This interval shall reflect that market participants prefer to
trade rather small quantities due to the higher probability that the order is successful
(compare in this context Lo and Sapp, 2010).
Given the quantity decision, the program first finds the indifference offer price
with Eq. (7.11) and then uses Eq. (7.28) to calculate optimal bid prices and Eq. (7.29) to
calculate optimal ask prices by iteration.Whereas theWeibull shapeparameterγ is set
to three (convex hazard and reversed hazard rate functions), the location parameter
θ and the scale parameter λ are constructed from the results of the previous time
steps using the approach presented in Sect. 7.3.2. This requires evaluation of the
success probability at two price levels. In this context, the simulation stores the
highest and the lowest successful limit order price at each trading opportunity (that
is, the price of the first and the last limit order consumed by the CRM). At a given
time step, the program then calculates four average prices over all previous time
steps: i) the average highest bid price, ii) the average lowest ask price, iii) the average
lowest bid price, and iv) the average highest ask price.7 Given these price levels, the
assumption is that the market participants will evaluate submitting a bid (an ask)
at the average highest bid price (average lowest ask price) to be successful with a
probability of 80 percent. Pricing a bid (an ask) at the average of all previous lowest
bid prices (highest ask prices) shall be evaluated to be successful with a probability
of 20 percent. Therefore, we can use Eq. (7.31) and Eq. (7.32) to find the Weibull
parameters required for the calculation of optimal offer prices. This approach implies
that market participants construct and update “belief functions” (distribution and
survival functions) by observing the open order book.8 As these functions determine
7For the first time step, the highest bid and the lowest ask price equal the day-ahead clearing price
and the lowest bid price (highest ask price) is set to the day-ahead price minus (plus)e10/MWh.
8Note that we shall interpret the offer type decision and the evaluated probability of success as the
market participant’s subjective beliefs. If, for example, a power generator submits a bid at a given time
step, it “expects” the CRM to sell quantities. Given this expectation, the generatormay choose a bid price
which is believed to result in a success probability of almost 100 percent. However, this does not mean
that the simulation models this bid to be successful with this likelihood. If, for example, the CRMwants
to buy electricity at this particular trading opportunity, the generator’s bid will be unsuccessful and the
formed beliefs turn out to be incorrect.
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the solution to the trade-off between profit and risk, the simulation incorporates a
feedback between strategic price-setting decisions and past market activity.
The order book is constructed by sorting the price-quantity offers of all power
generators and electricity demanders in descending order (bids) or ascending order
(asks) with respect to their price. The order book in the simulation contains eachmar-
ket participant’s identification number, information on the type ofmarket participant
(generator or demander), the offered quantity, the indifference price, and the optimal
offer price.
8.1.5 Determination of balancing decisions
As extensively discussed in Chap. 5, the CRM participates in the intraday market
to balance forecast errors of the feed-in from renewables. To model this activity in
the simulation, the program must decide for each of the 10 time steps how much
electricity the CRM consumes from the order book.
Figure 8.4: Illustration of theCRM’s profile to balance forecast errors. The light grey dots show
the quantity that has to be traded in response to the evolution of the forecast error (dark grey
squares).
In this context, Fig. 8.4 shows a possible profile which can be used to make this
decision. On the abscissa, time step “0” refers to the closure of the day-ahead market
and the subsequent 10 time steps refer to trading opportunities in the intradaymarket
before physical delivery.9 The dark grey squares illustrate for each of these time steps
the expected forecast error at physical delivery. This expectation is expressed on the
9Note that it is not necessary to think of the first time step as the first possibility to trade in the
intraday market; that is, time step “1” can be close to real time. Furthermore, there is no need for
considering the intervals between the time steps to be equal.
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ordinate as a share of the actual forecast error at physical delivery. The actual forecast
error is the difference between the day-ahead forecasted output from renewables and
the measured output at real time. For example, consider the input for a simulation
run to be an actual forecast error of +1,000MW (overestimation). Because at time step
“10” the dark grey square maps to the share of 100 percent, the CRM’s expectation
of the forecast error equals the actual forecast error. At time step “6”, however, the
expectation is that the overestimation only amounts to 400MW (the share of 40
percent multiplied with the actual forecast error of +1,000MW). Hence, the program
implicitly models that the CRM receives new information on the forecast error over
time and has an accurate short-term forecast at the last opportunity to trade in the
intraday market.
The light grey dots in Fig. 8.4 map to the trade quantity at each time step.
This quantity is expressed as a share of the actual forecast error. Given an actual
overestimation of +1,000MW, the CRM expects at time step “1” that the forecast error
amounts to -50MW (underestimation). To correct for this anticipated imbalance,
the CRM sells 50MW in the intraday market. At the second time step, the short-
term forecast indicates a deviation of -150MW so that the CRM sells the additional
100MW at this time step. The relative shares presented in Fig. 8.4 hence imply that
the accuracy of the short-term forecast improves over time. At the beginning, theCRM
trades some quantities in the opposite direction of the actual forecast error and then
steadily trades in the correct direction until the deviation from the day-ahead forecast
is fully resolved at the last time step. Although the given explanation linked the trading
decisions to the evolution of the forecast error over time, there is no necessity to do so.
Hence, we shall simply call the decision about which quantity to trade at which time
step the “balancing profile”.
This balancing profile may be defined explicitly (e. g. as shown in Fig. 8.4) or
can be found randomly for each simulated hour. In the latter case, the program
uses uniformly distributed random numbers to determine which quantity is sold or
bought at each time step while considering the following three restrictions. First, the
actual forecast error must be balanced by the last trading opportunity.10 Second, no
more than 25 percent of the actual forecast error is traded at each of the 10 adjustment
opportunities. Third, the likelihood that electricity is sold (bought) at a given time
step is 75 percent in cases where the actual forecast error of the respective hour refers
to an underestimation (overestimation). These restrictions shall thus ensure that the
program generates “plausible” trading decisions.
8.1.6 Calculation of intraday transactions and intraday price
Following the analytical framework of Chap. 5, the simulation models that the CRM
chooses from the offers stored in the order book and prefers high over low bid prices
and low over high ask prices, which implies trading with market orders. Resulting
10More precisely, the program is allowed to have a tolerance of 0.5 percent in matching the required
quantity to fully resolve the forecast error.
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from the determination of the balancing profile, the assumption is that the CRM
consumes either bids (current underestimation) or asks (current overestimation) at a
given time step. The resulting interactionwith the order book is determined as follows:
The program starts with the first entry on the respective side of the order book and
checks for every offer if its quantity is required to cover the adjustment need of the
CRM. Given that this is the case, the offer is successful and we shall refer to this event
as the realisation of a transaction between the market participant and the CRM.11
The volume-weighted average intraday market price is calculated by using the
information associated with these transactions. More specifically, the program calcu-
lates the product of price and quantity for every transaction taking place at one of the
10 trading opportunities. Adding up these products and dividing the sum by the total
traded quantity gives the volume weighted-average price for the simulated hour.
8.2 Implementation for the German intradaymarket
8.2.1 Power plant portfolio
The portfolio of power generators considered in the implementation for the German
power system refers to the fossil-fuelled power plants in Germany as listed in the
database of the Bundesnetzagentur for 2012 (BNetzA, 2014b). While the database
considers all power plants with a nominal capacity equal to or above 10MW, the
simulation only incorporates nuclear, lignite, coal, natural gas, and oil-fired power
stations explicitly.12 The annual output from biomass plants (39.7TWh), run-of-river
and hydro reservoir installations (21.8TWh), and production usingwaste (5TWh) and
other energy carriers (25.7TWh) are treated as feed-in from must-run technologies
(data from Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen e.V., 2014).13 For pumped-hydro
storage plants, the simplifying assumption is that they demand electricity in off-
peak hours and sell electricity in peak hours. Therefore, their demand of 10.3TWh
in 2012 (BNetzA, 2014a) is evenly spread among all hours between 8p.m. and 8a.m.
Assuming a round-trip efficiency of 75 percent, 7.7 TWh are evenly spread among all
remaining peak hours when the electricity price can be expected to be relatively high.
Each power generator considered explicitly in the simulation is characterised by
the following parameters:
• Identification number of generator (e. g. “1”)
• Name of generator (e. g. “Isar 2”)
11If the quantity of the last required offer is not fully needed to match the trade quantity of the CRM,
only the respective part is consumed. For simplicity, however, the simulation models that the market
participant considers the offer to be successful in its entirety.
12Note that the simulation approach treats each power generator as an individualmarket participant.
In real market situations, power generation companies can be expected to take their entire generation
portfolio into consideration when trading in the intraday market.
13In contrast to thermal power plants, we can assume that the characteristics of these technologies
(e. g. very lowmarginal costs) make it possible to produce independently from the level of demand.
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• Type of generation technology (e. g. “nuclear”)
• Type of fuel used (e. g. “uranium”)
• Combined Heat and Power (e. g. “no”)
• Reference capacity (e. g. 1,184MW)
• Minimum load (e. g. 637MW)
• Heat capacity (e. g. 0MW)
• Efficiency at reference capacity (e. g. 0.33)
• Efficiency at minimum load (e. g. 0.297)
• Emission factor (e. g. 0 tCO2/kWhth)
The reference capacity of each generator is calculated by multiplying the nominal
capacity with a technology-specific availability factor. This factor aims to incorporate
non-availability due to maintenance or power outages, and in the case of CHP plants
the lower electricity output due to heat restrictions. The assumed availability factors,
taken from Schröder et al. (2013, p. 71), are 84 percent for nuclear plants, 87 percent
for coal plants, and 90 percent for lignite, Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT), as well
as Open Cycle Oil Turbine (OCOT) generators. The availability for Combined Cycle
Gas Turbines (CCGT) amounts to 91 percent, and gas steam as well as oil turbines
are assumed to be available in 89 percent of the hours of a year. Power stations
also producing heat (CHP) are assumed to have only 5,500 full-load hours (compare
Schröder et al., 2013, p. 54). This shall reflect that their electricity output can be
substantially limited due to the level of heat demand. A generator is classified as
a CHP plant if the maximum heat capacity is higher than the nominal capacity.
Otherwise, the provision of heat is not considered to constrain the decision regarding
electricity output. In total, a nominal capacity of 11.6GW is classified as providing
both heat and power.14 The simulation allows generators with a reference capacity
below a specified limit to be excluded from participating in the intraday market.
This participation limit is set to 50MW if not stated otherwise and shall reflect that
participation costs can be too high for small power generators.
Due to the lack of reliable, generator-specific information on the conversion from
fuel to electricity at minimum load, the following assumptions are made. Nuclear,
lignite, and coal plants have an efficiency atminimum load which is 10 percent below
their efficiency at reference capacity. Gas and oil-fired generators are more strongly
affected by partial load conditions so that we shall assume a 20 percent reduction
of their reference efficiency when producing at minimum load (compare Leuthold
et al., 2012). As explained in Sect. 7.1.2, this information is required to determine how
output adjustments affect the efficiency factor (parameter κ) and thus the per-unit
costs of production. Besidesκ, specifying the efficiency function requires definition of
the parameter β. All simulation runs are performed with β= 2 for modelling concave
efficiency functions (see Fig. 7.1 for illustrations).
14A heat credit ofe35/MWhel is subtracted from the day-ahead offer price to approximate the costs
of only producing electricity (compare IEA and NEA, 2010, p. 58).
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8.2.2 Electricity demanders
In stark contrast to the power generators, there is no relevant, publicly available
information about the characteristics of the electricity demanders that trade in the
German electricity market. As a consequence, their attributes have to be based
entirely on assumptions.
The number of demanders participating in the intraday market for a given hour
shall depend on the level of electricity demand as follows: The program creates an
electricity demander with a day-ahead consumption between 100 and 300MW until
the combined consumption of all demanders is equal to 25 percent of the output
required from thepower plant portfolio.Hence, the demanders trading in the intraday
market are assumed to hold a relatively small amount of the entire electricity demand.
For each demander and if not stated otherwise, the price elasticity of demand
for the level of consumption at the day-ahead clearing price is assumed to be -0.15
(compare Lijesen, 2007). This allows calculation of the slope of the demand curve, the
prohibitive price, and the saturation quantity for each demander. Note that the slopes
differ between market participants. This is because each demander has a different
day-ahead consumption so that the specified price elasticity of demand refers to a
different point on the demand curve. An electricity demander with a lower day-ahead
consumption has a steeper demand curve.
8.2.3 Electricity demand and renewable production
The electricity demand in Germany for 2012 is provided by ENTSO-E (2014a) and
amounted to 539.9TWh. This quantity includes network losses and leaves out the
trade surplus and the demand of pumped-hydro storage plants (both aspects are
considered separately). The electricity demand is allocated to each hour of the year
with the help of hourly load values published by ENTSO-E (2014a) and the procedure
proposed in Egerer et al. (2014, p. 19).
The electricity exchange with Germany’s neighbouring countries is not endog-
enously modelled. The hourly net export is calculated based on ENTSO-E (2014b)
and added to the hourly electricity demand. If the net export is positive, the power
generators have to generate more electricity than domestically demanded because
quantities are exported to othermarket areas. Given anegative net export, the imports
exceed the exports so that the German power plant portfolio is relieved by this
difference. The simulation considers the electricity exchange only for determining the
day-ahead dispatch; there are no interactions with other market areas in the intraday
market.
Hourly values for the forecasted and the actual feed-in from wind turbines and
photovoltaic installations are from EEX Transparency (2014). The forecast error used
in the simulation is calculated as the difference between the anticipated and the
actual feed-in. If not stated otherwise, the forecast error is distributed to the 10 trading
opportunities using a randomly calculated balancing profile (compare Sect. 8.1.5).
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Because we shall model renewables as a “must-run” technology with zero marginal
costs, their production is subtracted from the electricity demand. The amount of
output required from the power plant portfolio for a given hour thus equals the
domestic electricity demand, plus the net export to neighbouring countries, and
minus the output from weather-dependent renewables as well as the output from
technologies not explicitly considered in the simulation, such as water and biomass
production (recall Sect. 8.2.1). If the actual feed-in from renewable energy sources is
used for this calculation, we shall refer to the resulting figure as the “actual residual
load” fromnow on. Given that the forecasted feed-in is subtracted from the electricity
demand, we shall speak of the “expected residual load”. The expected residual load is
the basis for the day-ahead dispatch of the power generators.
8.2.4 Fuel and carbon prices
As lignite is not traded but converted into electricity where it is mined, its price is
assumed to be e4.5/MWhth (compare Traber and Kemfert, 2011; Wissel et al., 2010).
Similarly, we shall assume that the uranium price amounts toe3.5/MWhth (compare
Traber and Kemfert, 2011; Egerer et al., 2014; Wissel et al., 2010). Both prices are
considered to be constant over the year. For coal, the quarterly prices are from BAFA
(2014b). With an average of e11.42/MWhth , they are nearly four times as high as the
price for lignite. The prices for natural gas are the daily reference prices from EEX
(2014b) for the GASPOOL market area while considering location-spreads with the
market areas “Title Transfer Facility” (TTF) and “NetConnect Germany” (NCG). The
monthly oil price is taken from BAFA (2014a) and converted to euro per megawatt
hour thermal with 41.9MJ/kg. The yearly average price amounts toe55.2/MWhth .
To address the fact that the energy carriers have to be transported and (possibly)
stored, the simulation considers a mark-up on each fuel price. For uranium and
lignite, this mark-up is zero because uranium is needed only in small quantities and
lignite is mined very close to the power station. The mark-up for coal is defined
to be e1/MWhth and shall amount to e2/MWhth for natural gas and oil. The
simulation furthermore considers operation andmaintenance costs ofe3/MWhel for
all conventional production technologies except for gas-fired generators (e2/MWhel )
(compare in this context Schröder et al., 2013). These costs are added to the day-ahead
offer price and we shall assume that they vary with the level of output for the sake of
simplicity.
The carbon price refers to the price of European Emission Allowances as pub-
lished by EEX (2014a). Due to the lack of trading at weekends, the prices for Saturdays
and Sundays equal the price of the corresponding Friday. The yearly average carbon
price ise7.4/tCO2 .
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8.3 Results for the German intradaymarket
8.3.1 Validity of the simulation results
As the simulation relies on significant simplifications, it is essential to verify that
we can nevertheless obtain reality-related results. Therefore, the following shows to
which extent the presented intradaymarket simulation can reproduce day-ahead and
intraday prices of the German electricity market (EPEX SPOT).
(a) Day-ahead market (b) Intraday market
Figure 8.5: Left: Price Duration Curves for historical and simulated clearing prices of the
day-ahead auction (data from EEX, 2014c). Right: Price Duration Curves for historical and
simulated optimal and indifference intraday market prices (data from EPEX SPOT, 2014).
Fig. 8.5a compares actual and simulated day-ahead prices by sorting them in
descending order to generate PriceDurationCurves (PDCs).Whereas very high prices
(above e100/MWh) only occur in a few hours, prices between 60 and e40/MWh are
very frequent. Hence, the intersection of the merit order and the demand curve can
be found most often in this price range. Because the electricity demand is very low
for only a few hours, low or negative prices are also seldom results of the day-ahead
auction. Comparingmarket prices (“PDC (DA price) historical”) and simulated prices
(“PDC (DAprice)model”) shows that the presented simulation adequately reflects the
outcome of the day-ahead auction inmost hours of the year; theMean Absolute Error
amounts toe3.69/MWh. However, especially very high and very low prices cannot be
reproduced. There are several reasons for this common problem of electricity market
models. Two of them relate to the following aspects.
First, the simulation uses the entire power plant portfolio and electricity demand
for Germany to approximate day-ahead prices. However, in 2012 less than 50 percent
of Germany’s electricity demand was traded through the day-ahead market at the
EPEX SPOT (EEX, 2014c). This implies that not all entities of the supply and demand
side determine the outcome of the auction. Furthermore, the activity of these market
participants—and thus the supply and demand curves—varies from hour to hour.
93
CHAPTER 8. A SIMULATION FOR CONTINUOUS INTRADAY MARKETS
The consequences of these differences can lead to significant deviations between
historical and simulated prices, especially in hours where the electricity demand is
either very high or very low.
Second, the simulation cannot adequately reflect potential commitments in
other markets. For example, some power plant operators committed themselves to
providing negative balancing power. To ensure the ability to reduce output, they
may submit negative prices in the day-ahead auction to increase the likelihood that
the plant is operating. This means that in hours with low electricity demand, the
simulation results can strongly deviate from the outcome of the day-ahead auction.
This example shows that the merit order constructed for day-ahead dispatch models
cannot adequately reflect the incentives of market participants to depart from their
short-run marginal costs of production.
Figure 8.6: Time series of historical, optimal, and indifference intraday market prices for the
last seven days of March 2012. Data from EPEX SPOT (2014).
Fig. 8.5b shows Price Duration Curves for observed and simulated volume-
weighted average intraday market prices. The curve labelled “PDC (ID price) opt.”
is created from a simulation run where market participants submitted optimal offer
prices and therefore responded to the state of the order book. The curve labelled “PDC
(ID price) indiff.” is constructed from transactions which cleared at indifference offer
prices. These prices only reflect the costs of providing or the valuation of consuming
electricity and do not generate profit for the market participants submitting these
offers. Similar to the day-ahead market results, the Price Duration Curve can be
adequately reconstructed except for the few hours with very low and very high
price levels (not shown in Fig. 8.5b). This exemplifies the relevance of accurately
representing the day-ahead market for modelling intraday market results. In terms
of “PDC (ID price) opt.” the Mean Absolute Error is e2.67/MWh (compare Tab. 8.1).
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We can furthermore see from Fig. 8.5b that the PDC constructed from optimal offer
prices is closer to the historical market results.
Although Price Duration Curves are very useful for analysing the distribution of
price levels, they break up the timedependency. Therefore, Fig. 8.6 shows a time series
for historical, optimal, and indifference volume-weighted average intraday prices for
the seven days with the median Mean Absolute Error (the last seven days of March
2012, MAE = e8.8/MWh). We can see that the general price movements are followed
by both indifference and optimal prices. As already discussed, however, especially the
peaks are difficult to reproduce. In this regard, Fig. 8.6 indicates that optimal prices
better reflect the volatility of the observed market data. This is supported by the fact
that the standard deviation ofmarket prices for 2012 ise19.97/MWhand the standard
deviation of the simulated time series amounts to e16.61/MWh using optimal offer
prices and only toe15.50/MWh using indifference offer prices.
Figure 8.7: Comparison of historical and simulated intradaymarket prices for hours in which
the absolute day-ahead price difference is smaller than e3/MWh and the absolute forecast
error is greater than 3,000MW. Data from EEX (2014c); EPEX SPOT (2014).
The presented approach to modelling continuous intraday markets is strongly
determined by the outcomes of the day-ahead auction and refers to a power system
with a high share of renewables. It is therefore meaningful to inspect intraday prices
only for hours in which the calculated and observed day-ahead prices are very close
to each other and the forecast error is large. In this context, Fig. 8.7 compares volume-
weighted average intraday market prices given that the absolute day-ahead price
difference is smaller than e3/MWh and the absolute forecast error is greater than
3,000MW.We can see that the prices in the intraday market deviate strongly from the
corresponding day-ahead prices. This is due to the fact that the significant forecast
errors cause large deviations from the respective day-ahead equilibria (compare the
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explanations in Chap. 5). Fig. 8.7 shows that the program can image the magnitude of
these deviations adequately.
TShi stor ical TSmodel Pricescor rected PDCmodel
Mean [e/MWh] 43.59 44.03 — —
Min [e/MWh] -270.10 15.40 — —
Max [e/MWh] 273.00 137.80 — —
SD [e/MWh] 19.97 16.61 — —
PCC [%] — 72.11 82.29 91.69
MAE [e/MWh] — 9.42 6.88 2.67
RMSE [e/MWh] — 14.01 7.29 8.17
Table 8.1: Comparison of historical and simulated volume-weighted average intradaymarket
prices for the year 2012. The time series “TShi stor ical ” refers to data from EPEX SPOT
(2014). “Pricescor rected” compares historical and simulated intraday prices only for hours in
which the absolute difference between the observed and the simulated day-ahead price is
below e10/MWh (6,259 hours). The column labelled “PDCmodel ” gives information on the
comparison of Price Duration Curves constructed from historical and simulated prices.
To summarise, the simulation approach can reproduce day-ahead and intraday
market prices in a quality that enablesmarket analyses for drawing conclusions about
reality. However, especially imaging the outcomes of the day-ahead auction more
accurately would improve the model results for the intraday market significantly
(compare in this context the column labelled “Pricescor rected” in Tab. 8.1).
8.3.2 The response to the balancing of forecast errors
As explained in Sect. 8.1.4, the simulation models that market participants use in-
formation from the order book to form beliefs regarding the likelihood that offers
are successful. More specifically, power generators and electricity demanders update
distribution or survival functions based on observingmarket bid ormarket ask prices.
The following shows how the CRM’s interaction with the order book influences these
updates.
We shall first consider a situation where the expected residual load amounts
to 25GW and the CRM corrects for an underestimation of five gigawatts using the
balancing profile illustrated in Fig. 8.4. The cumulative distribution functions shown
in Fig. 8.8amap bid prices to their probability of success and indicate how themarket
participants respond to the CRM’s trading activity over the 10 time steps. For clarity
of visualisation, only the CDFs for the first, fifth, and tenth trading opportunity are
labelled. We can see that the distribution functions shift to the left and become less
steep if the CRM balances a relatively large underestimation by consuming bids from
the order book. This has three main implications for the market participants. First,
they expect a wider range of bid prices to be associated with a positive probability
of success. This implies that order book ranks further away from the top of the order
book possess a relevant likelihood that these ranks are sufficient for transacting with
the CRM. Second, the market participants believe that the success probability of a
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given bid price level covered by the CDF increases.15 Compared to the first time
steps where the CRM’s need to cover a relatively large underestimation could not
be deduced from its trading activity, holding the same order book rank later on is
evaluated as being less risky. Third, the power generators and electricity demanders
believe that varying the bid price has a smaller impact on the bid’s chance of success.
Thus, the difference in success probability between two consecutive order book ranks
becomes smaller at later time steps. Fig. 8.8a furthermore shows that the CRM’s
interaction with the order book induces the market participants to believe that
negative bid prices have a positive probability of success. This is especially due to
the low expected residual load of 25GW, which implies that the clearing price of
the day-ahead auction is relatively low and only few power generators (especially
base-load plants and CHP generators) have the ability to reduce their output. As a
result, transactions clear at low or negative bid prices so that the distribution function
expands to negative prices.
(a) Underestimation (CRM sells) (b) Overestimation (CRM buys)
Figure 8.8: Left: Cumulative distribution functions for the 10 time steps given that the CRM
balances an underestimation of 5GW at an expected residual load of 25GW. Right: Survival
functions for the 10 time steps given that the CRM balances an overestimation of 5GW at an
expected residual load of 55GW.
In this context, Tab. 8.2 shows for a lignite-fired power generator with a successful
day-ahead offer (418.5MWh at e19.3/MWh) that the significant redefinition of the
CDF after the seventh time step (compare Fig. 8.4) allows moving further away
from the indifference bid price. We can also see from Tab. 8.2 that—as a response
to the CRM selling quantities to balance an underestimation of the feed-in from
renewables—the generator predominantly submits bids to buy electricity and that
most of these bids are successful.
15Note from the intersection of the CDF for time step “5” with the CDF for time step “10” that this
must not always be the case. The main reason is that starting from the eighth trading opportunity,
generators with positions below minimum load submit forced offers at indifference prices (compare
Sect. 8.1.3). This means that the prices at the top of the order book are relatively high, which is reflected
in the corresponding cumulative distribution functions.
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Time step t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10
Offer type bid bid bid ask bid bid bid bid bid bid
Quantity [MWh] 32.2 42.4 48.4 1.9 30.9 44.6 4.8 30.2 28.1 29.3
Indiff. price [e/MWh] 19.0 18.9 18.9 18.6 18.4 18.2 18.1 18.0 18.1 18.2
Opt. price [e/MWh] 12.9 12.9 12.9 25.1 14.0 13.8 13.7 9.9 9.1 9.6
Success × ×  ×      
Table 8.2: Intraday activity of a lignite-fired power generator subject to the market
environment imaged by the cumulative distribution functions of Fig. 8.8a.
Fig. 8.8b illustrates the shift of survival functions which map ask prices to their
probability of success, for a situation where the expected residual load amounts
to 55GW and the CRM corrects for an overestimation of five gigawatts using the
balancing profile illustrated in Fig. 8.4. We can see that the survival functions extend
to the right and cover a wider range of ask prices. The implications are very similar to
the ones presented for the case of an underestimation.
8.3.3 The costs of balancing forecast errors
As Chap. 2 discussed in detail, the feed-in from weather-dependent renewables is
generated with zero marginal costs but is subject to variability and uncertainty.
To ensure a permanent equilibrium of supply and demand, the effects of these
“externalities” have to be compensated and therefore induce integration costs.16 In
this context, the presented simulation approach makes it possible to determine the
costs of balancing the uncertain feed-in from renewables in a continuous intraday
market. We shall refer to these costs as “trading costs” (TC). They can be calculated
with
TC (h)=
n∑
T=1
pbuyT Q
buy
T −
m∑
T=1
p sel lT Q
sel l
T , (8.1)
where n is the number of transactions in hour h in which the CRM bought quantities
from generators or demanders (therefore, QbuyT is the quantity and p
buy
T is the price
associated with a buy transaction). Consequently,m equals the number of the CRM’s
sell transactions in hour h and p sel lT Q
sel l
T gives the revenue of transaction T . Note
that, in most situations, trading costs are positive in cases where missing quantities
are purchased in the intraday market (overestimation) and negative when selling
overproduction from renewables (underestimation).17 Thus, negative trading costs
are equivalent to trading revenue.
Tab. 8.3 presents trading costs in the German intraday market for 2012 together
with information on the amount of the forecast error and the feed-in as provided
by EEX Transparency (2014). The column labelled “TCFE” gives the trading costs
16See Hirth et al. (2015) for the various definitions and dimensions of integration costs.
17Given that quantities are predominantly sold at negative prices, trading costs can also be positive
in the case of an underestimation.
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per megawatt hour of forecast error and “TCF I ” corresponds to the trading costs
per megawatt hour of renewables feed-in. We can see that there is a connection
between the direction of the forecast error and the level of trading costs. In months
where significantly more electricity has to be purchased (overestimation) than has
to be sold (underestimation) in the intraday market, trading costs are relatively high.
Whereas the total underestimation amounted to 150GWh in November 2012, for
example, 620GWh accumulated from the hours exhibiting an overestimation. As a
consequence of this difference, the trading costs of EUR36.9 million are relatively
high compared to the costs for months where this difference is small (e. g. in April).
The main reason follows from the insights of the analytical model presented in
Chap. 5. Selling overproduction predominantly results in transactions which clear
at prices below the day-ahead price. In contrast, correcting for an overestimation
requires trading most quantities at prices which are higher than the day-ahead
clearing price (compare Fig. 5.3). Hence, the revenue from selling a certain amount
of electricity is not as high as the costs for purchasing the same amount. For the
year 2012, trading costs were calculated to be EUR207.6 million. This means that
balancing a megawatt hour of forecast error cost EUR23.6 on average. Although this
figure shows that avoiding forecast errors can be associated with significant cost
reductions, relating trading costs to the feed-in (last column of Tab. 8.3) indicates that
their relevance should not be overestimated (e2.82/MWh f eed−in).
Under. Over. Feed-in TC TCFE TCF I
[TWh] [TWh] [TWh] [me] [e/MWh] [e/MWh]
Jan. 0.39 0.36 7.58 7.77 10.34 1.03
Feb. 0.32 0.32 5.62 12.35 19.47 2.20
Mar. 0.38 0.44 6.34 13.14 15.92 2.07
Apr. 0.30 0.39 5.97 11.74 17.01 1.97
May 0.21 0.53 6.94 17.66 24.04 2.54
June 0.24 0.61 6.52 21.71 25.41 3.33
July 0.42 0.40 6.39 6.43 7.86 1.01
Aug. 0.27 0.26 6.05 4.96 9.22 0.82
Sept. 0.19 0.35 5.93 13.10 24.27 2.21
Oct. 0.27 0.55 5.54 27.06 32.74 4.88
Nov. 0.15 0.62 4.72 36.92 48.43 7.82
Dec. 0.15 0.66 6.02 34.79 42.73 5.78
2012 3.29 5.50 73.63 207.62 23.62 2.82
Table 8.3: Simulated trading costs for balancing forecast errors in the German intraday
market for the year 2012. The column labelled “TCFE” (“TCF I ”) gives trading costs per
megawatt hour of forecast error (renewables feed-in). Forecast errors and feed-in from EEX
Transparency (2014).
As the results presented in Tab. 8.3 were calculated under a given set of specifica-
tions, Tab. 8.4 shows trading costs subject to variations of this configuration.18 Given
18The different simulation runs were calculated using the same balancing profile. However, market
participants’ offer type and quantity, the slopes of the demand curves, and the number of electricity
demanders can differ between each simulation run. However, these minor deviations do not have a
significant impact on the simulation results over one year and can thus be neglected.
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the assumption that power generators and electricity demanders offer their true
valuation of the electricity they are buying or selling—that is, they submit indifference
offer prices as discussed in Sect. 7.1.3—trading costs amount to EUR158.3 million
or e2.15/MWh f eed−in . Thus, around 25 percent of the trading costs calculated with
optimal offer prices corresponds to profit for the market participants that provide
flexibility in the intraday market. If the combined day-ahead consumption of all
electricity demanders participating in the intraday market equals 10 percent of the
expected residual load (instead of 25 percent), trading costs increase by approx.
EUR15 million. This rise is very similar to the change in trading costs given that
only generators with a reference capacity above 100MW participate in the intraday
market (“Fewer generators”). This result may first seem surprising as these variations
imply that over 100 power generators are excluded (reduction from 269 to 163
generators) and only approx. 30 demanders do not trade in the intraday market
any more (reduction from approx. 50 to approx. 20 demanders, determined at a
residual load of 40GW). However, generators with a capacity below 100MW are
predominantly peak-load power plants. This means that they are positioned at the
right end of the merit order and thus do not often contribute to balancing forecast
errors. Tab. 8.4 also reveals that making the demand curves less steep (price elasticity
of -0.3 instead of -0.15) can result in relevant cost reductions (EUR12 million).
With reference to the discussion of options for improving the market integration
of renewables, see Chap. 6, this is because demanders are willing to pay more
for consuming additional quantities and require less compensation for reducing
electricity consumption. To summarise the insights of Tab. 8.4, we shall consider
trading costs arounde3/MWh f eed−in to be a relatively stable result.
TC TCFE TCF I
[me] [e/MWh] [e/MWh]
No strategic behaviour 158.34 18.02 2.15
Fewer generators 221.28 25.18 3.01
Fewer demanders 222.53 25.32 3.02
Flexible demanders 195.56 22.25 2.66
Table 8.4: Sensitivity of trading costs for the year 2012. “No strategic behaviour” refers to the
balancing of forecast errors at indifference offer prices, “Fewer generators” to the exclusion
of power generators with a reference capacity below 100MW (instead of 50MW), “Fewer
demanders” to electricity demanders holding only 10 percent of the expected residual load
(instead of 25 percent), and “Flexible demanders” to a price elasticity of -0.3 (instead of -0.15).
To give more general insights into the connection between the balancing of
forecast errors and trading costs, we can calculate these costs for a single hour and
vary the magnitude of the actual residual load and the forecast error. In this context,
Fig. 8.9a shows that the trading revenue (negative trading costs) per megawatt hour
of forecast error increases with the residual load.19 This is because the day-ahead
19Each data point in Fig. 8.9 corresponds to the average of 10 simulation runs to reduce the influence
of the random-based determination of the offer type and quantity, for example.
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equilibrium refers to a higher point on the merit order so that the overproduction
from renewables can be sold at higher prices in the intraday market. From this it
also follows that the costs for correcting an overestimation increase with the level of
residual load (see Fig. 8.9b). Thus, a close connection between trading costs and the
day-ahead clearing price exists.
(a) Underestimation (b) Overestimation
Figure 8.9: Trading costs per megawatt hour of forecast error subject to different levels of
actual residual load. The calculations were performed with the balancing profile illustrated in
Fig. 8.4.
Fig 8.9 furthermore shows that larger imbalances result in lower average trading
revenues (underestimation) and higher average trading costs (overestimation). This
supports the conclusion in Sect. 6.1 that reducing the magnitude of forecast errors
benefits the market integration of renewables.
8.3.4 The costs associated with the uncertainty of renewables
To assess the effects of the uncertainty of feed-in from renewables more generally,
we must recognise that corrections in the intraday market are necessary because
the forecasted feed-in sold in the day-ahead market deviates from the actual feed-in.
Hence, we can include the effects of selling the expected, and not the actual, output
from renewables in the day-ahead auction into the analysis. In this context, Fig. 8.10
illustrates the revenue from selling the forecasted feed-in (dark grey rectangle) with
the revenue that c. p. would have resulted from selling the actual output from
renewables (light grey rectangle). As the situation refers to an underestimation of
electricity production, the sold quantity Q f orecastda is lower than the actual feed-in
(Q f eed−inda ). Due to themerit order effect explained in Sect. 2.2, this has consequences
for the clearing price of the day-ahead auction. Selling fewer quantities producedwith
zero marginal costs leads to a smaller shift of the merit order so that the uniform
clearing price decreases less strongly (compare Fig. 2.3). This is why the day-ahead
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price p f orecastda illustrated in Fig. 8.10 is higher than the price that would have resulted
had the quantity Q f eed−inda been sold in the day-ahead market. Thus, the dark grey
rectangle corresponds to the actual revenue from selling the feed-in expected at the
gate closure of the day-ahead auction. The light grey rectangle gives the “hypothetical”
revenue had the uncertainty of weather-dependent renewables not existed.
Figure 8.10: Comparison of revenue from selling the underestimated and the actual feed-in
from renewables in the day-ahead market.
Comparing these revenues gives two areas where they do not overlap. The first
area results frommultiplying the difference between p f orecastda and p
f eed−in
da with the
quantity sold in the day-ahead market. This area is labelled with a “+” because it
measures the favourable effect that having soldQ f orecastda resulted in a less significant
merit order effect. That is, the quantity Q f orecastda could be sold for a higher per-unit
price. We shall refer to this as the “price effect” (PE), which can be calculated as
PEunder. (h)=
(
p f orecastda (h)−p
f eed−in
da (h)
)
Q f orecastda (h) .
The underestimation also implies that less electricity was sold compared to the “no-
uncertainty-situation” where Q f eed−inda would have been offered in the day-ahead
market. Thus, this second effect, which we shall call “quantity effect” (QE), is unfa-
vourable and can be calculated as
QEunder. (h)=−
[
p f eed−inda (h)
(
Q f eed−inda (h)−Q
f orecast
da (h)
)]
.
However, the direct consequence of not having sold Q f eed−inda −Q
f orecast
da , which
corresponds to the forecast error, in the day-ahead market is that this quantity can
now be sold in the intraday market (negative trading costs). This shows that the
discussed trading costs should be considered only one of three effects associatedwith
the uncertainty of renewables in the context of intraday markets. We shall therefore
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define the term “market integration costs” (MIC) as comprising trading costs, see
Eq. (8.1), and the two day-ahead effects so that we have
MIC (h)= TC (h)− [PEunder. (h)+QEunder. (h)] ,
which is equal to
MIC (h)= TC (h)+p f eed−inda (h)Q
f eed−in
da (h)−p
f orecast
da (h)Q
f orecast
da (h) . (8.2)
These market integration costs can be considered the more general measure of the
impact of the uncertainty from renewables.20 As for trading costs, they can be both
positive and negative. If they are negative, we can also speak of “market integration
revenue”. Note, however, that it is not obvious a priori how the sign of market
integration costs relates to the direction of the forecast error.
Figure 8.11: Comparison of revenue from selling the overestimated and the actual feed-in
from renewables in the day-ahead market.
Fig. 8.11 illustrates the effects of selling the forecasted andnot the actual feed-in in
the day-aheadmarket in the case of an overestimation of the output from renewables.
Due to the overestimation,Q f orecastda is higher thanQ
f eed−in
da and, as a consequence of
the merit order effect, p f orecastda is lower than p
f eed−in
da . This means that an accurate
forecast would have allowed selling Q f eed−inda at a higher per-unit price. This is why
the price effect is labelled with a “-” and equals
PEover. (h)=−
[(
p f eed−inda (h)−p
f orecast
da (h)
)
Q f eed−inda (h)
]
.
20Note, however, thatmore effects associatedwith the uncertainty ofweather-dependent renewables
exist. For example, a larger merit order effect reduces the profits of (conventional) power generators
and increases the consumer surplus. Furthermore, because the last opportunity to trade in the intraday
market is before physical delivery, a small amount of uncertainty remains after intraday trading. The
deviations emerging within this time frame may have to be compensated by making use of balancing
services and therefore have effects in the balancing market.
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In contrast, the quantity effect is favourable because the overestimated output could
be sold in the day-ahead market:
QEover. (h)= p f orecastda (h)
(
Q f orecastda (h)−Q
f eed−in
da (h)
)
.
Since this quantity was sold although renewables cannot provide it, the forecast
error has to be bought in the intraday market. The market integration costs in
terms of an overestimation, which can be calculated with Eq. (8.2), are thus formed
by three effects. First, the overestimation to some extent diminished the per-unit
revenue for the amount of electricity corresponding toQ f eed−inda . Second, having sold
quantities in the day-ahead market that will not be produced by renewables resulted
in additional revenue. Third, purchasing themissing quantities in the intradaymarket
to correct the imbalance generates trading costs.
Under. Over. Feed-in MIC MICFE MICF I
[TWh] [TWh] [TWh] [me] [e/MWh] [e/MWh]
Jan. 0.39 0.36 7.58 0.50 0.66 0.07
Feb. 0.32 0.32 5.62 7.36 11.61 1.31
Mar. 0.38 0.44 6.34 9.14 11.08 1.44
Apr. 0.30 0.39 5.97 7.64 11.07 1.28
May 0.21 0.53 6.94 8.84 12.03 1.27
June 0.24 0.61 6.52 11.55 13.52 1.77
July 0.42 0.40 6.39 7.81 9.55 1.22
Aug. 0.27 0.26 6.05 3.28 6.09 0.54
Sept. 0.19 0.35 5.93 6.30 11.67 1.06
Oct. 0.27 0.55 5.54 13.53 16.37 2.44
Nov. 0.15 0.62 4.72 16.98 22.28 3.60
Dec. 0.15 0.66 6.02 17.03 20.92 2.83
2012 3.29 5.50 73.63 109.96 12.51 1.49
Table 8.5: Simulated market integration costs for balancing forecast errors in the German
intraday market for the year 2012. The column labelled “MICFE” (“MICF I ”) gives market
integration costs per megawatt hour of forecast error (renewables feed-in). Forecast errors
and feed-in from EEX Transparency (2014).
MIC MICFE MICF I
[me] [e/MWh] [e/MWh]
No strategic behaviour 60.67 6.90 0.82
Fewer generators 123.61 14.06 1.68
Fewer demanders 124.87 14.21 1.70
Flexible demanders 97.90 11.14 1.33
Table 8.6: Sensitivity of market integration costs for the year 2012. “No strategic behaviour”
refers to the balancing of forecast errors at indifference offer prices, “Fewer generators” to the
exclusion of power generators with a reference capacity below 100MW (instead of 50MW),
“Fewer demanders” to electricity demanders holding only 10 percent of the expected residual
load (instead of 25 percent), and “Flexible demanders” to a price elasticity of -0.3 (instead of
-0.15).
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Tab. 8.5 shows that the market integration costs for 2012 amount to EUR110.0
million or EUR1.49 per megawatt hour of feed-in. Thus, they are not as high as the
trading costs presented in Tab. 8.3 (EUR207.6 million or e2.82/MWh f eed−in). This
means that the price and the quantity effect counterbalance the costs for trading
in the intraday market to some extent. As these two day-ahead effects are not
influenced by the different configurations presented in Tab. 8.6, the impact of varying
the underlying parameter onmarket integration costs is entirely driven by the change
in trading costs. We shall conclude from Tab. 8.6 that market integration costs around
EUR1.5 per megawatt hour of feed-in from renewables are a relatively stable result.
(a) Underestimation (b) Overestimation
Figure 8.12: The components of market integration costs resulting from all hours in 2012
which exhibit either an underestimation (left) or an overestimation (right).
To provide further insights into the difference between trading and market in-
tegration costs, Fig. 8.12a shows the three components of market integration costs
resulting from all hours in 2012 which exhibit an underestimation. We can see that
the costs resulting from the quantity effect (EUR125.1 million) are higher than the
trading revenue (EUR101.3 million). This implies that selling the overproduction in
the day-ahead market would have generated more revenue than selling the forecast
error in the intraday market. However, the price effect measures that not selling the
actual but only the forecasted output results in a higher day-ahead clearing price and
thus in a higher per-unit revenue for the sold quantities (EUR38.7million for all hours
in 2012 with an underestimation). Combining these three effects shows that market
integration costs are negative. Hence, if the uncertainty of renewables resolved
in an underestimation, the consequences of this uncertainty were favourable. To
understand this result better, we can draw a comparison to the effects of exerting
market power. That is, the uncertainty-induced underestimation can be considered
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equivalent to withholding one part of the entire production potential to increase the
per-unit revenue for the remaining part. The restrained quantities are then traded
at a later date in another market. For the overestimated output in 2012, we can see
fromFig. 8.12b that themarket integration costs are positive. Hence, the revenue from
sellingmore quantities than can actually be delivered by renewables in the day-ahead
market cannot compensate the costs for buying the missing quantities later on in the
intraday market. Furthermore, the price effect (negative EUR52.2 million) measures
that having sold more electricity in the day-ahead market influenced the magnitude
of the merit order effect and hence diminished the per-unit revenue to some extent.
Underestimation [GWh] 1 3 5 7
Interval [GWh] 0.9–1.1 2.8–3.2 4.5–5.5 6–8
Count 248 54 22 10
Average feed-in [GWh] 10.1 16.6 19.2 19.4
Overestimation [GWh] 1 3 5 7
Interval [GWh] 0.9–1.1 2.8–3.2 4.5–5.5 6–8
Count 428 99 33 9
Average feed-in [GWh] 7.3 9.2 13.5 12.5
Table 8.7: Average feed-in from renewables subject to specified intervals of forecast errors.
The intervals widen to include more observations. Data from EEX Transparency (2014).
To give more detailed insights into the determinants of market integration costs,
we can calculate these costs and their components for a single hour and vary the
magnitude of the forecast error and the residual load. This has been done for
Fig. 8.13, which shows market integration costs per megawatt hour of forecast error
for an hour exhibiting a specific combination of an underestimation and an actual
residual load.21 The renewables feed-in, which is required to determine the price
effect, is extracted from historical data for 2012 by averaging the observed production
levels within specified intervals of forecast errors (see Tab. 8.7). All calculations were
performed using the balancing profile illustrated in Fig. 8.4 to ensure comparability of
the results. Fig. 8.13 reveals that market integration costs are very low or negative for
actual residual loads around 35 and 60GW. Looking into the three cost components
shows that the price effect is themain driver of this result. An underestimation implies
that less electricity is sold in the day-ahead market than can actually be delivered
by renewables. This “uncertainty-induced withholding” is especially favourable if the
effect on the clearing price is large (compare Fig. 8.10). Around 35 and 60GW, the
day-ahead price is more sensitive to changes in the residual load. This is because of
technology switches from lignite to coal and from coal to gas-fired power generators
21Each bar in Fig. 8.13 corresponds to the average of 10 simulation runs with the respective forecast
error and residual load as inputs. This reduces the influence of the random-based determination of the
offer type and quantity, for example. The range of actual residual loads (20–65GW) and forecast errors
(up to seven gigawatts) reflects the spectrum observable in the year 2012.
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in the merit order. As a consequence of these “cost jumps”, underestimating the feed-
in from renewables—that is, increasing the expected residual load by this amount—
significantly increases the per-unit revenue for the sold output and lowers market
integration costs.
Figure 8.13: Market integration costs for a single hour with a specific underestimation and
an actual residual load.
We can furthermore see from Fig. 8.13 that integration costs are relatively high if large
quantities have to be sold when the actual residual load is very low. There are two
main reasons for this (compare Sect. 6.3). First, low residual loads imply that only a
few power plants are needed to cover the difference between the electricity demand
and the output from renewables. This means that the order books at the trading
opportunities contain few offers to buy electricity. Second, the generators that are
dispatched in such situations are predominantly base-load or CHP plants submitting
low or even negative bid prices. As a consequence of these two aspects, selling large
quantities at low residual loads implies transacting at low prices, which means that
trading revenue is low andmarket integration costs are high.
Figure 8.14:Market integration costs for a single hour with a specific overestimation and an
actual residual load.
Fig. 8.14 shows market integration costs per megawatt hour of forecast error for
various overestimations and actual residual loads. The fact that they are always
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positive implies that the quantity effect does not outweigh the trading costs and the
price effect. Hence, the revenue from selling the overestimated quantity in the day-
ahead market is not sufficient to balance the costs for purchasing this amount in the
intraday market and the loss of revenue due to the suppressed day-ahead clearing
price. Note that the market integration costs for actual residual loads around 35 and
60GWare high for the same reason that they are low in the case of an underestimation
(compare Fig. 8.13): the day-ahead clearing price is more sensitive to the residual
load so that the impact of the price effect is high. Furthermore, buying additional
quantities given an actual residual load of 65GW induces high trading costs. With
reference to the analysis of Fig. 5.2, this is because leaving the day-ahead equilibrium
by “moving up” a steep segment of the merit order (as well as the shifted demand
curve) implies transacting with market participants that require high compensation
for increasing output and therefore submit high ask prices to the order book.
8.3.5 The incentive to increase the likelihood of an underestimation
Comparing Fig. 8.13 with Fig. 8.14 shows that market integration costs are higher for
an overestimation. This implies that it is more favourable if the uncertainty about
the output from renewables resolves in an underestimation. Thus, the incentive may
exist to strategically deviate from the renewables forecast tomake anunderestimation
more likely. This involves selling fewer quantities than forecasted in the day-ahead
auction with the rationale to earn a higher per-unit revenue for the offered output
and to sell the “withheld” quantities later on in the intraday market. However,
it is not obvious a priori how such a strategy affects the forecast error because
the actual feed-in is uncertain. We can distinguish three main situations in this
context. First, selling fewer quantities in the day-aheadmarket can reduce the amount
of an overestimation. This should be favourable as Fig. 8.14 implies that market
integration costs generally increase with the magnitude of the forecast error. Second,
the strategy can induce a switch from an overestimation to an underestimation. Such
an event should be beneficial for the reasons already explained. Third, offering less
output in the day-ahead auction than forecasted can increase the magnitude of an
underestimation. As Fig. 8.13 implies, this may not always reduce market integration
costs.
No strategy Strategy95% Strategy95%/noPE
Trading costs [me] 207.62 49.15 49.15
Price effect [me] -13.45 28.30 0.00
Quantity effect [me] 111.11 -35.80 -35.80
MIC [me] 109.96 56.65 84.95
MICFE [e/MWh] 12.51 6.43 9.65
MICF I [e/MWh] 1.49 0.77 1.15
Table 8.8:Market integration costs for 2012 given that the CRM sells 100 percent (No strategy)
or 95 percent (Strategy95%) of the forecasted feed-in in the day-ahead auction. “noPE” means
that the price effect is neglected.
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In this context, the column of Tab. 8.8 labelled “Strategy95%” presents calculations
for the year 2012 given the assumption that the CRM sells only 95 percent of the
anticipated feed-in from renewables as provided by EEX Transparency (2014) in
the day-ahead market. This results in a slightly higher total absolute forecast error
(8,805GWh compared to 8,789GWh) and changes its composition so that the total
underestimation is higher (5,191GWh instead of 3,288GWh). As a consequence, trad-
ing costs decrease significantly—from EUR208million to EUR49million—compared
to the situation where the entire forecast is sold (“No strategy”). The reason is that
the CRM substitutes buying with selling electricity in the intraday market to some
extent. However, this substitution means that less electricity was sold in the day-
ahead auction, which is reflected in the difference of the quantity effect (EUR147
million). In turn, the “withholding” of output resulted in higher day-ahead clearing
prices and thus in a higher aggregated price effect (increase of EUR41.75 million).
Comparing market integration costs, which combine these three effects, shows that
the cost reduction is significant (EUR53.3 million). This implies that the benefit of
reducing overestimations aswell as inducing switches fromover- to underestimations
in some hours outweighs the (potential) disadvantage of having to correct a larger
underestimation in others.22
However, it is important to note that the presented results were calculated under
the assumptions that a single agent sells the expected system-wide feed-in from
renewables in the day-ahead auction and that the demand side does not react to
price changes (perfectly inelastic residual load curve). This means that the CRM can
influence—and therefore strategically relocate—the day-ahead equilibrium with its
trading decisions significantly. In contrast, the activity of a trader with a small renew-
ables portfolio should not have a significant impact on the day-ahead clearing price.23
In this context, the column labelled “Strategy95%/noPE” neglects the price effect and
shows that market integration costs are nonetheless lower than the costs which result
from selling the forecasted feed-in entirely (“No strategy”). Although neglecting the
price effect still implies that the CRM can influence the day-ahead equilibrium, this
suggests that making an underestimation more likely can be favourable merely due
to the resulting impact on trading costs and on the quantity effect.
Despite the fact that the presented simulation has to rely on significant simpli-
fications, the results in Tab. 8.8 indicate that strategies for minimising integration
costs which consider the day-ahead and the intradaymarketmay be profitable in real
market situations, and should therefore be addressed extensively by future research.
22Recall that in 2012, the total overestimation (5.5TWh) was higher than the total underestimation
(3.3TWh) (EEX Transparency, 2014). This fact can be expected to contribute to the finding that
making underestimations more likely is beneficial. In this context, we can compare the results of “No
strategy” and “Strategy95%” for February 2012 where the difference between the total overestimation
(319GWh) and the total underestimation (316GWh) was small. With e1.31/MWh f eed−in compared to
e0.63/MWh f eed−in , the advantage of “Strategy95%” exists in the same order of magnitude.
23However, it is reasonable to assume that profitable strategies are quickly adopted by most market
participants and that small renewables portfolios are merged to larger ones due to economies of scale.
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8.3.6 The role of the balancing profile
As explained in Sect. 8.1.5, the balancing profile of the CRMdetermines at which time
step which quantities are sold or bought to balance the forecast error. All results
shown so far were calculated either with the profile illustrated in Fig. 8.4, which
we shall refer to as “Profilebasic”, or with randomly determined trading decisions
(compare Sect. 8.1.5). The following gives more insights into how the decision to
spread the forecast error to the trading opportunities affects the simulation results.
Figure 8.15: Illustration of the balancing profile “Profilemiss”. The light grey dots show the
quantity that has to be traded in response to the evolution of the forecast error (dark grey
squares).
In this context, Fig. 8.15 illustrates an evolution of the forecast error which we
shall refer to as “Profilemiss”. This is because the traded quantities at the third, fourth,
and fifth time step are very large (at time step “5”, the CRM trades 50 percent of the
actual forecast error). In fact, the remaining opportunities to buy or sell electricity are
mainly used for trading in the opposite direction of the actual forecast error. This can
be expected to result in relatively high trading costs.
To evaluate the performance of Profilebasic and Profilemiss , we first have to find
a suitable benchmark. In this context, a balancing profile, which we shall denote
“Profileoptimal”, is calculated as follows: Using the approach explained in Sect. 8.1.5,
uniformly distributed random numbers determine which quantity is sold or bought
at each time step while taking into account that the actual forecast error must
be balanced by the last trading opportunity. Given these decisions, the simulation
calculates and stores the corresponding intraday price and trading costs, for example.
This procedure is repeated multiple times and the individual profiles are sorted in
ascending order with respect to their trading costs.
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Figure 8.16: Comparison of different balancing profiles subject to their trading costs. Out of
1,000 simulation runs, the figure shows the profile resulting in the lowest, themedian, and the
highest trading costs. The calculations were performed assuming an expected residual load of
40GW and an underestimation of 5GW.
Out of 1,000 iterations, Fig. 8.16 shows the balancing profile resulting in the lowest,
the median, and the highest trading costs. The comparison provides three main
insights. First, trading a small quantity at a given time step is better than trading a
large amount of electricity. This is not surprising as the “best” orders are positioned
at the top of the order book. Trading a large quantity therefore implies consuming
offers with low bid or high ask prices, which increases trading costs. Second, trading
in the direction of the actual forecast error is better than “oscillated trading”. This can
be reasoned with the analytical framework of Chap. 5 which shows that the CRM has
to sell at low and to buy at high prices (compare Fig. 5.3). However, this effect is likely
to be less severe if multiple entities managing forecast errors trade quantities with
market and limit orders. Third, trading early is better than trading (large quantities)
close to physical delivery. This is especially because the simulationmodels that some
power generators which were not dispatched in the day-ahead auction drop out of
the intraday market close to real time in order to avoid taking a position that would
require them to produce belowminimum load (recall Sect. 6.3 in this context).
Tab. 8.9 shows trading costs and the volume-weighted average intraday market
price (pID ) for the three discussed profiles subject to different forecast errors. The
results for Profileoptimal are taken from the balancing profile which resulted in the
lowest trading costs (out of 1,000 iterations).24 Not surprisingly, we can see from
Tab. 8.9 that Profilebasic performs better than Profilemiss . The difference in trading
24Thus, the term “optimal” should not imply that a balancing profile which can perform better does
not exist; it refers to the best profile given the (finite) number of iterations.
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Profilebasic Profilemiss Profileoptimal
Under. Over. Under. Over. Under. Over.
For. error 1 GW
TC [ke] -31.5 48.2 -27.3 49.9 -34.1 44.9
TCFE [e/MWh] -31.5 48.2 -27.3 49.9 -34.1 44.9
pID [e/MWh] 35.1 44.6 34.6 46.3 34.0 45.1
For. error 3 GW
TC [ke] -81.6 153.3 -57.0 161.2 -93.1 141.9
TCFE [e/MWh] -27.2 51.1 -19.0 53.7 -31.1 47.3
pID [e/MWh] 32.0 46.6 28.0 50.3 30.9 47.3
For. error 5 GW
TC [ke] -111.3 271.8 -49.8 295.9 -135.5 242.8
TCFE [e/MWh] -22.3 54.4 -10.0 59.2 -27.1 48.6
pID [e/MWh] 28.5 48.7 22.7 54.2 27.0 48.5
For. error 7 GW
TC [ke] -127.3 404.9 42.7 494.1 -169.4 347.9
TCFE [e/MWh] -18.2 57.8 6.1 70.6 -24.2 49.7
pID [e/MWh] 25.7 50.8 16.7 63.9 24.1 49.8
Table 8.9: Comparison of three balancing profiles subject to various levels of forecast errors.
All results were calculated assuming an expected residual load of 40GW.
costs between both profiles is especially significant when the CRM sells electricity.
This is because the order book impact of consuming bids is generally higher than the
impact of consuming asks. Given an expected residual load of 40GW and a forecast
error of five gigawatts, for example, the average spread between the first and the
last consumed offer is around e17/MWh (underestimation) compared to around
e13/MWh (overestimation). One important reason is that the order book contains
more asks than bids at relatively low residual loads, which is due to the fact that
only a few power generators were dispatched in the day-ahead auction.25 Comparing
the results for Profileoptimal with the results of the other two profiles shows that
significant improvements can be achieved by well-chosen balancing decisions or a
favourable evolution of the forecast error over time. This is because interaction with
the order books at the 10 trading opportunities is “managed” in a way that allows
generation of high trading revenue when selling and low trading costs when buying
electricity. Note, in this context, that the intraday market price for Profileoptimal is
very close to the trading costs per megawatt hour of forecast error. With reference to
Fig. 8.16, this is because the optimal balancing profile does not induce trading large
quantities in the opposite direction of the actual forecast error. In contrast, Profilemiss
results in consuming asks from the order book although an overproduction needs to
be corrected in the intraday market. This is the main reason why trading costs are
positive given an underestimation of seven gigawatts (see Tab. 8.9).
25However, the simulation models that non-dispatched generators participate very actively in the
intraday market. This may not always be the case in real market situations.
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An analysis with the help of Tab. 8.9 is limited to a specified level of residual load
(40GW). To provide more detailed insights for different actual residual loads and
forecast errors, Fig. 8.17 shows the difference between the trading costs permegawatt
hour of forecast error of Profilemiss and Profileoptimal .
(a) Underestimation
(b) Overestimation
Figure 8.17: Change in trading costs due to using Profilemiss instead of Profileoptimal for
various forecast errors and actual residual loads.
From Fig. 8.17a we can see that the quality of the trading decisions is more relevant
for hours in which a large underestimation has to be balanced at a low residual
load. This is reasonable as the order book contains only a few (low-priced) orders
in such situations. Thus, large negative impacts on trading costs may be avoided with
a well-chosen strategy for interacting with the order book. This is supported by the
fact that the trading profile’s quality is predominantly less relevant when correcting
for overestimations given actual residual loads in the range 20–40GW (compare
Fig. 8.17b). The reason is that the market participants’ ability to increase output is
generally higher than the ability to reduce output in such situations, which is reflected
in the order book. Fig. 8.17b also shows that Profilemiss induces significantly higher
trading costs than Profileoptimal when the CRM trades large forecast errors at high
residual loads. As discussedpreviously, the reason is twofold. First, there are only a few
non-dispatched generators in such a situation so that the market participants’ ability
to increase output is limited. Second, the merit order steepens for high output levels.
Hence, trading large overestimations requires buying from generators that demand
high compensation when selling electricity.
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8.3.7 The effects of increasing the number of market participants
Chap. 6 argued that increasing the number ofmarket participants viamarket coupling
improves the integration of renewables in continuous intraday markets. This is
because it allows the sale of overproduction at higher prices and the purchase of
missing quantities at lower prices. To provide more insights in this respect, we
shall see in the following how introducing additional generators to the power plant
portfolio affects the simulation results. More specifically, five gigawatts of additional
production capacity is allocated to 10 power generators so that their reference
capacity ranges from 450 to 590MW. This is done for Combined Cycle Gas Turbine
power plants and for lignite-fired power stations to assess how the market impact
differs between these twoproduction technologies.26 The following considers that the
additional power generators participate in the day-ahead and in the intraday market.
(a) More CCGT capacity
(b) More lignite-fired capacity
Figure 8.18: Change in trading costs due to introducing 5GW of additional gas-fired
generators (a) or 5GW of additional lignite-fired generators (b) for various underestimations
and actual residual loads. The calculations were performed with Profilebasic .
Fig. 8.18 shows the change in trading costs per megawatt hour of forecast error
due to introducing CCGT or lignite-fired generators for various underestimations and
actual residual loads. Itmay first seem surprising that trading costs increase (provided
they change by a significant magnitude) due to the conflict with the argument that
a higher number of market participants improves the integration of renewables.
Fig. 8.19makes it possible to showwhy there is no conflict. The fact that the additional
generators participated in the day-ahead auction before submitting intraday offers
26The efficiency of the conversion from fuel to electricity ranges from 48 to 52.5 percent for CCGT
plants and from 38 to 42.5 percent for lignite-fired generators.
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influenced the merit order. More specifically, they “shifted” all competitors with
higher per-unit costs of production to the right. If this shift occurred to the left
of the level of residual load, the equilibrium of the market moved downwards
compared to the situationwhere the additional generators stay out of themarket. As a
consequence, power generators with lower per-unit costs of production are located to
the left of the day-ahead equilibrium. They are thus willing to pay less for quantities
in the intraday market that can be used to replace own production. Hence, leaving
this equilibrium to the left—that is, selling underestimated output from renewables—
requires transacting with such generators and results in lower trading revenue.27
Figure 8.19: Illustration of the effect of introducing additional generators to the day-ahead
market on the market equilibrium.
With the help of these simple insights based on the model from Chap. 5, we can
also explain the difference between adding CCGT and adding lignite-fired plants in
Fig. 8.18. The CCGT generators’ per-unit costs are relatively high so that the merit
order stays unchanged for low and medium output levels if they enter the market. In
contrast, lignite-fired capacity induces the shift of the merit order at its beginning so
that trading costs are affected for a wide variety of residual loads. Fig. 8.20 makes the
comparison in the case of an overestimation and shows that trading costs decrease
if additional market participants are included in the power plant portfolio. With
reference to Fig. 8.19, this is because the generators to the right of the day-ahead
equilibrium have lower per-unit costs so that balancing overestimations is less costly.
27The larger differences for actual residual loads around 35 and 60GWare due to technology switches
from lignite to coal and from coal to gas-fired power generators. These “cost jumps” lead to more
significant relocations of the day-ahead equilibrium if the merit order is shifted to the right.
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(a) More CCGT capacity
(b) More lignite-fired capacity
Figure 8.20: Change in trading costs due to introducing 5GW of additional gas-fired
generators (a) or 5GW of additional lignite-fired generators (b) for various overestimations
and actual residual loads. The calculations were performed with Profilebasic .
We can therefore conclude that market coupling generally benefits intraday
trading because moving away from the day-ahead equilibrium to balance forecast
errors results in intraday transactions with prices that deviate less strongly from
the clearing price (note that the merit order with additional generators in Fig. 8.19
is less steep). However, cross-border trading in the day-ahead market most likely
results in a different location of this equilibrium. For the given example, this can
imply less revenue when selling and lower expenditures when buying electricity to
balance forecast errors in a continuous intraday market (compared to a situation
without market coupling). Thus, analysing the effects of a cross-border connection
for intraday trading should consider the effects in the day-ahead market.
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Main results and conclusions
T
HIS thesis was concerned with developing and applying approaches for the
analysis of how balancing forecast errors fromweather-dependent renewable
energy sources influences continuous intraday markets for electricity. The
main results are the following:
Chap. 5 showed that the information revealed in the day-ahead auction can be
used to construct a simple, non-mathematical model of a continuous intraday mar-
ket. The resulting framework gave insights into how the uncertainty from renewables
determines transactions between market participants and how these transactions
relate to the formation of prices. Data from the German electricity market supported
the finding that the direction of the forecast error is a fundamental driver of intraday
market results. More specifically, a significant underestimation of the output from
renewables should predominantly result in transactions with prices that are lower
than the corresponding clearing price of the day-ahead auction. In the case of an
overestimation, the prices of most transactions are expected to be higher than the
day-ahead price. While it is intuitive that higher supply reduces and higher demand
increases intraday prices, Chap. 5 gave insights into the dynamics behind this result.
Chap. 6 used the proposed model to evaluate how the market integration of
renewables can be improved. Enabling cross-border intraday trading, for example,
not only contributes to increasing the number of offers for a given price level range
in the order book, it also changes the trade-off between profit and risk for all market
participants. Due to stronger competition, they stay closer to the true valuation of
the electricity they buy or sell. As a consequence of such effects, market coupling can
make it possible to obtain higher priceswhen selling overproduction from renewables
and to transact at lower prices when buying missing quantities. Furthermore, the
chapter argued that the term “inflexibility” has two distinct dimensions in the context
of intraday trading. The first dimension is that technical characteristics of power
generators can force them to drop out of the market close to real time. This makes
it more costly to balance forecast errors shortly before physical delivery. Second,
inflexibility can also refer to the general preference to not adjust output although the
ability to do so exists. Data from the German electricity market indicated that market
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participants with this kind of inflexibility bid low or negative prices and can therefore
make it costly to balance large underestimations.
Chap. 7 provided a foundation for quantitative analyses of continuous intraday
markets by formulating price-setting decisions for power generators and electricity
demanders. Deriving the economic effects of output adjustments to calculate the
true valuation of buying and selling electricity demonstrated how the characteristics
of different types of power generators determine their indifference offer prices. For
example, a peak-load generator has high per-unit costs of production and hence a
high willingness to pay for substituting own output with quantities from the intraday
market. This gives the generator a competitive advantage over base and mid-load
power plants when bidding to buy electricity. The chapter thus showed that the
fundamental characteristics of the entities in a power system can be used to make
informed predictions of their behaviour in intraday markets. This also included the
formalisation of the trade-off between profit and risk inherent in a continuous double
auction. Solving this trade-off highlighted thatmarket participants do not bid and ask
truthfully and made it possible to derive profit-maximising price-setting strategies
for power generators and electricity demanders. The analysis revealed, for example,
that the peak-load generators’ competitive advantage of having high indifference bid
prices should generally allow them to move further away from their true valuation
when offering to buy electricity.
Chap. 8 presented a simulation of a continuous intradaymarket and implemented
the modelling approach for the German power system. The costs for balancing
forecast errors were calculated to be approx. EUR2.8 per megawatt hour of feed-
in from renewables in 2012. In this context, the chapter showed that these trading
costs are not sufficient to assess the impacts of the uncertainty of renewables and
therefore proposed “market integration costs”. Market integration costs recognise
that the existence of a forecast error implies selling the expected, and not the actual,
output from renewables in the day-ahead auction. Hence, they also include the
effects of selling too few (underestimation) or too many (overestimation) quantities
in the day-ahead market. The simulation results showed that these effects can be
significant and should therefore not be neglected in intraday market analyses. For
the German power system in 2012, market integration costs were calculated to be
approx. EUR1.5 for each megawatt hour of feed-in from renewables. The simulation
also showed that an underestimation generally causes lower market integration costs
than an overestimation. Therefore, the incentive can exist to intentionally increase
the likelihood of an underestimation by selling fewer quantities than forecasted in the
day-ahead market. Depending on the extent to which this “withholding” of potential
output affects the clearing price, such a strategy can make it possible to earn higher
per-unit revenue in the day-ahead market and can result in lower integration costs.
There are several directions for further research. The presented approach to
modelling continuous intraday markets would benefit significantly from the consid-
eration of intertemporal effects. For example, power generators will not reduce or
increase output for a given hour without taking into account previous hours and
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without having expectations about the future. This leads to complex trading strategies
which the presented intraday market simulation does not capture. The relevance of
intertemporal decision making is the reason why mathematical optimisation models
are frequently used to analyse electricity markets. However, most of the existing
models that image intraday markets assume perfect competition and minimise total
system costs. That is, they inherently assume a “central planner” so that the activity
of the agents is determined by the superordinate goal of optimising an objective
function and not by micro-level decisions. This does not respect aspects of strategic
behaviour and the opportunity of multiple trades essential for continuous intraday
markets. Hence, future modelling approaches should put more emphasis on these
important market characteristics. Similarly, it is of significant importance that intra-
day market analyses focus on modelling multiple independent agents that manage
the feed-in from renewables. Since, for example, forecast errors are more and more
often balanced by profit-oriented entities without an explicit obligation to ensure
system security, it is essential to understand their strategic incentives and how these
incentives relate to their interaction with the order book. Furthermore, as some of the
results presented in this thesis could be addressed in laboratory experiments (e. g. the
connection between market participants’ (technical) characteristics and their price-
setting decisions), future research on continuous intraday markets should expand to
include methods and insights from experimental and behavioural economics.
Ultimately, combining the insights of theoretical, empirical, and experimental
research to provide a thorough understanding of intraday markets for electricity will
help to make the best use of our natural environment’s unlimited energy resources.
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Output adjustments and the difference quotient
It is important to note that taking the derivative of profit function (7.1) to show the
economic effects of increasing output in the intradaymarket does not imply adjusting
electricity production only marginally. This is because the differential gives a good
approximation of the actual change in the function value (dpitn ≈∆pitn ) if we consider
the change of Gtn to be ∆Gtn = dGtn = 1MW. However, the following shows that the
distinction between the differential dpitn and the actual function difference ∆pitn is
meaningful for analysing the economic effects of output adjustments.
For determining the reaction of Eq. (7.1) to an increase of the output level by∆Gtn ,
consider the difference quotient
∆pitn
(
Gtn
)
∆Gtn
= pitn
(
Gtn +∆Gtn
)−pitn (Gtn )
∆Gtn
, (A.1)
which results fromdividing the function difference by the point difference. After some
manipulation, Eq. (A.1) reduces to
∆pitn
(
Gtn
)
∆Gtn
=−C
(
Gtn +∆Gtn
)−C (Gtn )
∆Gtn
+patn .
Note that this expression contains the difference quotient of the cost function C ,
which is specified by Eq. (7.7). Inserting and simplifying results in
∆pitn
(
Gtn
)
∆Gtn
=−cda −
cda
ρ∆tn
1−ρ∆tn
(
Gtn +∆Gtn
)− cda ρtn1−ρtn Gtn
∆Gtn
+patn ,
where ρ∆tn =
ηre f
η
(
Gt0
)κ
[(
1− Gtn+∆GtnGre f
)β− (1− Gt0Gre f )β
]
. By recognising that
cda
ρ∆tn
1−ρ∆tn
=∆
(
cda
ρtn
1−ρtn
)
+cda
ρtn
1−ρtn
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we can findmore specifically:
∆pitn
(
Gtn
)
∆Gtn
=−cda
(
1+ ρtn
1−ρtn
)
−
∆
(
cda
ρtn
1−ρtn
)
∆Gtn
(
Gtn +∆Gtn
)+patn . (A.2)
We can see that Eq. (A.2) comprises the per-unit costs of production at output level
Gtn and a termwhichmeasures how these costs change ifGtn increases by∆Gtn . After
somemanipulation, Eq. (A.2) becomes:
∆pitn
(
Gtn
)
∆Gtn
=−cda
(
1+ ρtn
1−ρtn
)
− cda
∆ρtn
∆Gtn(
1−ρtn
)2− (1−ρtn )∆ρtn
(
Gtn +∆Gtn
)+patn .
To simplify the calculation of the difference quotient for ρtn (recall that ρtn is given in
the context of Eq. (7.6)), we shall setβ= 2. This results in a concave efficiency function
and is therefore sufficient for the purpose of analysing the general economic effects
of output adjustments. After somemanipulation, we can complete the calculation by
finding
∆pitn
(
Gtn
)
∆Gtn
=−cda
(
1+ ρtn
1−ρtn
)
· · ·
· · · + cda
ηre f
η
(
Gt0
) κ
Gre f
[
2
(
1− GtnGre f
)
− ∆GtnGre f
]
(
1−ρtn
)2+ (1−ρtn ) ηre fη(Gt0 )κ∆GtnGre f
[
2
(
1− GtnGre f
)
− ∆GtnGre f
] (Gtn +∆Gtn )+patn .
(A.3)
If ∆Gtn approaches zero, the difference quotient (A.3) becomes the derivative of the
profit function:
∂pitn
(
Gtn
)
∂Gtn
=−cda
(
1+ ρtn
1−ρtn
)
+cda
ηre f
η
(
Gt0
) κ
Gre f
2
(
1− GtnGre f
)
(
1−ρtn
)2 Gtn +patn . (A.4)
Eq. (A.4) implies that the change in per-unit costs induced by the change in output
only affects the quantity Gtn although output has been further increased. The differ-
ence quotient takes into account, correctly, that the advantage of producing more
efficiently is attached to Gtn +∆Gtn . This means that taking the derivative does not
imply adjusting production only marginally, but it implies that the economic effects
of this adjustment are “marginalised” to a small extent.
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Source code: Newton-Raphsonmethod for optimal
bid prices
B.1 Power generators
1 %−−−−−Function for calculat ing intraday bid prices for generators−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
2
3 %. . . Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
5 %−−−1.−−−Calculate indif ference of fe r price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .18
6 %−−−2.−−−Perform Newton’ s method for approximating the optimal bid price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .34
7 %−−−2.1.−−−Perform correction of the i n i t i a l estimate i f necessary−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .48
8 %−−−2.2.−−−Perform i tera t ion procedure−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .72
9 %−−−2.2.1−−−Adjust previous estimate x (n) i f x (n+1) i s equal to or below theta−−−−−−−−− l .86
10 %−−−2.2.2−−−Replace x (n+1) i f absolute function value increases−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .122
11 %−−−2.3−−−Determine optimal bid price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .138
12
13 %. . . Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
15 function [ eta_da , rho_p_tn , rho_p_t , p_tn_indiff , p_tn_bid_opt ] = . . .
16 IDbid_Gen( eta_ref , kappa , beta , G_ref , G_tn , G_t , G_t0 , cda ,gamma, lambda , theta )
17
18 %−−−1.−−−Calculate indif ference of fe r price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
19
20 %Calculate e f f i c iency at day−ahead output G_t0
21 eta_da = eta_ref−eta_ref * ( ( ( G_ref−G_t0 )/ G_ref )^beta ) * kappa ;
22
23 %Calculate rho_p_t
24 rho_p_t = ( eta_ref /eta_da ) * kappa*(((1 − (G_t/G_ref ) )^ beta )−((1−(G_t0/G_ref ) )^ beta ) ) ;
25
26 %Calculate rho_p_tn
27 rho_p_tn = ( eta_ref /eta_da ) * kappa*(((1 − (G_tn/G_ref ) )^ beta ) . . .
28 −((1−(G_t0/G_ref ) )^ beta ) ) ;
29
30 %Calculate indif ference of fer price
31 p_tn_indif f = cda−cda * ( ( rho_p_t/(1−rho_p_t ) ) * ( G_t /(G_tn−G_t ) ) . . .
32 −(rho_p_tn/(1−rho_p_tn ) ) * ( G_tn/(G_tn−G_t ) ) ) ;
33
34 %−−−2.−−−Perform Newton’ s method for approximating the optimal bid price−−−−−−−−−−−
35
36 %Define number of i te ra t ions for Newton’ s method
37 number_iterations = 100;
38
39 %Preal locate
40 x = nan( number_iterations ) ;
41
42 %Calculate optimal bid price i f indif ference price i s above theta
43 i f ( p_tn_indiff−theta ) >= 0.5
44
45 %Determine i n i t i a l estimate of the root
46 x (1) = ( theta+p_tn_indif f ) /2 ;
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47
48 %−−−2.1.−−−Perform correction of the i n i t i a l estimate i f necessary−−−−−−−−−−−−−
49
50 %Increase i n i t i a l estimate i f function value i s too high
51 while ( p_tn_indiff−x (1 )+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) * ( x(1)− theta )^(1−gamma) . . .
52 *(1−exp ( ( ( x(1)− theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) > 100
53
54 new_start = x (1)+1 ;
55 x (1) = new_start ;
56 end
57
58 %Lower i n i t i a l estimate i f function value i s too low
59 while ( p_tn_indiff−x (1 )+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) * ( x(1)− theta )^(1−gamma) . . .
60 *(1−exp ( ( ( x(1)− theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) < −100
61
62 new_start = x (1)−1;
63
64 %Ensure that adjusted estimate i s to the r ight of theta
65 i f new_start > theta
66 x (1) = new_start ;
67 else
68 break
69 end
70 end
71
72 %−−−2.2.−−−Perform i tera t ion procedure−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
73
74 for n = 1 : 1 : number_iterations
75
76 %Calculate new estimate x (n+1) with previous estimate x (n)
77 x (n+1) = x (n)−(( p_tn_indiff−x (n)+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
78 * ( x (n)− theta )^(1−gamma)*(1−exp ( ( ( x (n)− theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) . . .
79 /(−1−(lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
80 * ( ( x (n)− theta )^(−gamma) ) . . .
81 +exp ( ( ( x (n)− theta )/ lambda)^gamma) . . .
82 * ( lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
83 * ( ( x (n)− theta )^(−gamma) ) . . .
84 −exp ( ( ( x (n)− theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) ;
85
86 %−−−2.2.1−−−Adjust previous estimate x (n) i f x (n+1) <= theta−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
87
88 i f x (n+1) <= theta
89
90 %Calculate new value for x (n)
91 new_est = ( theta+x (n) ) / 2 ;
92
93 %Calculate x (n+1) with new value for x (n) unt i l x (n+1) > theta
94 while (new_est−(( p_tn_indiff−new_est +(( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
95 * ( new_est−theta )^(1−gamma) . . .
96 *(1−exp ( ( ( new_est−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) . . .
97 /(−1−(lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
98 * ( ( new_est−theta )^(−gamma) ) . . .
99 +exp ( ( ( new_est−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) . . .
100 * ( lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
101 * ( ( new_est−theta )^(−gamma) ) . . .
102 −exp ( ( ( new_est−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) ) <= theta
103
104 calc_new_est = ( theta+new_est ) /2 ;
105 new_est = calc_new_est ;
106 end
107
108 %Calculate new estimate x (n+1) with new value for x (n)
109 x (n+1) = new_est−(( p_tn_indiff−new_est +(( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
110 * ( new_est−theta )^(1−gamma) . . .
111 *(1−exp ( ( ( new_est−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) . . .
112 /(−1−(lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
113 * ( ( new_est−theta )^(−gamma) ) . . .
114 +exp ( ( ( new_est−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) . . .
115 * ( lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
116 * ( ( new_est−theta )^(−gamma) ) . . .
117 −exp ( ( ( new_est−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) ;
118
138
B.2. ELECTRICITY DEMANDERS
119 %Estimate x (n+1) i s greater than theta
120 else
121
122 %−−−2.2.2−−−Replace x (n+1) i f absolute function value increases−−−−−−−−
123
124 while abs ( round ( ( p_tn_indiff−x (n+1)+(( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
125 * ( x (n+1)− theta )^(1−gamma) . . .
126 *(1−exp ( ( ( x (n+1)− theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) * 1 e5 )/1e5 ) . . .
127 > abs ( round ( ( p_tn_indiff−x (n)+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
128 * ( x (n)− theta )^(1−gamma) . . .
129 *(1−exp ( ( ( x (n)− theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) * 1 e5 )/1e5 )
130
131 %Replace the value for x (n+1) with a value which i s closer to x (n)
132 new_est_abs = ( x (n+1)+x (n) ) / 2 ;
133 x (n+1) = new_est_abs ;
134 end
135 end
136 end
137
138 %−−−2.3−−−Determine optimal bid price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
139
140 p_tn_bid_opt = x ( number_iterations ) ;
141
142 %Calculate optimal bid price i f indif ference price i s too close to or below theta
143 else
144
145 p_tn_bid_opt = p_tn_indif f ;
146 end
147 end
B.2 Electricity demanders
1 %−−−−−Function for calculat ing intraday bid prices for demanders−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
2
3 %. . . Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
5 %−−−1.−−−Calculate indif ference of fe r price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .18
6 %−−−2.−−−Perform Newton’ s method for approximating the optimal bid price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .22
7 %−−−2.1.−−−Perform correction of the i n i t i a l estimate i f necessary−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .36
8 %−−−2.2.−−−Perform i tera t ion procedure−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .60
9 %−−−2.2.1−−−Adjust previous estimate x (n) i f x (n+1) i s equal to or below theta−−−−−−−−− l .75
10 %−−−2.2.2−−−Replace x (n+1) i f absolute function value increases−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .111
11 %−−−2.3−−−Determine optimal bid price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .127
12
13 %. . . Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
15 function [ p_tn_indiff_Dem , p_tn_bid_opt_Dem] = . . .
16 IDbid_Dem(D_t ,D_tn , p_prohibitive , D_slope ,gamma, lambda , theta )
17
18 %−−−1.−−−Calculate indif ference of fe r price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
19
20 p_tn_indiff_Dem = p_prohibitive−D_slope * ( (D_tn+D_t ) / 2 ) ;
21
22 %−−−2.−−−Perform Newton’ s method for approximating the optimal bid price−−−−−−−−−−−
23
24 %Define number of i te ra t ions for Newton’ s method
25 number_iterations = 100;
26
27 %Preal locate
28 x = nan( number_iterations ) ;
29
30 %Calculate optimal bid price i f indif ference price i s above theta
31 i f ( p_tn_indiff_Dem−theta ) >= 0.5
32
33 %Determine i n i t i a l estimate of the root
34 x (1) = ( theta+p_tn_indiff_Dem )/2 ;
35
36 %−−−2.1.−−−Perform correction of the i n i t i a l estimate i f necessary−−−−−−−−−−−−−
37
38 %Increase i n i t i a l estimate i f function value i s too high
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39 while ( p_tn_indiff_Dem−x (1 )+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) * ( x(1)− theta )^(1−gamma) . . .
40 *(1−exp ( ( ( x(1)− theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) > 100
41
42 new_start = x (1)+1 ;
43 x (1) = new_start ;
44 end
45
46 %Lower i n i t i a l estimate i f function value i s too low
47 while ( p_tn_indiff_Dem−x (1 )+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) * ( x(1)− theta )^(1−gamma) . . .
48 *(1−exp ( ( ( x(1)− theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) < −100
49
50 new_start = x (1)−1;
51
52 %Ensure that adjusted estimate i s to the r ight of theta
53 i f new_start > theta
54 x (1) = new_start ;
55 else
56 break
57 end
58 end
59
60 %−−−2.2.−−−Perform i tera t ion procedure−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
61
62 for n = 1 : 1 : number_iterations
63
64 %Calculate new estimate x (n+1) with previous estimate x (n)
65 x (n+1) = x (n)−((p_tn_indiff_Dem−x (n)+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
66 * ( x (n)− theta )^(1−gamma)*(1−exp ( ( ( x (n)− theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) . . .
67 /(−1−(lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
68 * ( ( x (n)− theta )^(−gamma) ) . . .
69 +exp ( ( ( x (n)− theta )/ lambda)^gamma) . . .
70 * ( lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
71 * ( ( x (n)− theta )^(−gamma) ) . . .
72 −exp ( ( ( x (n)− theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) ;
73
74
75 %−−−2.2.1−−−Adjust previous estimate x (n) i f x (n+1) <= theta−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
76
77 i f x (n+1) <= theta
78
79 %Calculate new value for x (n)
80 new_est = ( theta+x (n) ) / 2 ;
81
82 %Calculate x (n+1) with new value for x (n) unt i l x (n+1) > theta
83 while (new_est−((p_tn_indiff_Dem−new_est +(( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
84 * ( new_est−theta )^(1−gamma) . . .
85 *(1−exp ( ( ( new_est−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) . . .
86 /(−1−(lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
87 * ( ( new_est−theta )^(−gamma) ) . . .
88 +exp ( ( ( new_est−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) . . .
89 * ( lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
90 * ( ( new_est−theta )^(−gamma) ) . . .
91 −exp ( ( ( new_est−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) ) <= theta
92
93 calc_new_est = ( theta+new_est ) /2 ;
94 new_est = calc_new_est ;
95 end
96
97 %Calculate new estimate x (n+1) with new value for x (n)
98 x (n+1) = new_est−((p_tn_indiff_Dem−new_est +(( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
99 * ( new_est−theta )^(1−gamma) . . .
100 *(1−exp ( ( ( new_est−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) . . .
101 /(−1−(lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
102 * ( ( new_est−theta )^(−gamma) ) . . .
103 +exp ( ( ( new_est−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) . . .
104 * ( lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
105 * ( ( new_est−theta )^(−gamma) ) . . .
106 −exp ( ( ( new_est−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) ;
107
108 %Estimate x (n+1) i s greater than theta
109 else
110
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111 %−−−2.2.2−−−Replace x (n+1) i f absolute function value increases−−−−−−−−
112
113 while abs ( round ( ( p_tn_indiff_Dem−x (n+1)+(( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
114 * ( x (n+1)− theta )^(1−gamma) . . .
115 *(1−exp ( ( ( x (n+1)− theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) * 1 e5 )/1e5 ) . . .
116 > abs ( round ( ( p_tn_indiff_Dem−x (n)+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
117 * ( x (n)− theta )^(1−gamma) . . .
118 *(1−exp ( ( ( x (n)− theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ) * 1 e5 )/1e5 )
119
120 %Replace the value for x (n+1) with a value which i s closer to x (n)
121 new_est_abs = ( x (n+1)+x (n) ) / 2 ;
122 x (n+1) = new_est_abs ;
123 end
124 end
125 end
126
127 %−−−2.3−−−Determine optimal bid price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
128
129 p_tn_bid_opt_Dem = x ( number_iterations ) ;
130
131 %Calculate optimal bid price i f indif ference price i s too close to or below theta
132 else
133
134 p_tn_bid_opt_Dem = p_tn_indiff_Dem ;
135 end
136 end
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Source code: Newton-Raphsonmethod for optimal
ask prices
C.1 Power generators
1 %−−−−−Function for calculat ing intraday ask prices for generators−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
2
3 %. . . Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
5 %−−−1.−−−Calculate indif ference of fe r price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .18
6 %−−−2.−−−Perform Newton’ s method for approximating the optimal ask price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .34
7 %−−−2.1.−−−Perform correction of the i n i t i a l estimate i f necessary−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .45
8 %−−−2.2.−−−Perform i tera t ion procedure−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .67
9 %−−−2.2.1−−−Adjust previous estimate x (n) i f x (n+1) i s equal to or below theta−−−−−−−−− l .76
10 %−−−2.2.2−−−Replace x (n+1) i f absolute function value increases−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .100
11 %−−−2.3−−−Determine optimal ask price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .114
12
13 %. . . Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
15 function [ eta_da , rho_p_tn , rho_p_t , p_tn_indiff , p_tn_ask_opt ] = . . .
16 IDask_Gen( eta_ref , kappa , beta , G_ref , G_tn , G_t , G_t0 , cda ,gamma, lambda , theta )
17
18 %−−−1.−−−Calculate indif ference of fe r price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
19
20 %Calculate e f f i c iency at day−ahead output G_t0
21 eta_da = eta_ref−eta_ref * ( ( ( G_ref−G_t0 )/ G_ref )^beta ) * kappa ;
22
23 %Calculate rho_p_t
24 rho_p_t = ( eta_ref /eta_da ) * kappa*(((1 − (G_t/G_ref ) )^ beta )−((1−(G_t0/G_ref ) )^ beta ) ) ;
25
26 %Calculate rho_p_tn
27 rho_p_tn = ( eta_ref /eta_da ) * kappa*(((1 − (G_tn/G_ref ) )^ beta ) . . .
28 −((1−(G_t0/G_ref ) )^ beta ) ) ;
29
30 %Calculate indif ference of fer price
31 p_tn_indif f = cda−cda * ( ( rho_p_t/(1−rho_p_t ) ) * ( G_t /(G_tn−G_t ) ) . . .
32 −(rho_p_tn/(1−rho_p_tn ) ) * ( G_tn/(G_tn−G_t ) ) ) ;
33
34 %−−−2.−−−Perform Newton’ s method for approximating the optimal ask price−−−−−−−−−−−
35
36 %Define number of i te ra t ions for Newton’ s method
37 number_iterations = 100;
38
39 %Preal locate
40 x = nan( number_iterations ) ;
41
42 %Determine i n i t i a l estimate of the root
43 x (1) = theta+abs ( theta ) ;
44
45 %−−−2.1.−−−Perform correction of the i n i t i a l estimate i f necessary−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
46
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47 %Increase i n i t i a l estimate i f function value i s too high
48 while ( p_tn_indiff−x (1 )+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) * ( x(1)− theta )^(1−gamma) ) > 100
49
50 new_start = x (1)+1 ;
51 x (1) = new_start ;
52 end
53
54 %Lower i n i t i a l estimate i f function value i s too low
55 while ( p_tn_indiff−x (1 )+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) * ( x(1)− theta )^(1−gamma) ) < −100
56
57 new_start = x (1)−1;
58
59 %Ensure that adjusted estimate i s to the r ight of theta
60 i f new_start > theta
61 x (1) = new_start ;
62 else
63 break
64 end
65 end
66
67 %−−−2.2.−−−Perform i tera t ion procedure−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
68
69 for n = 1 : 1 : number_iterations
70
71 %Calculate new estimate x (n+1) with previous estimate x (n)
72 x (n+1) = x (n)−(( p_tn_indiff−x (n)+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
73 * ( x (n)− theta )^(1−gamma))/(−1−(lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
74 * ( x (n)− theta )^(−gamma) ) ) ;
75
76 %−−−2.2.1−−−Adjust previous estimate x (n) i f x (n+1) i s equal to or below theta−
77
78 i f x (n+1) <= theta
79
80 %Calculate new value for x (n)
81 new_est = ( theta+x (n) ) / 2 ;
82
83 %Calculate x (n+1) with new value for x (n) unt i l x (n+1) > theta
84 while (new_est−(( p_tn_indiff−new_est +(( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
85 * ( new_est−theta )^(1−gamma))/(−1−(lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
86 * ( new_est−theta )^(−gamma) ) ) ) <= theta
87
88 calc_new_est = ( theta+new_est ) /2 ;
89 new_est = calc_new_est ;
90 end
91
92 %Calculate new estimate x (n+1) with new value for x (n)
93 x (n+1) = new_est−(( p_tn_indiff−new_est +(( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
94 * ( new_est−theta )^(1−gamma))/(−1−(lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
95 * ( new_est−theta )^(−gamma) ) ) ;
96
97 %Estimate x (n+1) i s greater than theta
98 else
99
100 %−−−2.2.2−−−Replace x (n+1) i f absolute function value increases−−−−−−−−−−−−
101
102 while abs ( round ( ( p_tn_indiff−x (n+1)+(( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
103 * ( x (n+1)− theta )^(1−gamma) ) *1 e5 )/1e5 ) . . .
104 > abs ( round ( ( p_tn_indiff−x (n)+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
105 * ( x (n)− theta )^(1−gamma) ) *1 e5 )/1e5 )
106
107 %Replace the value for x (n+1) with a value which i s closer to x (n)
108 new_est_abs = ( x (n+1)+x (n) ) / 2 ;
109 x (n+1) = new_est_abs ;
110 end
111 end
112 end
113
114 %−−−2.3−−−Determine optimal ask price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
115
116 p_tn_ask_opt = x ( number_iterations ) ;
117 end
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C.2 Electricity demanders
1 %−−−−−Function for calculat ing intraday ask prices for demanders−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
2
3 %. . . Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
5 %−−−1.−−−Calculate indif ference of fe r price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .18
6 %−−−2.−−−Perform Newton’ s method for approximating the optimal ask price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .22
7 %−−−2.1.−−−Perform correction of the i n i t i a l estimate i f necessary−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .33
8 %−−−2.2.−−−Perform i tera t ion procedure−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .55
9 %−−−2.2.1−−−Adjust previous estimate x (n) i f x (n+1) i s equal to or below theta−−−−−−−−− l .64
10 %−−−2.2.2−−−Replace x (n+1) i f absolute function value increases−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .88
11 %−−−2.3−−−Determine optimal ask price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .102
12
13 %. . . Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
15 function [ p_tn_indiff_Dem , p_tn_ask_opt_Dem] = . . .
16 IDask_Dem(D_t ,D_tn , p_prohibitive , D_slope ,gamma, lambda , theta )
17
18 %−−−1.−−−Calculate indif ference of fe r price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
19
20 p_tn_indiff_Dem = p_prohibitive−D_slope * ( (D_tn+D_t ) / 2 ) ;
21
22 %−−−2.−−−Perform Newton’ s method for approximating the optimal ask price−−−−−−−−−−−
23
24 %Define number of i te ra t ions for Newton’ s method
25 number_iterations = 100;
26
27 %Preal locate
28 x = nan( number_iterations ) ;
29
30 %Determine i n i t i a l estimate of the root
31 x (1) = theta+abs ( theta ) ;
32
33 %−−−2.1.−−−Perform correction of the i n i t i a l estimate i f necessary−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
34
35 %Increase i n i t i a l estimate i f function value i s too high
36 while ( p_tn_indiff_Dem−x (1 )+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) * ( x(1)− theta )^(1−gamma) ) > 100
37
38 new_start = x (1)+1 ;
39 x (1 ) = new_start ;
40 end
41
42 %Lower i n i t i a l estimate i f function value i s too low
43 while ( p_tn_indiff_Dem−x (1 )+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) * ( x(1)− theta )^(1−gamma) ) < −100
44
45 new_start = x (1)−1;
46
47 %Ensure that adjusted estimate i s to the r ight of theta
48 i f new_start > theta
49 x (1) = new_start ;
50 else
51 break
52 end
53 end
54
55 %−−−2.2.−−−Perform i tera t ion procedure−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
56
57 for n = 1 : 1 : number_iterations
58
59 %Calculate new estimate x (n+1) with previous estimate x (n)
60 x (n+1) = x (n)−(( p_tn_indiff_Dem−x (n)+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
61 * ( x (n)− theta )^(1−gamma))/(−1−(lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
62 * ( x (n)− theta )^(−gamma) ) ) ;
63
64 %−−−2.2.1−−−Adjust previous estimate x (n) i f x (n+1) i s equal to or below theta−
65
66 i f x (n+1) <= theta
67
68 %Calculate new value for x (n)
69 new_est = ( theta+x (n) ) / 2 ;
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70
71 %Calculate x (n+1) with new value for x (n) unt i l x (n+1) > theta
72 while (new_est−((p_tn_indiff_Dem−new_est +(( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
73 * ( new_est−theta )^(1−gamma))/(−1−(lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
74 * ( new_est−theta )^(−gamma) ) ) ) <= theta
75
76 calc_new_est = ( theta+new_est ) /2 ;
77 new_est = calc_new_est ;
78 end
79
80 %Calculate new estimate x (n+1) with new value for x (n)
81 x (n+1) = new_est−((p_tn_indiff_Dem−new_est +(( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
82 * ( new_est−theta )^(1−gamma))/(−1−(lambda g^amma) * ( (gamma−1)/gamma) . . .
83 * ( new_est−theta )^(−gamma) ) ) ;
84
85 %Estimate x (n+1) i s greater than theta
86 else
87
88 %−−−2.2.2−−−Replace x (n+1) i f absolute function value increases−−−−−−−−−−−−
89
90 while abs ( round ( ( p_tn_indiff_Dem−x (n+1)+(( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
91 * ( x (n+1)− theta )^(1−gamma) ) *1 e5 )/1e5 ) . . .
92 > abs ( round ( ( p_tn_indiff_Dem−x (n)+ ( ( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
93 * ( x (n)− theta )^(1−gamma) ) *1 e5 )/1e5 )
94
95 %Replace the value for x (n+1) with a value which i s closer to x (n)
96 new_est_abs = ( x (n+1)+x (n) ) / 2 ;
97 x (n+1) = new_est_abs ;
98 end
99 end
100 end
101
102 %−−−2.3−−−Determine optimal ask price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
103
104 p_tn_ask_opt_Dem = x ( number_iterations ) ;
105 end
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Source code: Verifying root calculation and global
maximum
D.1 Bidding to buy electricity
1 %−−−−−Program for checking root calculat ions and ver i fy ing global maximum (bid)−−−−−−
2
3 %. . . Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
5 %−−−1.−−−Check root calculations−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .29
6 %−−−1.1.−−−Define parameters for o f fe r price calculation−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .31
7 %−−−1.2.−−−Calculate o f fe r prices and check i f root i s correct−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .99
8 %−−−2.−−−Check of fe r price calculat ion and ver i f y global maximum−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .146
9 %−−−2.1.−−−Calculate pro f i t for time tn−1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .148
10 %−−−2.2.−−−Calculate pro f i t and expected pro f i t for time tn−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .159
11 %−−−2.3.−−−Calculate expected pro f i t for the interva l [ theta , theta+200] although
12 %checking the interva l [ theta , p_tn_indif f ] would be suf f i c ient−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .187
13 %−−−2.4.−−−Find maximum of expected prof i ts−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .217
14 %−−−2.5.−−−Check i f indif ference price i s calculated correct ly and function i s
15 %maximised global ly−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .223
16
17 %. . . Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18
19 %Define number of calculat ions
20 i te ra t ions = 1000000;
21
22 %Preal locate
23 evaluate_root = nan( i terat ions , 7 ) ;
24 profit_exp_price = nan(800 ,2 ) ;
25 evaluate_prof i t = nan( i terat ions , 7 ) ;
26
27 for i t = 1 : 1 : i t e ra t ions
28
29 %−−−1.−−−Check root calculations−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
30
31 %−−−1.1.−−−Define parameters for o f fe r price calculation−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
32
33 %Define eta ( for e f f i c iency function )
34 eta_ref = rand ;
35 while ( eta_ref < 0 .3 ) | | ( e ta_ref > 0 .6 )
36 eta_ref = rand ;
37 end
38
39 %Define kappa ( for e f f i c iency function )
40 kappa = rand ;
41 while (kappa < 0.05) | | ( kappa > 0 .4 )
42 kappa = rand ;
43 end
44
45 %Define beta ( for e f f i c iency function )
46 beta = rand *5 ;
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47 while beta < 1
48 beta = rand *5 ;
49 end
50
51 %Define reference capacity
52 G_ref = rand*1500;
53 while G_ref < 10
54 G_ref = rand*1500;
55 end
56
57 %Define day−ahead quantity
58 G_t0 = G_ref ;
59
60 %Define quantity before output reduction
61 G_t = rand*1500;
62 while (G_t > G_ref ) | | (G_t < 5)
63 G_t = rand*1500;
64 end
65
66 %Define quantity a f te r output reduction
67 G_tn = rand*1500;
68 while G_tn > (G_t−1)
69 G_tn = rand*1500;
70 end
71
72 %Define day−ahead of fe r price
73 cda = rand*100;
74 while cda < 5
75 cda = rand*100;
76 end
77
78 %Define day−ahead clearing price
79 pt0 = cda *1 . 5 ;
80
81 %Define intraday pro f i t generated unt i l time tn−1
82 Posit ionIntra = 10000;
83
84 %Define scale parameter
85 lambda = rand*100;
86 while lambda < 1
87 lambda = rand*100;
88 end
89
90 %Define shape parameter
91 gamma = rand *5 ;
92 while gamma <= 1.2
93 gamma = rand *5 ;
94 end
95
96 %Define location parameter
97 theta = rand*100−rand*50;
98
99 %−−−1.2.−−−Calculate of fe r prices and check i f root i s correct−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
100
101 %Calculate indif ference of fer price
102 [~ ,~ ,~ , p_tn_indiff , ~ ] = IDbid_Gen( eta_ref , kappa , beta , G_ref , G_tn , G_t , G_t0 , cda , . . .
103 gamma, lambda , theta ) ;
104
105 %Calculate optimal bid price
106 [~ ,~ ,~ ,~ , p_tn_bid_opt ] = IDbid_Gen( eta_ref , kappa , beta , G_ref , G_tn , G_t , G_t0 , cda , . . .
107 gamma, lambda , theta ) ;
108
109 %Calculate function value at p_tn_bid_opt
110 i f p_tn_bid_opt ~= p_tn_indif f
111
112 f_p_tn_bid_opt = p_tn_indiff−p_tn_bid_opt +(( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
113 * ( p_tn_bid_opt−theta )^(1−gamma) . . .
114 *(1−exp ( ( ( p_tn_bid_opt−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ;
115
116 else
117
118 %I f p_tn_indif f i s too close to or below theta −> p_tn_bid_opt = p_tn_indif f
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119 %and thus no root calculat ion
120 f_p_tn_bid_opt = 0;
121 end
122
123 i f abs ( f_p_tn_bid_opt ) <= 1e−5
124
125 %Store that calculat ions are correct
126 evaluate_root ( i t , 1 ) = 1 ;
127 evaluate_root ( i t , 2 ) = lambda ;
128 evaluate_root ( i t , 3 ) = gamma;
129 evaluate_root ( i t , 4 ) = theta ;
130 evaluate_root ( i t , 5 ) = p_tn_indif f ;
131 evaluate_root ( i t , 6 ) = p_tn_bid_opt ;
132 evaluate_root ( i t , 7 ) = f_p_tn_bid_opt ;
133
134 else
135
136 %Store that calculat ions are incorrect
137 evaluate_root ( i t , 1 ) = 0 ;
138 evaluate_root ( i t , 2 ) = lambda ;
139 evaluate_root ( i t , 3 ) = gamma;
140 evaluate_root ( i t , 4 ) = theta ;
141 evaluate_root ( i t , 5 ) = p_tn_indif f ;
142 evaluate_root ( i t , 6 ) = p_tn_bid_opt ;
143 evaluate_root ( i t , 7 ) = f_p_tn_bid_opt ;
144 end
145
146 %−−−2.−−−Check of fer price calculat ion and ver i f y global maximum−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
147
148 %−−−2.1.−−−Calculate pro f i t for time tn−1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
149
150 %Calculate e f f i c iency at day−ahead output G_t0
151 eta_da = eta_ref−eta_ref * ( ( ( G_ref−G_t0 )/ G_ref )^beta ) * kappa ;
152
153 %Calculate rho_p_t
154 rho_p_t = ( eta_ref /eta_da ) * kappa*(((1 − (G_t/G_ref ) )^ beta )−((1−(G_t0/G_ref ) )^ beta ) ) ;
155
156 %Calculate pro f i t
157 pro f i t _ t = pt0 *G_t0−cda*(1+( rho_p_t/(1−rho_p_t ) ) ) * G_t+Posit ionIntra ;
158
159 %−−−2.2.−−−Calculate pro f i t and expected pro f i t for time tn−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
160
161 %Calculate rho_p_tn
162 rho_p_tn = ( eta_ref /eta_da ) * kappa*(((1 − (G_tn/G_ref ) )^ beta ) . . .
163 −((1−(G_t0/G_ref ) )^ beta ) ) ;
164
165 %Calculate pro f i t for time tn with indif ference price
166 pro f i t _ tn_ ind i f f = pt0 *G_t0−cda*(1+( rho_p_tn/(1−rho_p_tn ) ) ) * G_tn . . .
167 +Posit ionIntra +(G_tn−G_t ) * p_tn_indif f ;
168
169 %Calculate pro f i t at time tn with optimal bid price
170 profit_tn_opt = pt0 *G_t0−cda*(1+( rho_p_tn/(1−rho_p_tn ) ) ) * G_tn . . .
171 +Posit ionIntra +(G_tn−G_t ) * p_tn_bid_opt ;
172
173 i f p_tn_bid_opt < p_tn_indif f
174
175 %Calculate expected pro f i t for p_tn_bid_opt
176 F = 1−exp ( − ( ( ( p_tn_bid_opt−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ;
177
178 profit_exp = (1−F)* pro f i t _ t+F* profit_tn_opt ;
179
180 else
181
182 %I f p_tn_indif f i s too close to or below theta −> p_tn_bid_opt = p_tn_indif f
183 %and thus expected pro f i t = pro f i t at time tn−1
184 profit_exp = pro f i t _ t ;
185 end
186
187 %−−−2.3.−−−Calculate expected pro f i t for the interva l [ theta , theta+200] although
188 %checking the interva l [ theta , p_tn_indif f ] would be suf f i c ient−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
189
190 for j = 0:1:800
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191
192 i f p_tn_bid_opt < p_tn_indif f
193
194 %Calculate of fe r price
195 price = theta+ j *0 .25 ;
196
197 %Calculate success probabi l i ty given of fer price
198 F_price = 1−exp ( − ( ( ( price−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ;
199
200 %Calculate pro f i t given of fer price
201 prof i t_tn_price = pt0 *G_t0−cda*(1+( rho_p_tn/(1−rho_p_tn ) ) ) * G_tn . . .
202 +Posit ionIntra +(G_tn−G_t ) * price ;
203
204 %Calculate expected pro f i t given of fe r price
205 profit_exp_price ( j +1 ,1) = (1−F_price ) * pro f i t _ t+F_price * prof i t_tn_price ;
206 profit_exp_price ( j +1 ,2) = price ;
207
208 else
209
210 %I f p_tn_indif f i s too close to or below theta −> p_tn_bid_opt =
211 %p_tn_indif f and thus expected pro f i t = pro f i t at time tn−1
212 profit_exp_price ( j +1 ,1) = pro f i t _ t ;
213 profit_exp_price ( j +1 ,2) = p_tn_bid_opt ;
214 end
215 end
216
217 %−−−2.4.−−−Find maximum of expected prof i ts−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
218
219 max_profit_exp_price = max( profit_exp_price ( : , 1 ) ) ;
220 [~ ,max_row] = max( profit_exp_price ( : , 1 ) ) ;
221 max_price = profit_exp_price (max_row , 2 ) ;
222
223 %−−−2.5.−−−Check i f indif ference price i s calculated correct ly and function i s
224 %maximised global ly−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
225
226 %Round to neglect small f loat ing−point arithmetic errors
227 pro f i t _ t = round( pro f i t _ t *1e5 )/1e5 ;
228 pro f i t _ tn_ ind i f f = round( pro f i t _ tn_ ind i f f *1e5 )/1e5 ;
229 profit_exp = round( profit_exp *1e5)/1e5 ;
230 max_profit_exp_price = round(max_profit_exp_price *1e5 )/1e5 ;
231
232 i f ( p ro f i t _ t == pro f i t _ tn_ ind i f f ) && ( profit_exp >= max_profit_exp_price )
233
234 %Store that calculat ions are correct
235 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 1 ) = 1 ;
236 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 2 ) = pro f i t _ t ;
237 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 3 ) = pro f i t _ tn_ ind i f f ;
238 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 4 ) = p_tn_indif f ;
239 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 5 ) = profit_tn_opt ;
240 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 6 ) = p_tn_bid_opt ;
241 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 7 ) = max_price ;
242 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 8 ) = profit_exp ;
243 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 9 ) = max_profit_exp_price ;
244
245 else
246
247 %Store that calculat ions are incorrect
248 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 1 ) = 0 ;
249 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 2 ) = pro f i t _ t ;
250 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 3 ) = pro f i t _ tn_ ind i f f ;
251 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 4 ) = p_tn_indif f ;
252 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 5 ) = profit_tn_opt ;
253 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 6 ) = p_tn_bid_opt ;
254 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 7 ) = max_price ;
255 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 8 ) = profit_exp ;
256 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 9 ) = max_profit_exp_price ;
257 end
258 end
259
260 %Evaluate how many calculat ions are incorrect
261 number_unsuccessful_root = sum( evaluate_root ( : , 1 )==0 ) ;
262 number_unsuccessful_profit = sum( evaluate_prof i t ( : , 1 )==0 ) ;
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D.2 Asking to sell electricity
1 %−−−−−Program for checking root calculat ions and ver i fy ing global maximum ( ask)−−−−−−
2
3 %. . . Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
5 %−−−1.−−−Check root calculations−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .29
6 %−−−1.1.−−−Define parameters for o f fe r price calculation−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .31
7 %−−−1.2.−−−Calculate o f fe r prices and check i f root i s correct−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .99
8 %−−−2.−−−Check of fe r price calculat ion and ver i f y global maximum−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .136
9 %−−−2.1.−−−Calculate pro f i t for time tn−1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .138
10 %−−−2.2.−−−Calculate pro f i t and expected pro f i t for time tn−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .149
11 %−−−2.3.−−−Calculate expected pro f i t for the interva l [ p_tn_indiff , p_tn_indif f +200] or
12 %for the interva l [ theta , theta+200]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− l .168
13 %−−−2.4.−−−Find maximum of expected prof i ts−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .196
14 %−−−2.5.−−−Check i f indif ference price i s calculated correct ly and function i s
15 %maximised global ly−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .202
16
17 %. . . Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18
19 %Define number of calculat ions
20 i te ra t ions = 1000000;
21
22 %Preal locate
23 evaluate_root = nan( i terat ions , 7 ) ;
24 profit_exp_price = nan(800 ,2 ) ;
25 evaluate_prof i t = nan( i terat ions , 7 ) ;
26
27 for i t = 1 : 1 : i t e ra t ions
28
29 %−−−1.−−−Check root calculations−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
30
31 %−−−1.1.−−−Define parameters for o f fe r price calculation−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
32
33 %Define eta ( for e f f i c iency function )
34 eta_ref = rand ;
35 while eta_ref < 0.3 | | e ta_ref > 0.6
36 eta_ref = rand ;
37 end
38
39 %Define kappa ( for e f f i c iency function )
40 kappa = rand ;
41 while kappa < 0.05 | | kappa > 0.4
42 kappa = rand ;
43 end
44
45 %Define beta ( for e f f i c iency function )
46 beta = rand *5 ;
47 while beta < 1
48 beta = rand *5 ;
49 end
50
51 %Define reference capacity
52 G_ref = rand*1500;
53 while G_ref < 10
54 G_ref = rand*1500;
55 end
56
57 %Define day−ahead quantity
58 G_t0 = G_ref ;
59
60 %Define quantity before output increase
61 G_t = rand*1500;
62 while G_t > (G_ref−1)
63 G_t = rand*1500;
64 end
65
66 %Define quantity a f te r output increase
67 G_tn = rand*1500;
68 while (G_tn > G_ref ) | | (G_tn <= G_t )
69 G_tn = rand*1500;
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70 end
71
72 %Define day−ahead of fe r price
73 cda = rand*100;
74 while cda < 5
75 cda = rand*100;
76 end
77
78 %Define day−ahead clearing price
79 pt0 = cda *1 . 5 ;
80
81 %Define intraday pro f i t generated unt i l time tn−1
82 posit ion_intra = 10000;
83
84 %Define scale parameter
85 lambda = rand*100;
86 while lambda < 1
87 lambda = rand*100;
88 end
89
90 %Define shape parameter
91 gamma = rand *5 ;
92 while gamma <= 1.2
93 gamma = rand *5 ;
94 end
95
96 %Define location parameter
97 theta = rand*100−rand*50;
98
99 %−−−1.2.−−−Calculate of fe r prices and check i f root i s correct−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
100
101 %Calculate indif ference of fer price
102 [~ ,~ ,~ , p_tn_indiff , ~ ] = IDask_Gen( eta_ref , kappa , beta , G_ref , G_tn , G_t , G_t0 , cda , . . .
103 gamma, lambda , theta ) ;
104
105 %Calculate optimal ask price
106 [~ ,~ ,~ ,~ , p_tn_ask_opt ] = IDask_Gen( eta_ref , kappa , beta , G_ref , G_tn , G_t , G_t0 , cda , . . .
107 gamma, lambda , theta ) ;
108
109 %Calculate function value at p_tn_ask_opt
110 f_p_tn_ask_opt = p_tn_indiff−p_tn_ask_opt +(( lambda g^amma)/gamma) . . .
111 * ( p_tn_ask_opt−theta )^(1−gamma) ;
112
113 i f ( p_tn_ask_opt > theta ) && ( abs ( f_p_tn_ask_opt ) <= 1e−5)
114
115 %Store that calculat ions are correct
116 evaluate_root ( i t , 1 ) = 1 ;
117 evaluate_root ( i t , 2 ) = lambda ;
118 evaluate_root ( i t , 3 ) = gamma;
119 evaluate_root ( i t , 4 ) = theta ;
120 evaluate_root ( i t , 5 ) = p_tn_indif f ;
121 evaluate_root ( i t , 6 ) = p_tn_ask_opt ;
122 evaluate_root ( i t , 7 ) = f_p_tn_ask_opt ;
123
124 else
125
126 %Store that calculat ions are incorrect
127 evaluate_root ( i t , 1 ) = 0 ;
128 evaluate_root ( i t , 2 ) = lambda ;
129 evaluate_root ( i t , 3 ) = gamma;
130 evaluate_root ( i t , 4 ) = theta ;
131 evaluate_root ( i t , 5 ) = p_tn_indif f ;
132 evaluate_root ( i t , 6 ) = p_tn_ask_opt ;
133 evaluate_root ( i t , 7 ) = f_p_tn_ask_opt ;
134 end
135
136 %−−−2.−−−Check of fe r price calculat ion and ver i f y global maximum−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
137
138 %−−−2.1.−−−Calculate pro f i t for time tn−1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
139
140 %Calculate e f f i c iency at day−ahead output G_t0
141 eta_da = eta_ref−eta_ref * ( ( ( G_ref−G_t0 )/ G_ref )^beta ) * kappa ;
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142
143 %Calculate rho_p_t
144 rho_p_t = ( eta_ref /eta_da ) * kappa*(((1 − (G_t/G_ref ) )^ beta )−((1−(G_t0/G_ref ) )^ beta ) ) ;
145
146 %Calculate pro f i t
147 pro f i t _ t = pt0 *G_t0−cda*(1+( rho_p_t/(1−rho_p_t ) ) ) * G_t+posit ion_intra ;
148
149 %−−−2.2.−−−Calculate pro f i t and expected pro f i t for time tn−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
150
151 %Calculate rho_p_tn
152 rho_p_tn = ( eta_ref /eta_da ) * kappa*(((1 − (G_tn/G_ref ) )^ beta ) . . .
153 −((1−(G_t0/G_ref ) )^ beta ) ) ;
154
155 %Calculate pro f i t at time tn with indif ference price
156 pro f i t _ tn_ ind i f f = pt0 *G_t0−cda*(1+( rho_p_tn/(1−rho_p_tn ) ) ) * G_tn . . .
157 +posit ion_intra +(G_tn−G_t ) * p_tn_indif f ;
158
159 %Calculate pro f i t at time tn with optimal ask price
160 profit_tn_opt = pt0 *G_t0−cda*(1+( rho_p_tn/(1−rho_p_tn ) ) ) * G_tn . . .
161 +posit ion_intra +(G_tn−G_t ) * p_tn_ask_opt ;
162
163 %Calculate expected pro f i t for p_tn_ask_opt
164 S = exp ( − ( ( ( p_tn_ask_opt−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ;
165
166 profit_exp = (1−S )* pro f i t _ t+S* profit_tn_opt ;
167
168 %−−−2.3.−−−Calculate expected pro f i t for the interva l [ p_tn_indiff , p_tn_indif f +200]
169 %or the interva l [ theta , theta+200]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
170
171 for j = 0:1:800
172
173 i f p_tn_indif f >= theta
174
175 %Calculate o f fe r price
176 price = p_tn_indif f+ j *0 .25 ;
177
178 else
179
180 %Calculate o f fe r price
181 price = theta+ j *0 .25 ;
182 end
183
184 %Calculate success probabi l i ty given of fe r price
185 S_price = exp ( − ( ( ( price−theta )/ lambda)^gamma) ) ;
186
187 %Calculate pro f i t given of fer price
188 prof i t_tn_price = pt0 *G_t0−cda*(1+( rho_p_tn/(1−rho_p_tn ) ) ) * G_tn . . .
189 +posit ion_intra +(G_tn−G_t ) * price ;
190
191 %Calculate expected pro f i t given of fer price
192 profit_exp_price ( j +1 ,1) = (1−S_price ) * p ro f i t _ t+S_price * prof i t_tn_price ;
193 profit_exp_price ( j +1 ,2) = price ;
194 end
195
196 %−−−2.4.−−−Find maximum of expected prof i ts−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
197
198 max_profit_exp_price = max( profit_exp_price ( : , 1 ) ) ;
199 [~ ,max_row] = max( profit_exp_price ( : , 1 ) ) ;
200 max_price = profit_exp_price (max_row , 2 ) ;
201
202 %−−−2.5.−−−Check i f indif ference price i s calculated correct ly and function i s
203 %maximised global ly−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
204
205 %Round to neglect small f loat ing−point arithmetic errors
206 pro f i t _ t = round( pro f i t _ t *1e5 )/1e5 ;
207 pro f i t _ tn_ ind i f f = round( pro f i t _ tn_ ind i f f *1e5 )/1e5 ;
208 profit_exp = round( profit_exp *1e5)/1e5 ;
209 max_profit_exp_price = round(max_profit_exp_price *1e5 )/1e5 ;
210
211 i f ( p ro f i t _ t == pro f i t _ tn_ ind i f f ) && ( profit_exp >= max_profit_exp_price )
212
213 %Store that calculat ions are correct
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214 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 1 ) = 1 ;
215 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 2 ) = pro f i t _ t ;
216 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 3 ) = pro f i t _ tn_ ind i f f ;
217 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 4 ) = p_tn_indif f ;
218 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 5 ) = profit_tn_opt ;
219 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 6 ) = p_tn_ask_opt ;
220 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 7 ) = max_price ;
221 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 8 ) = profit_exp ;
222 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 9 ) = max_profit_exp_price ;
223
224 else
225
226 %Store that calculat ions are incorrect
227 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 1 ) = 0 ;
228 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 2 ) = pro f i t _ t ;
229 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 3 ) = pro f i t _ tn_ ind i f f ;
230 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 4 ) = p_tn_indif f ;
231 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 5 ) = profit_tn_opt ;
232 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 6 ) = p_tn_ask_opt ;
233 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 7 ) = max_price ;
234 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 8 ) = profit_exp ;
235 evaluate_prof i t ( i t , 9 ) = max_profit_exp_price ;
236 end
237 end
238
239 %Evaluate how many calculat ions are incorrect
240 number_unsuccessful_root = sum( evaluate_root ( : , 1 )==0 ) ;
241 number_unsuccessful_profit = sum( evaluate_prof i t ( : , 1 )==0 ) ;
154
Source code: Simulation of a continuous intraday
market
1 %######################################################################################
2 %−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
3
4 %Simulation of a continuous intraday market for e l e c t r i c i t y
5
6 %−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
7 %######################################################################################
8
9 %. . . Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
11 %−−−1.−−−Perform day−ahead dispatch−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .138
12 %−−−1.1.−−−Prepare calculat ion of day−ahead of fer quantity and price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .140
13 %−−−1.2.−−−Simulate day−ahead dispatch for each hour h−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−l .212
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50
51 %−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−SETTINGS−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
52 %######################################################################################
53
54 %Choose number of simulated hours :
55 number_hours = 8784;
56
57 %Choose number of simulated time steps (max. 10) :
58 number_time_steps = 10;
59
60 %Use indif ference of fer prices ( choose 4) or s t ra teg ic o f fe r prices ( choose 5 ) :
61 sim_type = 5;
62
63 %Define at which time step correction of positions close to rea l time s ta r t s :
64 t ime_t i l l _ rea l t ime = 2;
65
66 %Define below which capacity ( G_ref [MW] ) generators do not part ic ipate intraday :
67 part ic ipat ion_l imit = 50;
68
69 %Define per−unit penalty [ euro/MWhel] i f forecast error i s not completely traded :
70 penalty_bid = 10;
71 penalty_ask = 10;
72
73 %Define operation and maintenance costs [ euro/MWhel] :
74 OM_uranium = 3;
75 OM_lignite_coal = 3 ;
76 OM_gas_oil = 2 ;
77
78 %Define mark−up [ euro/MWhth] on fuel prices :
79 markup_uranium = 0;
80 markup_lignite = 0 ;
81 markup_coal = 1 ;
82 markup_gas = 2;
83 markup_oil = 2 ;
84
85 %Define mark−down [ euro/MWhel] on day−ahead of fe r prices of CHP plants :
86 markdown_lignite = 35;
87 markdown_coal = 35;
88 markdown_gas = 35;
89
90 %Choose forecast error [MW] :
91 load ’ forecast_error .mat ’
92
93 %Choose residual e l e c t r i c i t y load [MW] :
94 load ’ residual_load .mat ’
95
96 %Choose CRM balancing pro f i l e ("random" or "predefined" and load pro f i l e ) :
97 CRM_profile_decision = ’ predefined ’ ;
98 load ’CRM_profile_basic .mat ’ ;
99
100 %Choose power plant port fo l io (and preal locate struct "GenData " ) :
101 N = 496;
102 GenData_initial = repmat ( s t ruct ( ’ x ’ , 1 ) , 1 , N) ;
103 load ’ GenData_initial .mat ’
104
105 %Define combined day−ahead consumption of a l l demanders :
106 factor_DA_consumption = 0 .25 ;
107
108 %Define price e l a s t i c i t y of demand for the leve l of consumption at DA clearing price :
109 e l a s t i c i t y = −0.15;
110
111 %Define of fer type decision probabi l i t i es :
112
113 %Underestimation (CRM se l l s )
114 %Generators
115 prob_ask_1third_below_underest = 0 . 2 ;
116 prob_ask_2third_below_underest = 0 .25 ;
117 prob_bid_1third_above_underest = 0 .75 ;
118 prob_bid_2third_above_underest = 0 . 9 ;
119 %Demanders
120 prob_ask_below_underest = 0 . 4 ;
121 prob_bid_above_underest = 0 . 9 ;
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122 prob_bid_middle_underest = 0 . 7 ;
123
124 %Overestimation (CRM buys )
125 %Generators
126 prob_ask_1third_below_overest = 0 .75 ;
127 prob_ask_2third_below_overest = 0 . 9 ;
128 prob_bid_1third_above_overest = 0 . 2 ;
129 prob_bid_2third_above_overest = 0 .25 ;
130 %Demanders
131 prob_ask_below_overest = 0 . 9 ;
132 prob_bid_above_overest = 0 . 4 ;
133 prob_bid_middle_overest = 0 . 3 ;
134
135 %######################################################################################
136 %−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
137
138 %−−−1.−−−Perform day−ahead dispatch−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
139
140 %−−−1.1.−−−Prepare calculat ion of day−ahead of fer quantity and price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
141
142 %Define mark−ups on fuel prices
143 for g = 1 : 1 : s ize ( GenData_initial , 2 )
144
145 switch GenData_initial ( g ) . fue l
146
147 case ’Uranium’
148 GenData_initial ( g ) . pfuel ( : , 1 ) = GenData_initial ( g ) . pfuel ( : , 1 ) . . .
149 +markup_uranium ;
150
151 case ’ Lignite ’
152 GenData_initial ( g ) . pfuel ( : , 1 ) = GenData_initial ( g ) . pfuel ( : , 1 ) . . .
153 +markup_lignite ;
154
155 case ’Coal ’
156 GenData_initial ( g ) . pfuel ( : , 1 ) = GenData_initial ( g ) . pfuel ( : , 1 ) . . .
157 +markup_coal ;
158
159 case ’Gas ’
160 GenData_initial ( g ) . pfuel ( : , 1 ) = GenData_initial ( g ) . pfuel ( : , 1 ) . . .
161 +markup_gas ;
162
163 case ’ Oil ’
164 GenData_initial ( g ) . pfuel ( : , 1 ) = GenData_initial ( g ) . pfuel ( : , 1 ) . . .
165 +markup_oil ;
166 end
167 end
168
169 %Extract relevant arrays from GenData
170 ID_al l = cell2mat ( { GenData_initial . ID } ) ’ ;
171 G_ref_al l = cell2mat ( { GenData_initial . G_ref } ) ’ ;
172 e ta_ re f _a l l = cell2mat ( { GenData_initial . e ta_ref } ) ’ ;
173 emission_factor_al l = cell2mat ( { GenData_initial . emission_factor } ) ’ ;
174 kappa_all = cell2mat ( { GenData_initial . kappa } ) ’ ;
175 beta_al l = cell2mat ( { GenData_initial . beta } ) ’ ;
176
177 %Preal locate and load struct "DemData_initial " :
178 DemData_initial = repmat ( s t ruct ( ’ x ’ , 1 ) , 1 , 500) ;
179 load ’DemData_initial .mat ’
180
181 %Preal locate
182 DA_price = nan(number_hours , 1 ) ;
183
184 %Preal locate
185 CRM_trade = nan(number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
186 CRM_trading_costs_timestep = nan(number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
187 CRM_quantity_timestep = nan(number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
188 trans_value_timestep = nan(number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
189 trans_volume_timestep = nan(number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
190 ID_price_timestep = nan(number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
191 missing_quant_underest = zeros (number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
192 missing_quant_overest = zeros (number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
193
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194 %Preal locate
195 MB_OOB_high = nan(number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
196 MB_OOB_low = nan(number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
197 MA_OOB_high = nan(number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
198 MA_OOB_low = nan(number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
199
200 %Preal locate
201 Parameter_theta_bid = nan(number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
202 Parameter_lambda_bid = nan(number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
203 Parameter_theta_ask = nan(number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
204 Parameter_lambda_ask = nan(number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
205
206 %Preal locate
207 CRM_profile_random = nan(number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
208
209 %Preal locate
210 OOB_doc = nan(500 ,6 ,number_hours , number_time_steps+1) ;
211
212 %−−−1.2.−−−Simulate day−ahead dispatch for each hour h−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
213
214 for h = 1 : 1 : number_hours
215
216 %Transfer "GenData_initial " to "GenData" in order to clear s t ruct
217 GenData = GenData_initial ;
218
219 %−−−1.2.1.−−−Calculate day−ahead of fe r quantity and price for power generators−−−−−
220
221 %Preal locate and clear arrays
222 pfue l_a l l = nan( s ize (GenData , 2 ) , 1 ) ;
223 pcarbon_all = nan( s ize (GenData , 2 ) , 1 ) ;
224 cda_update_all = nan( s ize (GenData , 2 ) , 1 ) ;
225
226 %Build pfuel and pcarbon array
227 for g = 1 : 1 : s ize (GenData , 2 )
228
229 pfue l_a l l ( g , 1 ) = GenData(g ) . pfuel (h , 1 ) ;
230 pcarbon_all ( g , 1 ) = GenData(g ) . pcarbon(h , 1 ) ;
231 end
232
233 %Determine day−ahead of fer quantity
234 G_t0_all = G_ref_al l ;
235
236 %Use function "DAoffer" to calculate day−ahead of fer prices
237 cda_al l = DAoffer ( pfuel_al l , emission_factor_all , pcarbon_all , e ta_re f_a l l , . . .
238 G_ref_al l , G_t0_all , beta_al l , kappa_all ) ;
239
240 %Store day−ahead of fe r quantity and price
241 for g = 1 : 1 : s ize (GenData , 2 )
242
243 %Store type of o f fe r
244 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 ,1 } = ’ ask ’ ;
245 %Store offered quantity
246 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {3 ,1 } = G_t0_al l ( g ) ;
247 %Store change in offered quantity
248 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {4 ,1 } = 0 ;
249 %Store indif ference of fe r price
250 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {5 ,1 } = cda_al l ( g ) ;
251 %Store optimal o f fe r price
252 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 ,1 } = cda_al l ( g ) ;
253
254 %Consider operation and maintenance costs [ euro/MWhel]
255 switch GenData(g ) . fue l
256
257 case ’Uranium’
258 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 ,1 } = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 ,1 } . . .
259 +OM_uranium;
260
261 case { ’ Lignite ’ , ’ Coal ’ }
262 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 ,1 } = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 ,1 } . . .
263 +OM_lignite_coal ;
264
265 case { ’Gas ’ , ’ Oil ’ }
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266 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 ,1 } = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 ,1 } . . .
267 +OM_gas_oil ;
268 end
269
270 %Consider mark−down on day−ahead of fe r prices of CHP plants
271 i f ( strcmp(GenData(g ) .CHP, ’ yes ’ ) == 1)
272
273 switch GenData(g ) . fue l
274
275 case ’ Lignite ’
276 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 ,1 } = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 ,1 } . . .
277 −markdown_lignite ;
278
279 case ’Coal ’
280 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 ,1 } = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 ,1 } . . .
281 −markdown_coal ;
282
283 case ’Gas ’
284 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 ,1 } = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 ,1 } . . .
285 −markdown_gas ;
286 end
287 end
288
289 %Update array of day−ahead of fer prices a f te r adjustments for O&M and CHP
290 cda_update_all ( g ) = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers { 6 , 1 } ;
291 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {5 ,1 } = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers { 6 , 1 } ;
292 GenData(g ) . cda (h , 1 ) = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers { 6 , 1 } ;
293 end
294
295 %−−−1.2.1.1.−−−Build day−ahead merit order−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
296
297 %Build matrix cdaGt0 to prepare calculat ion of merit order
298 cdaGt0 = [ ID_all , G_t0_all , cda_update_all ] ;
299
300 %Sort cdaGt0 with respect to day−ahead of fe r price cda
301 cdaGt0 = sortrows (cdaGt0 , 3 ) ;
302
303 %Generate merit order (sum of G_t0 )
304 merit_order = [ cdaGt0 ( : , 1 ) , cumsum(cdaGt0 ( : , 2 ) ) , cdaGt0 ( : , 3 ) ] ;
305
306 %−−−1.2.1.2.−−−Determine which generator i s dispatched and store information−−−−−−−
307
308 for m = 1 :1 : s ize (merit_order , 1 )
309
310 %Get ID of each generator through position m in merit order
311 ID = merit_order (m, 1 ) ;
312
313 %Store merit order position of generator
314 GenData( ID ) . merit_order_rank (h , 1 ) = m;
315
316 %Generator at position m is needed to cover residual load
317 i f merit_order (m,2 ) < residual_load (h , 1 )
318
319 GenData( ID ) . dispatched {h , 1 } = ’ yes ’ ;
320 GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers {7 ,1 } = ’ accepted ’ ;
321
322 %Transfer o f fe r information to IntraPosit ions
323 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (2 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 2 , 1 ) ;
324 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (3 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 3 , 1 ) ;
325 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (4 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 4 , 1 ) ;
326 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (5 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 5 , 1 ) ;
327 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (6 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 6 , 1 ) ;
328 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions {7 ,1 } = ’ accepted ’ ;
329
330 %Generator at position m is needed to cover residual load
331 e l s e i f merit_order (m,2 ) == residual_load (h , 1 )
332
333 GenData( ID ) . dispatched {h , 1 } = ’ yes , marginal ’ ;
334 GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers {7 ,1 } = ’ accepted ’ ;
335
336 %Transfer o f fe r information to IntraPosit ions
337 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (2 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 2 , 1 ) ;
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338 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (3 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 3 , 1 ) ;
339 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (4 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 4 , 1 ) ;
340 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (5 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 5 , 1 ) ;
341 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (6 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 6 , 1 ) ;
342 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions {7 ,1 } = ’ accepted ’ ;
343
344 %Marginal generator sets the clearing price
345 DA_price (h , 1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers { 6 , 1 } ;
346
347 %Generator at position m is needed to cover residual load
348 e l s e i f (merit_order (m,2 ) > residual_load (h , 1 ) ) . . .
349 && (merit_order (m−1 ,2) < residual_load (h , 1 ) )
350
351 GenData( ID ) . dispatched {h , 1 } = ’ yes , marginal ’ ;
352 GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers {7 ,1 } = ’ accepted ’ ;
353
354 %Transfer o f fe r information to IntraPosit ions
355 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (2 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 2 , 1 ) ;
356 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (3 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 3 , 1 ) ;
357 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (4 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 4 , 1 ) ;
358 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (5 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 5 , 1 ) ;
359 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (6 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 6 , 1 ) ;
360 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions {7 ,1 } = ’ accepted ’ ;
361
362 %Marginal generator sets the clearing price
363 DA_price (h , 1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers { 6 , 1 } ;
364
365 %Generator at position m is not needed to cover residual load
366 e l s e i f merit_order (m,2 ) > residual_load (h , 1 )
367
368 GenData( ID ) . dispatched {h , 1 } = ’no ’ ;
369 GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers {7 ,1 } = ’not accepted ’ ;
370
371 %Transfer o f fe r information to IntraPosit ions
372 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (2 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 2 , 1 ) ;
373 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions {3 ,1 } = 0 ;
374 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions {4 ,1 } = 0 ;
375 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (5 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 5 , 1 ) ;
376 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions (6 ,1 ) = GenData( ID ) . IntraOffers ( 6 , 1 ) ;
377 GenData( ID ) . IntraPosit ions {7 ,1 } = ’not accepted ’ ;
378 end
379 end
380
381 %−−−1.2.2.−−−Build day−ahead of fe rs for e l e c t r i c i t y demanders−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
382
383 %Transfer "DemData_initial " to "DemData" in order to clear s t ruct
384 DemData = DemData_initial ;
385
386 %Define i n i t i a l value for combined consumption
387 comb_consumption = 0;
388
389 %Determine day−ahead al locat ion for e l e c t r i c i t y demanders
390 for d = 1 : 1 : s ize (DemData, 2 )
391
392 %Combined consumption of a l l demanders must not be lower than
393 %(residual load in hour h ) * ( factor_DA_consumption )
394 i f comb_consumption >= residual_load (h , 1 ) * factor_DA_consumption
395
396 break
397
398 else
399
400 %Determine of fer quantity D_t0
401 D_t0 = 300*rand ;
402
403 %Ensure that o f fe r quantity i s between 100 and 300 MW
404 while D_t0 < 100
405
406 D_t0 = 300*rand ;
407 end
408
409 %Store of fe r quantity
160
410 DemData(d ) . D_t0 = D_t0 ;
411
412 comb_consumption = comb_consumption+D_t0 ;
413 end
414 end
415
416 %Remove unused elements of DemData
417 DemData( [DemData. D_t0]==0) = [ ] ;
418
419 %Determine slope of demand curve for each e l e c t r i c i t y demander
420 for d = 1 : 1 : s ize (DemData, 2 )
421
422 %Calculate and store slope parameter for each demander
423 DemData(d ) . D_slope = −(DA_price (h , 1 ) / ( e l a s t i c i t y *DemData(d ) . D_t0 ) ) ;
424
425 %Calculate prohibit ive price
426 DemData(d ) . p_prohibitive = DA_price (h,1 )+ (DemData(d ) . D_slope*DemData(d ) . D_t0 ) ;
427
428 %Store type of o f fe r
429 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {2 ,1 } = ’bid ’ ;
430 %Store offered quantity
431 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {3 ,1 } = DemData(d ) . D_t0 ;
432 %Store change in offered quantity
433 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {4 ,1 } = 0 ;
434 %Store indif ference of fer price
435 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {5 ,1 } = DA_price (h , 1 ) ;
436 %Store optimal o f fe r price
437 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {6 ,1 } = DA_price (h , 1 ) ;
438 %Store that demander i s dispatched
439 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {7 ,1 } = ’ accepted ’ ;
440
441 %Transfer o f fe r information to IntraPosit ions
442 DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions (2 ,1 ) = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers ( 2 , 1 ) ;
443 DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions (3 ,1 ) = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers ( 3 , 1 ) ;
444 DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions (4 ,1 ) = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers ( 4 , 1 ) ;
445 DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions (5 ,1 ) = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers ( 5 , 1 ) ;
446 DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions (6 ,1 ) = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers ( 6 , 1 ) ;
447 DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions (7 ,1 ) = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers ( 7 , 1 ) ;
448 end
449
450 %−−−2.−−−Simulate intraday market for each hour h−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
451
452 %−−−2.1.−−−Determine quantity the CRM trades in each time step t for a given hour h
453
454 %Determine CRM trade quantity randomly
455 i f strcmp(CRM_profile_decision , ’ random’ )
456
457 sum_CRM_profile_random = 0;
458
459 %Ensure that forecast error i s traded " ent i re ly "
460 while sum_CRM_profile_random < 0.995 | | sum_CRM_profile_random > 1.005
461
462 for i = 2 : 1 : number_time_steps+1
463
464 %Find random number
465 decision_sign = rand ;
466
467 %Determine CRM balancing pro f i l e ( factors for each time step )
468 i f decision_sign <= 0.75
469
470 CRM_profile_random(h , i ) = ( rand /4 ) * (+1 ) ;
471
472 else
473
474 CRM_profile_random(h , i ) = ( rand/4)*( −1) ;
475 end
476 end
477
478 sum_CRM_profile_random = nansum(CRM_profile_random(h , : ) ) ;
479 end
480
481 %Calculate CRM trade quantity for each time step
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482 CRM_trade(h , 1 : number_time_steps+1) = forecast_error (h , 1 ) . . .
483 *CRM_profile_random(h , 1 : number_time_steps+1) ;
484
485 %Use predefined CRM balancing pro f i l e
486 e l s e i f strcmp(CRM_profile_decision , ’ predefined ’ )
487
488 %Calculate CRM trade quantity for each time step
489 CRM_trade(h , 1 : number_time_steps+1) = forecast_error (h , 1 ) . . .
490 *CRM_profile (1 ,1 : number_time_steps+1) ;
491 end
492
493 %−−−2.2.−−−Set o f fe r type decision probabi l i t ies−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
494
495 %Specify probabi l i t ies in the case of an underestimation (CRM se l l s )
496 i f forecast_error (h , 1 ) <= 0
497
498 prob_ask_1third_below = prob_ask_1third_below_underest ;
499 prob_ask_2third_below = prob_ask_2third_below_underest ;
500 prob_bid_1third_above = prob_bid_1third_above_underest ;
501 prob_bid_2third_above = prob_bid_2third_above_underest ;
502
503 prob_ask_below = prob_ask_below_underest ;
504 prob_bid_above = prob_bid_above_underest ;
505 prob_bid_middle = prob_bid_middle_underest ;
506
507 %Specify probabi l i t ies in the case of an overestimation (CRM buys )
508 e l s e i f forecast_error (h , 1 ) > 0
509
510 prob_ask_1third_below = prob_ask_1third_below_overest ;
511 prob_ask_2third_below = prob_ask_2third_below_overest ;
512 prob_bid_1third_above = prob_bid_1third_above_overest ;
513 prob_bid_2third_above = prob_bid_2third_above_overest ;
514
515 prob_ask_below = prob_ask_below_overest ;
516 prob_bid_above = prob_bid_above_overest ;
517 prob_bid_middle = prob_bid_middle_overest ;
518 end
519
520 %Preal locate
521 CRM_quantity_underest = nan(500 ,number_time_steps+1) ;
522 CRM_price_underest = nan(500 ,number_time_steps+1) ;
523 CRM_trading_costs_underest = nan(500 ,number_time_steps+1) ;
524 trans_value_underest = nan(500 ,number_time_steps+1) ;
525 trans_volume_underest = nan(500 ,number_time_steps+1) ;
526
527 %Preal locate
528 CRM_quantity_overest = nan(500 ,number_time_steps+1) ;
529 CRM_price_overest = nan(500 ,number_time_steps+1) ;
530 CRM_trading_costs_overest = nan(500 ,number_time_steps+1) ;
531 trans_value_overest = nan(500 ,number_time_steps+1) ;
532 trans_volume_overest = nan(500 ,number_time_steps+1) ;
533
534 %−−−2.3.−−−Simulate intraday ac t i v i t y for every time step t−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
535
536 for t = 2 : 1 : number_time_steps+1
537
538 %−−−2.3.1.−−−Determine of fe r type for each generator−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
539
540 for g = 1 : 1 : s ize (GenData , 2 )
541
542 %Distinguish dispatched and non−dispatched generators
543 switch GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {7 ,1 }
544
545 %Determine of fer type for dispatched generators
546 case ’ accepted ’
547
548 %Output leve l i s too close to minimum output −> ask
549 i f GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} < (GenData(g ) .G_min+2)
550
551 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ ask ( close G_min) ’ ;
552
553 %Output leve l i s too close to maximum output −> bid
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554 e l s e i f GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} > (GenData(g ) . G_ref−2)
555
556 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ bid ( close G_ref ) ’ ;
557
558 %Output leve l does not force bid or ask
559 else
560
561 %DA of fer price i s " s l i gh t l y " below DA clearing price
562 i f GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {6 ,1 } >= DA_price (h , 1 ) . . .
563 −((1/3)*DA_price (h , 1 ) )
564 %Find random number
565 decision_1third_below = rand ;
566
567 %Determine of fer type based on speci f ied probabi l i t i es
568 i f decision_1third_below <= prob_ask_1third_below
569
570 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ ask (1 third below ) ’ ;
571
572 else
573
574 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ bid (1 third below ) ’ ;
575 end
576
577 %DA of fer price i s " s i gn i f i can t l y " below DA clearing price
578 e l s e i f GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {6 ,1 } < DA_price (h , 1 ) . . .
579 −((1/3)*DA_price (h , 1 ) )
580
581 %Find random number
582 decision_2third_below = rand ;
583
584 %Determine of fer type based on speci f ied probabi l i t i es
585 i f decision_2third_below <= prob_ask_2third_below
586
587 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ ask (2 third below ) ’ ;
588
589 else
590
591 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ bid (2 third below ) ’ ;
592 end
593 end
594 end
595
596 %Determine of fe r type for non−dispatched generators
597 case ’not accepted ’
598
599 %Output leve l i s too close to zero output −> ask
600 i f GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} < 2
601
602 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ ask ( close 0 ) ’ ;
603
604 %Output leve l i s too close to maximum output −> bid
605 e l s e i f GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} > (GenData(g ) . G_ref−2)
606
607 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ bid ( close G_ref ) ’ ;
608
609 %Output leve l does not force bid or ask
610 else
611
612 %DA of fer price i s " s l i gh t l y " above DA clearing price
613 i f GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {6 ,1 } <= DA_price (h , 1 ) . . .
614 +((1/3)*DA_price (h , 1 ) )
615
616 %Find random number
617 decision_1third_above = rand ;
618
619 %Determine of fer type based on speci f ied probabi l i t i es
620 i f decision_1third_above <= prob_bid_1third_above
621
622 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ bid (1 third above ) ’ ;
623
624 else
625
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626 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ ask (1 third above ) ’ ;
627 end
628
629 %DA of fer price i s " s i gn i f i can t l y " above DA clearing price
630 e l s e i f GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {6 ,1 } > DA_price (h , 1 ) . . .
631 +((1/3)*DA_price (h , 1 ) )
632
633 %Find random number
634 decision_2third_above = rand ;
635
636 %Determine of fe r type based on speci f ied probabi l i t ies
637 i f decision_2third_above <= prob_bid_2third_above
638
639 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ bid (2 third above ) ’ ;
640
641 else
642
643 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ ask (2 third above ) ’ ;
644 end
645 end
646 end
647
648 %Force of fe r type close to l a s t time step
649 i f t >= ( ( number_time_steps+1)− t ime_t i l l _ rea l t ime )
650
651 %Determine of fe r type i f output at time t−1 i s below G_min
652 i f GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} < GenData(g ) .G_min
653
654 %Check i f output i s closer to zero than to G_min −> bid
655 i f ( (GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} . . .
656 /GenData(g ) .G_min) <= 0 .5 ) . . .
657 && (GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} >= 2)
658
659 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ forced bid ’ ;
660
661 %Check i f output i s closer to G_min than to zero −> ask
662 e l s e i f ( (GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} . . .
663 /GenData(g ) .G_min) > 0 .5 )
664
665 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ forced ask ’ ;
666
667 %Check i f output i s too close to zero output −> no of fe r
668 e l s e i f GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} < 2
669
670 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’no offer ’ ;
671 end
672
673 %Check i f output i s equal to or above minimum load −> ask
674 e l s e i f GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} >= GenData(g ) .G_min
675
676 %Check i f increasing output i s feas ib le −> ask
677 i f GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} <= (GenData(g ) . G_ref−2)
678
679 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ ask (above G_min) ’ ;
680
681 %I f increasing output i s not feas ib le −> no of fer
682 else
683
684 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’no offer ’ ;
685 end
686 end
687 end
688 end
689 end
690
691 %−−−2.3.2.−−−Prevent some generators from participation−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
692
693 for g = 1 : 1 : s ize (GenData , 2 )
694
695 %Generators with max. output below part ic ipat ion_l imit do not part ic ipate
696 i f GenData(g ) . G_ref < part ic ipat ion_l imit
697
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698 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’no offer ’ ;
699 end
700 end
701
702 %−−−2.3.3.−−−Determine of fer type for each demander−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
703
704 for d = 1 : 1 : s ize (DemData, 2 )
705
706 %Consumption leve l i s too close to zero consumption −> bid
707 i f DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} < 2
708
709 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ bid ( close 0 ) ’ ;
710
711 %Consumption leve l i s too close to maximum consumption −> ask
712 e l s e i f DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} . . .
713 > ( (DemData(d ) . p_prohibitive /DemData(d ) . D_slope)−2)
714
715 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ ask ( close Dmax) ’ ;
716
717 %Consumption leve l does not force bid or ask
718 else
719
720 %Position on demand curve at t−1 i s below DA clearing price
721 i f (DemData(d ) . p_prohibitive−DemData(d ) . D_slope . . .
722 *DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1}) . . .
723 < (DA_price (h,1) −(1/3)*DA_price (h , 1 ) )
724
725 %Find random number
726 decision_below = rand ;
727
728 %Determine of fe r type based on speci f ied probabi l i t ies
729 i f decision_below <= prob_ask_below
730
731 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ ask (below ) ’ ;
732
733 else
734
735 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ bid (below ) ’ ;
736 end
737
738 %Position on demand curve at t−1 i s above DA clearing price
739 e l s e i f (DemData(d ) . p_prohibitive−DemData(d ) . D_slope . . .
740 *DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1}) . . .
741 > (DA_price (h,1 )+ (1/3) *DA_price (h , 1 ) )
742
743 %Find random number
744 decision_above = rand ;
745
746 %Determine of fe r type based on speci f ied probabi l i t ies
747 i f decision_above <= prob_bid_above
748
749 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ bid (above ) ’ ;
750
751 else
752
753 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ ask (above ) ’ ;
754 end
755
756 %Position on demand curve at t−1 i s near DA clearing price
757 else
758
759 %Find random number
760 decision_middle = rand ;
761
762 %Determine of fe r type based on speci f ied probabi l i t ies
763 i f decision_middle <= prob_bid_middle
764
765 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ bid (middle ) ’ ;
766
767 else
768
769 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } = ’ ask (middle ) ’ ;
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770 end
771 end
772 end
773 end
774
775 %−−−2.3.4.−−−Calculate o f fe r quantit ies for generators and demanders−−−−−−−−−−−
776
777 %Preal locate and clear arrays
778 size_GenData = size (GenData , 2 ) ;
779 size_DemData = size (DemData, 2 ) ;
780
781 bid_time_Gen = nan( size_GenData , 1 ) ;
782 bid_ID_Gen = nan( size_GenData , 1 ) ;
783 bid_quantity_Gen = nan( size_GenData , 1 ) ;
784 bid_p_tn_indiff_Gen = nan( size_GenData , 1 ) ;
785 bid_p_tn_bid_opt_Gen = nan( size_GenData , 1 ) ;
786 bid_type_Gen = nan( size_GenData , 1 ) ;
787
788 bid_time_Dem = nan(size_DemData , 1 ) ;
789 bid_ID_Dem = nan(size_DemData , 1 ) ;
790 bid_quantity_Dem = nan(size_DemData , 1 ) ;
791 bid_p_tn_indiff_Dem = nan(size_DemData , 1 ) ;
792 bid_p_tn_bid_opt_Dem = nan(size_DemData , 1 ) ;
793 bid_type_Dem = nan(size_DemData , 1 ) ;
794
795 ask_time_Gen = nan( size_GenData , 1 ) ;
796 ask_ID_Gen = nan( size_GenData , 1 ) ;
797 ask_quantity_Gen = nan( size_GenData , 1 ) ;
798 ask_p_tn_indiff_Gen = nan( size_GenData , 1 ) ;
799 ask_p_tn_ask_opt_Gen = nan( size_GenData , 1 ) ;
800 ask_type_Gen = nan( size_GenData , 1 ) ;
801
802 ask_time_Dem = nan(size_DemData , 1 ) ;
803 ask_ID_Dem = nan(size_DemData , 1 ) ;
804 ask_quantity_Dem = nan(size_DemData , 1 ) ;
805 ask_p_tn_indiff_Dem = nan(size_DemData , 1 ) ;
806 ask_p_tn_ask_opt_Dem = nan(size_DemData , 1 ) ;
807 ask_type_Dem = nan(size_DemData , 1 ) ;
808
809 %−−−2.3.4.1.−−−Calculate o f fe r quantity for each generator−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
810
811 for g = 1 : 1 : s ize (GenData , 2 )
812
813 %Distinguish type of o f fe r as stored in IntraOffers (2 , t )
814 switch GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t }
815
816 %Calculate bid quantity for o f fe r type "bid"
817 case { ’ bid ( close G_ref ) ’ , ’ bid (1 third below ) ’ , . . .
818 ’ bid (2 third below ) ’ , ’ bid (1 third above ) ’ , . . .
819 ’ bid (2 third above ) ’ }
820
821 %Distinguish dispatched and non−dispatched generator
822 switch GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {7 ,1 }
823
824 %Calculate bid quantity for dispatched generator
825 case ’ accepted ’
826
827 %Determine bid quantity
828 G_tn = GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} . . .
829 −(GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} . . .
830 −GenData(g ) .G_min)* rand ;
831
832 %Ensure that bid quantity i s greater than 1 and smaller
833 %than 50 MW
834 while ( abs (G_tn−GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1}) < 1) . . .
835 | | ( abs (G_tn−GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1}) > 50)
836
837 G_tn = GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} . . .
838 −(GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} . . .
839 −GenData(g ) .G_min)* rand ;
840 end
841
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842 %Store bid quantity
843 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {3 , t } = G_tn ;
844
845 %Store change in output leve l
846 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {4 , t } = G_tn . . .
847 −GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1};
848
849 %Calculate bid quantity for non−dispatched generator
850 case ’not accepted ’
851
852 %Determine bid quantity
853 G_tn = GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} . . .
854 −(GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1}−0)*rand ;
855
856 %Ensure that bid quantity i s greater than 1 and smaller
857 %than 50 MW
858 while ( abs (G_tn−GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1}) < 1) . . .
859 | | ( abs (G_tn−GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1}) > 50)
860
861 G_tn = GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} . . .
862 −(GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1}−0)*rand ;
863 end
864
865 %Store bid quantity
866 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {3 , t } = G_tn ;
867
868 %Store change in output leve l
869 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {4 , t } = G_tn . . .
870 −GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1};
871 end
872
873 %Calculate bid quantity for o f fe r type " forced bid"
874 case ’ forced bid ’
875
876 %Determine bid quantity
877 G_tn = 0;
878
879 %Store bid quantity
880 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {3 , t } = G_tn ;
881 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {4 , t } = G_tn . . .
882 −GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1};
883
884 %Calculate ask quantity for o f fe r type "ask"
885 case { ’ ask ( close G_min) ’ , ’ ask (1 third below ) ’ , . . .
886 ’ ask (2 third below ) ’ , ’ ask ( close 0) ’ , . . .
887 ’ ask (1 third above ) ’ , ’ ask (2 third above ) ’ , . . .
888 ’ ask (above G_min) ’ }
889
890 %Determine ask quantity
891 G_tn = GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} . . .
892 +(GenData(g ) . G_ref−GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1})* rand ;
893
894 %Ensure that ask quantity i s greater than 1 and smaller than 50 MW
895 while ( (G_tn−GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1}) < 1) . . .
896 | | ( ( G_tn−GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1}) > 50)
897
898 G_tn = GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1}+(GenData(g ) . G_ref . . .
899 −GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1})* rand ;
900 end
901
902 %Store ask quantity
903 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {3 , t } = G_tn ;
904
905 %Store change in output leve l
906 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {4 , t } = G_tn . . .
907 −GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1};
908
909 %Calculate ask quantity for o f fe r type " forced ask"
910 case ’ forced ask ’
911
912 %Determine ask quantity
913 G_tn = GenData(g ) .G_min;
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914
915 %Store ask quantity
916 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {3 , t } = G_tn ;
917
918 %Store change in output leve l
919 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {4 , t } = G_tn . . .
920 −GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1};
921 end
922 end
923
924 %−−−2.3.4.2.−−−Calculate o f fe r quantity for each demander−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
925
926 for d = 1 : 1 : s ize (DemData, 2 )
927
928 %Distinguish type of o f fe r as stored in IntraOffers (2 , t )
929 switch DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {2 , t }
930
931 %Calculate bid quantity for o f fe r type "bid"
932 case { ’ bid ( close 0 ) ’ , ’ bid (below ) ’ , ’ bid (above ) ’ , ’ bid (middle ) ’ }
933
934 %Determine bid quantity
935 D_tn = DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} . . .
936 +((DemData(d ) . p_prohibitive /DemData(d ) . D_slope ) . . .
937 −DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1})* rand ;
938
939 %Ensure that bid quantity i s greater than 1 and smaller than 50 MW
940 while ( (D_tn−DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1}) < 1) . . .
941 | | ( (D_tn−DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1}) > 50)
942
943 D_tn = DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} . . .
944 +((DemData(d ) . p_prohibitive /DemData(d ) . D_slope ) . . .
945 −DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1})* rand ;
946 end
947
948 %Store bid quantity
949 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {3 , t } = D_tn ;
950
951 %Store change in demand leve l
952 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {4 , t } = D_tn . . .
953 −DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1};
954
955 %Calculate ask quantity for o f fe r type "ask"
956 case { ’ ask ( close Dmax) ’ , ’ ask (below ) ’ , ’ ask (above ) ’ , ’ ask (middle ) ’ }
957
958 %Determine ask quantity
959 D_tn = DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} . . .
960 −(DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1}−0)*rand ;
961
962 %Ensure that ask quantity i s greater than 1 and smaller than 50 MW
963 while ( abs (D_tn−DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1}) < 1) . . .
964 | | ( abs (D_tn−DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1}) > 50)
965
966 D_tn = DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1} . . .
967 −(DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t−1}−0)*rand ;
968 end
969
970 %Store ask quantity
971 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {3 , t } = D_tn ;
972
973 %Store change in demand leve l
974 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {4 , t } = D_tn . . .
975 −DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1};
976 end
977 end
978
979 %−−−2.3.5.−−−Calculate o f fe r prices for generators and demanders−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
980
981 %Determine i n i t i a l guess of the parameter values required to find the PDF for
982 %min market bid price and max market ask price
983
984 %For min market bid price
985 MB_OOB_high(h , 1 ) = DA_price (h , 1 ) ;
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986 MB_OOB_low(h, 1 ) = DA_price (h,1)−10;
987
988 %For max market ask price
989 MA_OOB_low(h, 1 ) = DA_price (h , 1 ) ;
990 MA_OOB_high(h , 1 ) = DA_price (h,1 )+10 ;
991
992 %−−−2.3.5.1.−−−Calculate o f fe r prices for each generator−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
993
994 for g = 1 : 1 : s ize (GenData , 2 )
995
996 %Distinguish type of o f fe r as stored in IntraOffers (2 , t )
997 switch GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t }
998
999 %Calculate o f fe r prices for o f fe r type "bid"
1000 case { ’ bid ( close G_ref ) ’ , ’ bid (1 third below ) ’ , . . .
1001 ’ bid (2 third below ) ’ , ’ bid (1 third above ) ’ , . . .
1002 ’ bid (2 third above ) ’ , ’ forced bid ’ }
1003
1004 %Define gamma ( shape parameter )
1005 gamma = 3;
1006
1007 %Determine values for constructing PDF of min market bid price
1008 b_h = nanmean(MB_OOB_high(h , 1 : t −1)) ;
1009 F_h = 0 . 8 ;
1010 b_l = nanmean(MB_OOB_low(h , 1 : t −1)) ;
1011 F_l = 0 . 2 ;
1012
1013 %Calculate theta ( location parameter )
1014 theta = (b_h*(− log(1−F_l ) )^(1/gamma) . . .
1015 −b_l *(− log(1−F_h))^(1/gamma) ) . . .
1016 /((− log(1−F_l ) )^(1/gamma)−(− log(1−F_h))^(1/gamma) ) ;
1017
1018 %Calculate lambda ( scale parameter )
1019 lambda = ( b_l−b_h) . . .
1020 /((− log(1−F_l ) )^(1/gamma)−(− log(1−F_h))^(1/gamma) ) ;
1021
1022 %Store Weibull parameters
1023 Parameter_theta_bid (h , t ) = theta ;
1024 Parameter_lambda_bid (h , t ) = lambda ;
1025
1026 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {8 , t } = gamma;
1027 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {9 , t } = theta ;
1028 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {10 , t } = lambda ;
1029
1030 %Load parameters for bid price calculat ion
1031 G_ref = GenData(g ) . G_ref ;
1032 G_t0 = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers { 3 , 1 } ;
1033 G_t = GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1};
1034 G_tn = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {3 , t } ;
1035 cda = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers { 6 , 1 } ;
1036 eta_ref = GenData(g ) . eta_ref ;
1037 kappa = GenData(g ) . kappa ;
1038 beta = GenData(g ) . beta ;
1039 gamma = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {8 , t } ;
1040 theta = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {9 , t } ;
1041 lambda = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {10 , t } ;
1042
1043 %Calculate indif ference bid price
1044 [~ ,~ ,~ , p_tn_indiff , ~ ] = IDbid_Gen( eta_ref , kappa , beta , G_ref , . . .
1045 G_tn , G_t , G_t0 , cda ,gamma, . . .
1046 lambda , theta ) ;
1047
1048 %Calculate optimal bid price
1049 [~ ,~ ,~ ,~ , p_tn_bid_opt ] = IDbid_Gen( eta_ref , kappa , beta , G_ref , . . .
1050 G_tn , G_t , G_t0 , cda ,gamma, . . .
1051 lambda , theta ) ;
1052
1053 %Store of fe r prices
1054 switch GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t }
1055
1056 %I f ’ forced bid ’ −> use indif ference price as optimal price
1057 case ’ forced bid ’
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1058
1059 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {5 , t } = p_tn_indif f ;
1060 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 , t } = p_tn_indif f ;
1061
1062 case { ’ bid ( close G_ref ) ’ , ’ bid (1 third below ) ’ , . . .
1063 ’ bid (2 third below ) ’ , ’ bid (1 third above ) ’ , . . .
1064 ’ bid (2 third above ) ’ }
1065
1066 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {5 , t } = p_tn_indif f ;
1067 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 , t } = p_tn_bid_opt ;
1068 end
1069
1070 %Transfer resu l t s for set t ing up open order book
1071 bid_time_Gen (g , 1 ) = t ;
1072 bid_ID_Gen(g , 1 ) = GenData(g ) . ID ;
1073 bid_quantity_Gen (g , 1 ) = abs (GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {4 , t } ) ;
1074 bid_p_tn_indiff_Gen (g , 1 ) = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {5 , t } ;
1075 bid_p_tn_bid_opt_Gen (g , 1 ) = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 , t } ;
1076 bid_type_Gen (g , 1 ) = 1 ; %"1" indicates generator
1077
1078 %Calculate o f fe r prices for o f fe r type "ask"
1079 case { ’ ask ( close G_min) ’ , ’ ask (1 third below ) ’ , . . .
1080 ’ ask (2 third below ) ’ , ’ ask ( close 0) ’ , . . .
1081 ’ ask (1 third above ) ’ , ’ ask (2 third above ) ’ , . . .
1082 ’ forced ask ’ , ’ ask (above G_min) ’ }
1083
1084 %Define gamma (shape parameter )
1085 gamma = 3;
1086
1087 %Determine values for constructing PDF of max market ask price
1088 a_h = nanmean(MA_OOB_high(h , 1 : t −1)) ;
1089 S_h = 0 . 2 ;
1090 a_l = nanmean(MA_OOB_low(h , 1 : t −1)) ;
1091 S_l = 0 . 8 ;
1092
1093 %Calculate theta ( location parameter )
1094 theta = (a_h*(− log ( S_l ) )^(1/gamma) . . .
1095 −a_l *(− log (S_h ))^(1/gamma) ) . . .
1096 /((− log ( S_l ) )^(1/gamma)−(− log (S_h ) )^(1/gamma) ) ;
1097
1098 %Calculate lambda ( scale parameter )
1099 lambda = ( a_l−a_h) . . .
1100 /((− log ( S_l ) )^(1/gamma)−(− log (S_h ))^(1/gamma) ) ;
1101
1102 %Store Weibull parameters
1103 Parameter_theta_ask (h , t ) = theta ;
1104 Parameter_lambda_ask (h , t ) = lambda ;
1105
1106 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {8 , t } = gamma;
1107 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {9 , t } = theta ;
1108 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {10 , t } = lambda ;
1109
1110 %Load parameters for ask calculat ion
1111 G_ref = GenData(g ) . G_ref ;
1112 G_t0 = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers { 3 , 1 } ;
1113 G_t = GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1};
1114 G_tn = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {3 , t } ;
1115 cda = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers { 6 , 1 } ;
1116 eta_ref = GenData(g ) . eta_ref ;
1117 kappa = GenData(g ) . kappa ;
1118 beta = GenData(g ) . beta ;
1119 gamma = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {8 , t } ;
1120 theta = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {9 , t } ;
1121 lambda = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {10 , t } ;
1122
1123 %Calculate indif ference ask price
1124 [~ ,~ ,~ , p_tn_indiff , ~ ] = IDask_Gen( eta_ref , kappa , beta , G_ref , . . .
1125 G_tn , G_t , G_t0 , cda ,gamma, . . .
1126 lambda , theta ) ;
1127
1128 %Calculate optimal ask price
1129 [~ ,~ ,~ ,~ , p_tn_ask_opt ] = IDask_Gen( eta_ref , kappa , beta , G_ref , . . .
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1130 G_tn , G_t , G_t0 , cda ,gamma, . . .
1131 lambda , theta ) ;
1132
1133 %Store of fe r prices
1134 switch GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t }
1135
1136 %I f ’ forced ask ’ −> use indif ference price as optimal price
1137 case ’ forced ask ’
1138
1139 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {5 , t } = p_tn_indif f ;
1140 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 , t } = p_tn_indif f ;
1141
1142 case { ’ ask ( close G_min) ’ , ’ ask (1 third below ) ’ , . . .
1143 ’ ask (2 third below ) ’ , ’ ask ( close 0) ’ , . . .
1144 ’ ask (1 third above ) ’ , ’ ask (2 third above ) ’ , . . .
1145 ’ ask (above G_min) ’ }
1146
1147 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {5 , t } = p_tn_indif f ;
1148 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 , t } = p_tn_ask_opt ;
1149 end
1150
1151 %Transfer resu l t s for set t ing up open order book
1152 ask_time_Gen (g , 1 ) = t ;
1153 ask_ID_Gen(g , 1 ) = GenData(g ) . ID ;
1154 ask_quantity_Gen (g , 1 ) = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {4 , t } ;
1155 ask_p_tn_indiff_Gen (g , 1 ) = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {5 , t } ;
1156 ask_p_tn_ask_opt_Gen (g , 1 ) = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 , t } ;
1157 ask_type_Gen (g , 1 ) = 1 ; %"1" indicates generator
1158
1159 %Generator submits no of fe r
1160 case ’no offer ’
1161
1162 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {3 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1163 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {4 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1164 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {5 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1165 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1166 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1167 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {8 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1168 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {9 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1169 GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {10 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1170
1171 GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’no offer ’ ;
1172 GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t −1);
1173 GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {4 , t } = 0 ;
1174 GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {5 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1175 GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {6 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1176 GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1177 end
1178 end
1179
1180 %−−−2.3.5.2.−−−Calculate o f fe r prices for each demander−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
1181
1182 for d = 1 : 1 : s ize (DemData, 2 )
1183
1184 %Distinguish type of o f fe r as stored in IntraOffers (2 , t )
1185 switch DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {2 , t }
1186
1187 %Calculate o f fe r prices for o f fe r type "bid"
1188 case { ’ bid ( close 0 ) ’ , ’ bid (below ) ’ , ’ bid (above ) ’ , ’ bid (middle ) ’ }
1189
1190 %Define gamma ( shape parameter )
1191 gamma = 3;
1192
1193 %Determine values for constructing PDF of min market bid price
1194 b_h = nanmean(MB_OOB_high(h , 1 : t −1)) ;
1195 F_h = 0 . 8 ;
1196 b_l = nanmean(MB_OOB_low(h , 1 : t −1)) ;
1197 F_l = 0 . 2 ;
1198
1199 %Calculate theta ( location parameter )
1200 theta = (b_h*(− log(1−F_l ) )^(1/gamma) . . .
1201 −b_l *(− log(1−F_h))^(1/gamma) ) . . .
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1202 /((− log(1−F_l ) )^(1/gamma)−(− log(1−F_h))^(1/gamma) ) ;
1203
1204 %Calculate lambda ( scale parameter )
1205 lambda = ( b_l−b_h) . . .
1206 /((− log(1−F_l ) )^(1/gamma)−(− log(1−F_h))^(1/gamma) ) ;
1207
1208 %Store Weibull parameters
1209 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {8 , t } = gamma;
1210 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {9 , t } = theta ;
1211 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {10 , t } = lambda ;
1212
1213 %Load parameters for bid price calculat ion
1214 D_t = DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1};
1215 D_tn = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {3 , t } ;
1216 p_prohibitive = DemData(d ) . p_prohibitive ;
1217 D_slope = DemData(d ) . D_slope ;
1218 gamma = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {8 , t } ;
1219 theta = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {9 , t } ;
1220 lambda = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {10 , t } ;
1221
1222 %Calculate indif ference bid price
1223 [ p_tn_indiff_Dem ,~ ] = IDbid_Dem(D_t ,D_tn , p_prohibitive , . . .
1224 D_slope ,gamma, lambda , theta ) ;
1225
1226 %Calculate optimal bid price
1227 [~ ,p_tn_bid_opt_Dem] = IDbid_Dem(D_t ,D_tn , p_prohibitive , . . .
1228 D_slope ,gamma, lambda , theta ) ;
1229
1230 %Store of fe r prices
1231 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {5 , t } = p_tn_indiff_Dem ;
1232 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {6 , t } = p_tn_bid_opt_Dem ;
1233
1234 %Transfer resu l t s for set t ing up open order book
1235 bid_time_Dem(d , 1 ) = t ;
1236 bid_ID_Dem(d , 1 ) = DemData(d ) . ID ;
1237 bid_quantity_Dem(d , 1 ) = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {4 , t } ;
1238 bid_p_tn_indiff_Dem (d , 1 ) = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {5 , t } ;
1239 bid_p_tn_bid_opt_Dem(d , 1 ) = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {6 , t } ;
1240 bid_type_Dem(d , 1 ) = 2 ; %"2" indicates demander
1241
1242 %Calculate o f fe r prices for o f fe r type "ask"
1243 case { ’ ask ( close Dmax) ’ , ’ ask (below ) ’ , ’ ask (above ) ’ , ’ ask (middle ) ’ }
1244
1245 %Define gamma (shape parameter )
1246 gamma = 3;
1247
1248 %Determine values for constructing PDF of max market ask price
1249 a_h = nanmean(MA_OOB_high(h , 1 : t −1)) ;
1250 S_h = 0 . 2 ;
1251 a_l = nanmean(MA_OOB_low(h , 1 : t −1)) ;
1252 S_l = 0 . 8 ;
1253
1254 %Calculate theta ( location parameter )
1255 theta = (a_h*(− log ( S_l ) )^(1/gamma) . . .
1256 −a_l *(− log (S_h ))^(1/gamma) ) . . .
1257 /((− log ( S_l ) )^(1/gamma)−(− log (S_h ) )^(1/gamma) ) ;
1258
1259 %Calculate lambda ( scale parameter )
1260 lambda = ( a_l−a_h) . . .
1261 /((− log ( S_l ) )^(1/gamma)−(− log (S_h ))^(1/gamma) ) ;
1262
1263 %Store Weibull parameters
1264 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {8 , t } = gamma;
1265 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {9 , t } = theta ;
1266 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {10 , t } = lambda ;
1267
1268 %Load parameters for ask price calculat ion
1269 D_t = DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {3 , t −1};
1270 D_tn = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {3 , t } ;
1271 p_prohibitive = DemData(d ) . p_prohibitive ;
1272 D_slope = DemData(d ) . D_slope ;
1273 gamma = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {8 , t } ;
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1274 theta = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {9 , t } ;
1275 lambda = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {10 , t } ;
1276
1277 %Calculate indif ference ask price
1278 [ p_tn_indiff_Dem ,~ ] = IDask_Dem(D_t ,D_tn , p_prohibitive , . . .
1279 D_slope ,gamma, lambda , theta ) ;
1280
1281 %Calculate optimal ask price
1282 [~ ,p_tn_ask_opt_Dem] = IDask_Dem(D_t ,D_tn , p_prohibitive , . . .
1283 D_slope ,gamma, lambda , theta ) ;
1284
1285 %Store of fe r prices
1286 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {5 , t } = p_tn_indiff_Dem ;
1287 DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {6 , t } = p_tn_ask_opt_Dem ;
1288
1289 %Transfer resu l t s for set t ing up open order book
1290 ask_time_Dem(d , 1 ) = t ;
1291 ask_ID_Dem(d , 1 ) = DemData(d ) . ID ;
1292 ask_quantity_Dem(d , 1 ) = abs (DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {4 , t } ) ;
1293 ask_p_tn_indiff_Dem (d , 1 ) = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {5 , t } ;
1294 ask_p_tn_ask_opt_Dem(d , 1 ) = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {6 , t } ;
1295 ask_type_Dem(d , 1 ) = 2 ; %"2" indicates demander
1296 end
1297 end
1298
1299 %−−−2.3.6.−−−Build open order book−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
1300
1301 %Clear arrays
1302 var l i s t_b id = { ’ bid_time ’ , ’ bid_ID ’ , ’ bid_quantity ’ , ’ bid_p_tn_indiff ’ , . . .
1303 ’ bid_p_tn_bid_opt ’ , ’ bid_type ’ , ’ bid_matrix ’ , ’OOB_bid’ , . . .
1304 ’OOB_bid_doc ’ } ;
1305
1306 clear ( var l i s t_b id { : } ) ;
1307
1308 var l i s t _ask = { ’ ask_time ’ , ’ ask_ID ’ , ’ ask_quantity ’ , ’ ask_p_tn_indiff ’ , . . .
1309 ’ ask_p_tn_ask_opt ’ , ’ ask_type ’ , ’ ask_matrix ’ , ’OOB_ask ’ , . . .
1310 ’OOB_ask_doc ’ } ;
1311
1312 clear ( var l i s t_ask { : } ) ;
1313
1314 %Integrate bids from generators and demanders
1315 bid_time = vertcat (bid_time_Gen , bid_time_Dem ) ;
1316 bid_ID = vertcat (bid_ID_Gen , bid_ID_Dem ) ;
1317 bid_quantity = vertcat ( bid_quantity_Gen , bid_quantity_Dem ) ;
1318 bid_p_tn_indiff = vertcat ( bid_p_tn_indiff_Gen , bid_p_tn_indiff_Dem ) ;
1319 bid_p_tn_bid_opt = vertcat ( bid_p_tn_bid_opt_Gen , bid_p_tn_bid_opt_Dem ) ;
1320 bid_type = vertcat ( bid_type_Gen , bid_type_Dem ) ;
1321
1322 %Collect bid information for set t ing up open order book (OOB)
1323 bid_matrix = [ bid_time , bid_ID , bid_quantity , bid_p_tn_indiff , . . .
1324 bid_p_tn_bid_opt , bid_type ] ;
1325
1326 %Delete rows that do not re fer to bid
1327 bid_matrix ( ( isnan ( bid_matrix ( : , 2 ) ) ) , : ) = [ ] ;
1328
1329 %Sort "bid_matrix" in descending order with respect to of fe r price ( determined
1330 %by "sim type ") to generate open order book for bids
1331 OOB_bid = sortrows ( bid_matrix ,−sim_type ) ;
1332
1333 %Integrate asks from generators and demanders
1334 ask_time = vertcat ( ask_time_Gen , ask_time_Dem ) ;
1335 ask_ID = vertcat (ask_ID_Gen , ask_ID_Dem ) ;
1336 ask_quantity = vertcat ( ask_quantity_Gen , ask_quantity_Dem ) ;
1337 ask_p_tn_indiff = vertcat ( ask_p_tn_indiff_Gen , ask_p_tn_indiff_Dem ) ;
1338 ask_p_tn_ask_opt = vertcat ( ask_p_tn_ask_opt_Gen , ask_p_tn_ask_opt_Dem ) ;
1339 ask_type = vertcat ( ask_type_Gen , ask_type_Dem ) ;
1340
1341 %Collect ask information for set t ing up open order book (OOB)
1342 ask_matrix = [ ask_time , ask_ID , ask_quantity , ask_p_tn_indiff , . . .
1343 ask_p_tn_ask_opt , ask_type ] ;
1344
1345 %Delete rows that do not re fer to ask
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1346 ask_matrix ( ( isnan ( ask_matrix ( : , 2 ) ) ) , : ) = [ ] ;
1347
1348 %Sort "ask_matrix" in ascending order with respect to of fe r price ( determined
1349 %by "sim type ") to generate open order book for asks
1350 OOB_ask = sortrows ( ask_matrix , sim_type ) ;
1351
1352 %−−−2.3.7.−−−Underestimation (CRM se l l s)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
1353
1354 i f CRM_trade(h , t ) < 0
1355
1356 %Document order book for each hour and time step
1357 OOB_bid_doc = OOB_bid ;
1358 OOB_bid_doc(500 ,6) = 0 ;
1359 OOB_doc ( : , : , h , t ) = OOB_bid_doc ;
1360
1361 %CRM se l l s at time step t −> asks are not successful
1362 for r = 1 : 1 : s ize (OOB_ask, 1 )
1363
1364 %Store resu l t s for generator
1365 i f OOB_ask( r , 6 ) == 1
1366
1367 %Extract ID of generator
1368 ID_OOB = OOB_ask( r , 2 ) ;
1369
1370 %Store information that o f fe r i s not successful
1371 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1372 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ ask ’ ;
1373 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1374 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t −1);
1375 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {4 , t } = 0 ;
1376 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {5 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1377 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {6 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1378 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1379
1380 %Store resu l t s for demander
1381 e l s e i f OOB_ask( r , 6 ) == 2
1382
1383 %Extract ID of demander
1384 ID_OOB = OOB_ask( r , 2 ) ;
1385
1386 %Store information that o f fe r i s not successful
1387 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1388 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ ask ’ ;
1389 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1390 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t −1);
1391 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {4 , t } = 0 ;
1392 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {5 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1393 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {6 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1394 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1395 end
1396 end
1397
1398 %−−−2.3.7.1.−−−Check for every rank r in the OOB which of fer i s accepted−−−
1399
1400 %Predefine use_quantity
1401 use_quantity = 0 ;
1402
1403 for r = 1 : 1 : s ize (OOB_bid, 1 )
1404
1405 %Sum quantit ies in the OOB successively
1406 use_quantity = use_quantity+OOB_bid( r , 3 ) ;
1407
1408 %Bid quantity at rank r in the OOB i s needed to cover CRM_trade
1409 i f use_quantity <= abs (CRM_trade(h , t ) )
1410
1411 %Store resu l t s for generator
1412 i f OOB_bid( r , 6 ) == 1
1413
1414 %Extract ID of generator
1415 ID_OOB = OOB_bid( r , 2 ) ;
1416
1417 %Store that the bid of the generator i s successful
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1418 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1419 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ bid ’ ;
1420 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1421 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (3 , t ) ;
1422 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (4 , t ) = . . .
1423 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (4 , t ) ;
1424 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (5 , t ) = . . .
1425 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (5 , t ) ;
1426 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (6 , t ) = . . .
1427 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (6 , t ) ;
1428 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1429
1430 %Store resu l t s for demander
1431 e l s e i f OOB_bid( r , 6 ) == 2
1432
1433 %Extract ID of demander
1434 ID_OOB = OOB_bid( r , 2 ) ;
1435
1436 %Store that the bid of the demander i s successful
1437 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1438 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ bid ’ ;
1439 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1440 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (3 , t ) ;
1441 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (4 , t ) = . . .
1442 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (4 , t ) ;
1443 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (5 , t ) = . . .
1444 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (5 , t ) ;
1445 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (6 , t ) = . . .
1446 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (6 , t ) ;
1447 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1448 end
1449
1450 %Store quantity the CRM se l l s to generator or demander
1451 CRM_quantity_underest ( r , t ) = OOB_bid( r , 3 ) ;
1452
1453 %Store price the CRM receives from generator or demander
1454 CRM_price_underest ( r , t ) = OOB_bid( r , sim_type ) ;
1455
1456 %Store trading costs for se l l ing quantity
1457 CRM_trading_costs_underest ( r , t ) = −(CRM_quantity_underest ( r , t ) . . .
1458 *CRM_price_underest ( r , t ) ) ;
1459
1460 %Store transaction value ( product of quantity and price )
1461 trans_value_underest ( r , t ) = OOB_bid( r , 3 ) *OOB_bid( r , sim_type ) ;
1462
1463 %Store transaction volume
1464 trans_volume_underest ( r , t ) = OOB_bid( r , 3 ) ;
1465
1466 %Consider penalty i f some quantit ies cannot be sold
1467 i f ( r == size (OOB_bid , 1 ) ) && ( use_quantity < abs (CRM_trade(h , t ) ) )
1468
1469 %Calculate quantity that cannot be sold
1470 missing_quant_underest (h , t ) = abs (CRM_trade(h , t ))−use_quantity ;
1471
1472 %Store missing quantity
1473 CRM_quantity_underest ( r +1 , t ) = missing_quant_underest (h , t ) ;
1474
1475 %Calculate and store price at which missing quantity i s valued
1476 CRM_price_underest ( r +1 , t ) = OOB_bid( r , sim_type)−penalty_bid ;
1477
1478 %Calculate and store trading costs
1479 CRM_trading_costs_underest ( r +1 , t ) = . . .
1480 −(CRM_quantity_underest ( r +1 , t ) . . .
1481 *CRM_price_underest ( r +1 , t ) ) ;
1482
1483 %Calculate and store transaction value
1484 trans_value_underest ( r +1 , t ) = missing_quant_underest (h , t ) . . .
1485 * (OOB_bid( r , sim_type ) . . .
1486 −penalty_bid ) ;
1487
1488 %Store transaction volume
1489 trans_volume_underest ( r +1 , t ) = missing_quant_underest (h , t ) ;
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1490 end
1491
1492 %Store rank of l a s t ( lowest ) market bid price
1493 i f ( r == size (OOB_bid , 1 ) ) && ( use_quantity < abs (CRM_trade(h , t ) ) )
1494
1495 rank_last_bid = r +1;
1496
1497 else
1498
1499 rank_last_bid = r ;
1500 end
1501
1502 %Only a part of the bid quantity at rank r i s needed to cover CRM_trade
1503 e l s e i f ( use_quantity > abs (CRM_trade(h , t ) ) ) . . .
1504 && ( ( use_quantity−OOB_bid( r , 3 ) ) < abs (CRM_trade(h , t ) ) )
1505
1506 %Store resu l t s for generator
1507 i f OOB_bid( r , 6 ) == 1
1508
1509 %Extract ID of generator
1510 ID_OOB = OOB_bid( r , 2 ) ;
1511
1512 %Store that the bid of the generator i s successful
1513 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1514 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ bid ’ ;
1515 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1516 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (3 , t ) ;
1517 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (4 , t ) = . . .
1518 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (4 , t ) ;
1519 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (5 , t ) = . . .
1520 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (5 , t ) ;
1521 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (6 , t ) = . . .
1522 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (6 , t ) ;
1523 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1524
1525 %Store resu l t s for demander
1526 e l s e i f OOB_bid( r , 6 ) == 2
1527
1528 %Extract ID of demander
1529 ID_OOB = OOB_bid( r , 2 ) ;
1530
1531 %Store that the bid of the demander i s successful
1532 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1533 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ bid ’ ;
1534 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1535 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (3 , t ) ;
1536 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (4 , t ) = . . .
1537 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (4 , t ) ;
1538 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (5 , t ) = . . .
1539 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (5 , t ) ;
1540 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (6 , t ) = . . .
1541 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (6 , t ) ;
1542 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1543 end
1544
1545 %Store quantity the CRM se l l s to generator or demander
1546 CRM_quantity_underest ( r , t ) = abs (CRM_trade(h , t ) ) . . .
1547 −(use_quantity−OOB_bid( r , 3 ) ) ;
1548
1549 %Store price the CRM receives from generator or demander
1550 CRM_price_underest ( r , t ) = OOB_bid( r , sim_type ) ;
1551
1552 %Store trading costs for se l l ing quantity
1553 CRM_trading_costs_underest ( r , t ) = −(CRM_quantity_underest ( r , t ) . . .
1554 *CRM_price_underest ( r , t ) ) ;
1555
1556 %Store transaction value ( product of quantity and price )
1557 trans_value_underest ( r , t ) = ( abs (CRM_trade(h , t ) ) . . .
1558 −(use_quantity−OOB_bid( r , 3 ) ) ) . . .
1559 *OOB_bid( r , sim_type ) ;
1560
1561 %Store transaction volume
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1562 trans_volume_underest ( r , t ) = abs (CRM_trade(h , t ) ) . . .
1563 −(use_quantity−OOB_bid( r , 3 ) ) ;
1564
1565 %Store rank of l a s t ( lowest ) market bid price
1566 rank_last_bid = r ;
1567
1568 %Bid quantity at rank r in the OOB i s not needed to cover CRM_trade
1569 e l s e i f ( use_quantity > abs (CRM_trade(h , t ) ) ) . . .
1570 && ( ( use_quantity−OOB_bid( r , 3 ) ) >= abs (CRM_trade(h , t ) ) )
1571
1572 %Store resu l t s for generator
1573 i f OOB_bid( r , 6 ) == 1
1574
1575 %Extract ID of generator
1576 ID_OOB = OOB_bid( r , 2 ) ;
1577
1578 %Store that the bid of the generator i s not successful
1579 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1580 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ bid ’ ;
1581 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1582 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t −1);
1583 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {4 , t } = 0 ;
1584 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {5 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1585 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {6 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1586 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1587
1588 %Store resu l t s for demander
1589 e l s e i f OOB_bid( r , 6 ) == 2
1590
1591 %Extract ID of demander
1592 ID_OOB = OOB_bid( r , 2 ) ;
1593
1594 %Store that the bid of the demander i s not successful
1595 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1596 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ bid ’ ;
1597 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1598 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t −1);
1599 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {4 , t } = 0 ;
1600 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {5 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1601 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {6 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1602 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1603 end
1604
1605 %Store that CRM does not transact with generator or demander
1606 CRM_quantity_underest ( r , t ) = 0 ;
1607 CRM_price_underest ( r , t ) = 0 ;
1608 CRM_trading_costs_underest ( r , t ) = 0 ;
1609 trans_value_underest ( r , t ) = 0 ;
1610 trans_volume_underest ( r , t ) = 0 ;
1611 end
1612 end
1613
1614 %−−−2.3.7.2.−−−Calculate volume−weighted average price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
1615
1616 %Calculate trading costs for time step
1617 CRM_trading_costs_timestep (h , t ) = nansum(CRM_trading_costs_underest ( : , t ) ) ;
1618
1619 %Calculate traded quantity for time step
1620 CRM_quantity_timestep (h , t ) = nansum(CRM_quantity_underest ( : , t ) ) ;
1621
1622 %Calculate transaction value for time step
1623 trans_value_timestep (h , t ) = nansum( trans_value_underest ( : , t ) ) ;
1624
1625 %Calculate transaction volume for time step
1626 trans_volume_timestep (h , t ) = nansum( trans_volume_underest ( : , t ) ) ;
1627
1628 %Calculate volume−weighted average price for time step
1629 ID_price_timestep (h , t ) = trans_value_timestep (h , t ) . . .
1630 /trans_volume_timestep (h , t ) ;
1631
1632 %−−−2.3.7.3.−−−Store market bid price before and af te r transactions−−−−−−−−
1633
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1634 i f rank_last_bid > 1
1635
1636 MB_OOB_high(h , t ) = CRM_price_underest (1 , t ) ;
1637 MB_OOB_low(h , t ) = CRM_price_underest ( rank_last_bid , t ) ;
1638
1639 else
1640
1641 MB_OOB_high(h , t ) = nan ;
1642 MB_OOB_low(h , t ) = nan ;
1643 end
1644 end
1645
1646 %−−−2.3.8.−−−Overestimation (CRM buys)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
1647
1648 i f CRM_trade(h , t ) > 0
1649
1650 %Document order book for each hour and time step
1651 OOB_ask_doc = OOB_ask ;
1652 OOB_ask_doc(500 ,6) = 0 ;
1653 OOB_doc ( : , : , h , t ) = OOB_ask_doc ;
1654
1655 %CRM buys at time step t −> bids are not successful
1656 for r = 1 : 1 : s ize (OOB_bid, 1 )
1657
1658 %Store resu l t s for generator
1659 i f OOB_bid( r , 6 ) == 1
1660
1661 %Extract ID of generator
1662 ID_OOB = OOB_bid( r , 2 ) ;
1663
1664 %Store information that o f fe r i s not successful
1665 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1666 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ bid ’ ;
1667 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1668 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t −1);
1669 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {4 , t } = 0 ;
1670 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {5 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1671 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {6 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1672 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1673
1674 %Store resu l t s for demander
1675 e l s e i f OOB_bid( r , 6 ) == 2
1676
1677 %Extract ID of demander
1678 ID_OOB = OOB_bid( r , 2 ) ;
1679
1680 %Store information that o f fe r i s not successful
1681 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1682 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ bid ’ ;
1683 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1684 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t −1);
1685 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {4 , t } = 0 ;
1686 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {5 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1687 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {6 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1688 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1689 end
1690 end
1691
1692 %−−−2.3.8.1.−−−Check for every rank r in the OOB which of fer i s accepted−−−
1693
1694 %Predefine use_quantity
1695 use_quantity = 0 ;
1696
1697 for r = 1 : 1 : s ize (OOB_ask, 1 )
1698
1699 %Sum quantit ies in the OOB successively
1700 use_quantity = use_quantity+OOB_ask( r , 3 ) ;
1701
1702 %Ask quantity at rank r in the OOB i s needed to cover CRM_trade
1703 i f use_quantity <= CRM_trade(h , t )
1704
1705 %Store resu l t s for generator
178
1706 i f OOB_ask( r , 6 ) == 1
1707
1708 %Extract ID of generator
1709 ID_OOB = OOB_ask( r , 2 ) ;
1710
1711 %Store that the ask of the generator i s successful
1712 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1713 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ ask ’ ;
1714 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1715 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (3 , t ) ;
1716 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (4 , t ) = . . .
1717 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (4 , t ) ;
1718 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (5 , t ) = . . .
1719 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (5 , t ) ;
1720 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (6 , t ) = . . .
1721 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (6 , t ) ;
1722 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1723
1724 %Store resu l t s for demander
1725 e l s e i f OOB_ask( r , 6 ) == 2
1726
1727 %Extract ID of demander
1728 ID_OOB = OOB_ask( r , 2 ) ;
1729
1730 %Store that the ask of the demander i s successful
1731 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1732 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ ask ’ ;
1733 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1734 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (3 , t ) ;
1735 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (4 , t ) = . . .
1736 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (4 , t ) ;
1737 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (5 , t ) = . . .
1738 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (5 , t ) ;
1739 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (6 , t ) = . . .
1740 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (6 , t ) ;
1741 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1742 end
1743
1744 %Store quantity the CRM buys from generator or demander
1745 CRM_quantity_overest ( r , t ) = OOB_ask( r , 3 ) ;
1746
1747 %Store price the CRM pays to generator or demander
1748 CRM_price_overest ( r , t ) = OOB_ask( r , sim_type ) ;
1749
1750 %Store trading costs for buying quantity
1751 CRM_trading_costs_overest ( r , t ) = CRM_quantity_overest ( r , t ) . . .
1752 *CRM_price_overest ( r , t ) ;
1753
1754 %Store transaction value ( product of quantity and price )
1755 trans_value_overest ( r , t ) = OOB_ask( r , 3 ) *OOB_ask( r , sim_type ) ;
1756
1757 %Store transaction volume
1758 trans_volume_overest ( r , t ) = OOB_ask( r , 3 ) ;
1759
1760 %Consider penalty i f some quantit ies cannot be bought
1761 i f ( r == size (OOB_ask , 1 ) ) && ( use_quantity < CRM_trade(h , t ) )
1762
1763 %Calculate quantity that cannot be bought
1764 missing_quant_overest (h , t ) = CRM_trade(h , t )−use_quantity ;
1765
1766 %Store missing quantity
1767 CRM_quantity_overest ( r +1 , t ) = missing_quant_overest (h , t ) ;
1768
1769 %Calculate and store price at which missing quantity i s valued
1770 CRM_price_overest ( r +1 , t ) = OOB_ask( r , sim_type)+penalty_ask ;
1771
1772 %Calculate and store trading costs
1773 CRM_trading_costs_overest ( r +1 , t ) = . . .
1774 CRM_quantity_overest ( r +1 , t ) . . .
1775 *CRM_price_overest ( r +1 , t ) ;
1776
1777 %Calculate and store transaction value
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1778 trans_value_overest ( r +1 , t ) = missing_quant_overest (h , t ) . . .
1779 * (OOB_ask( r , sim_type ) . . .
1780 +penalty_ask ) ;
1781
1782 %Store transaction volume
1783 trans_volume_overest ( r +1 , t ) = missing_quant_overest (h , t ) ;
1784 end
1785
1786 %Store rank of l a s t ( highest ) market ask price
1787 i f ( r == size (OOB_ask , 1 ) ) && ( use_quantity < CRM_trade(h , t ) )
1788
1789 rank_last_ask = r +1;
1790
1791 else
1792
1793 rank_last_ask = r ;
1794 end
1795
1796 %Only a part of the ask quantity at rank r i s needed to cover CRM_trade
1797 e l s e i f ( use_quantity > CRM_trade(h , t ) ) . . .
1798 && ( ( use_quantity−OOB_ask( r , 3 ) ) < CRM_trade(h , t ) )
1799
1800 %Store resu l t s for generator
1801 i f OOB_ask( r , 6 ) == 1
1802
1803 %Extract ID of generator
1804 ID_OOB = OOB_ask( r , 2 ) ;
1805
1806 %Store that the ask of the generator i s successful
1807 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1808 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ ask ’ ;
1809 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1810 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (3 , t ) ;
1811 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (4 , t ) = . . .
1812 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (4 , t ) ;
1813 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (5 , t ) = . . .
1814 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (5 , t ) ;
1815 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (6 , t ) = . . .
1816 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (6 , t ) ;
1817 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1818
1819 %Store resu l t s for demander
1820 e l s e i f OOB_ask( r , 6 ) == 2
1821
1822 %Extract ID of demander
1823 ID_OOB = OOB_ask( r , 2 ) ;
1824
1825 %Store that the ask of the demander i s successful
1826 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1827 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ ask ’ ;
1828 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1829 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (3 , t ) ;
1830 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (4 , t ) = . . .
1831 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (4 , t ) ;
1832 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (5 , t ) = . . .
1833 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (5 , t ) ;
1834 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (6 , t ) = . . .
1835 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers (6 , t ) ;
1836 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’ accepted ’ ;
1837 end
1838
1839 %Store quantity the CRM buys from generator or demander
1840 CRM_quantity_overest ( r , t ) = CRM_trade(h , t ) . . .
1841 −(use_quantity−OOB_ask( r , 3 ) ) ;
1842
1843 %Store price the CRM pays to generator or demander
1844 CRM_price_overest ( r , t ) = OOB_ask( r , sim_type ) ;
1845
1846 %Store trading costs for buying quantity
1847 CRM_trading_costs_overest ( r , t ) = CRM_quantity_overest ( r , t ) . . .
1848 *CRM_price_overest ( r , t ) ;
1849
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1850 %Store transaction value ( product of quantity and price )
1851 trans_value_overest ( r , t ) = (CRM_trade(h , t ) . . .
1852 −(use_quantity−OOB_ask( r , 3 ) ) ) . . .
1853 *OOB_ask( r , sim_type ) ;
1854
1855 %Store transaction volume
1856 trans_volume_overest ( r , t ) = CRM_trade(h , t ) . . .
1857 −(use_quantity−OOB_ask( r , 3 ) ) ;
1858
1859 %Store rank of l a s t ( highest ) market ask price
1860 rank_last_ask = r ;
1861
1862 %Ask quantity at rank r in the OOB i s not needed to cover CRM_trade
1863 e l s e i f ( use_quantity > CRM_trade(h , t ) ) . . .
1864 && ( ( use_quantity−OOB_ask( r , 3 ) ) >= CRM_trade(h , t ) )
1865
1866 %Store resu l t s for generator
1867 i f OOB_ask( r , 6 ) == 1
1868
1869 %Extract ID of generator
1870 ID_OOB = OOB_ask( r , 2 ) ;
1871
1872 %Store that the ask of the generator i s not successful
1873 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1874 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ ask ’ ;
1875 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1876 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t −1);
1877 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {4 , t } = 0 ;
1878 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {5 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1879 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {6 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1880 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1881
1882 %Store resu l t s for demander
1883 e l s e i f OOB_ask( r , 6 ) == 2
1884
1885 %Extract ID of demander
1886 ID_OOB = OOB_ask( r , 2 ) ;
1887
1888 %Store that the ask of the demander i s not successful
1889 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1890 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ ask ’ ;
1891 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1892 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t −1);
1893 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {4 , t } = 0 ;
1894 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {5 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1895 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {6 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1896 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1897 end
1898
1899 %Store that CRM does not transact with generator or demander
1900 CRM_quantity_overest ( r , t ) = 0 ;
1901 CRM_price_overest ( r , t ) = 0 ;
1902 CRM_trading_costs_overest ( r , t ) = 0 ;
1903 trans_value_overest ( r , t ) = 0 ;
1904 trans_volume_overest ( r , t ) = 0 ;
1905 end
1906 end
1907
1908 %−−−2.3.8.2.−−−Calculate volume−weighted average price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
1909
1910 %Calculate trading costs for time step
1911 CRM_trading_costs_timestep (h , t ) = nansum(CRM_trading_costs_overest ( : , t ) ) ;
1912
1913 %Calculate traded quantity for time step
1914 CRM_quantity_timestep (h , t ) = nansum(CRM_quantity_overest ( : , t ) ) ;
1915
1916 %Calculate transaction value for time step
1917 trans_value_timestep (h , t ) = nansum( trans_value_overest ( : , t ) ) ;
1918
1919 %Calculate transaction volume for time step
1920 trans_volume_timestep (h , t ) = nansum( trans_volume_overest ( : , t ) ) ;
1921
181
APPENDIX E. SOURCE CODE: SIMULATION OF A CONTINUOUS INTRADAY MARKET
1922 %Calculate volume−weighted average price for time step
1923 ID_price_timestep (h , t ) = trans_value_timestep (h , t ) . . .
1924 /trans_volume_timestep (h , t ) ;
1925
1926 %−−−2.3.8.3.−−−Store market ask price before and af te r transactions−−−−−−−−
1927
1928 i f rank_last_ask > 1
1929
1930 MA_OOB_low(h , t ) = CRM_price_overest (1 , t ) ;
1931 MA_OOB_high(h , t ) = CRM_price_overest ( rank_last_ask , t ) ;
1932
1933 else
1934
1935 MA_OOB_low(h , t ) = nan ;
1936 MA_OOB_high(h , t ) = nan ;
1937 end
1938 end
1939
1940 %−−−2.3.9.−−−CRM does not trade−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
1941
1942 i f CRM_trade(h , t ) == 0
1943
1944 %Store that bid of generator or demander i s not successful
1945 for r = 1 : 1 : s ize (OOB_bid, 1 )
1946
1947 %Store resu l t s for generators
1948 i f OOB_bid( r , 6 ) == 1
1949
1950 %Extract ID of generator
1951 ID_OOB = OOB_bid( r , 2 ) ;
1952
1953 %Store information that o f fe r i s not successful
1954 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1955 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ bid ’ ;
1956 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1957 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t −1);
1958 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {4 , t } = 0 ;
1959 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {5 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1960 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {6 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1961 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1962
1963 %Store resu l t s for demander
1964 e l s e i f OOB_bid( r , 6 ) == 2
1965
1966 %Extract ID of demander
1967 ID_OOB = OOB_bid( r , 2 ) ;
1968
1969 %Store information that o f fe r i s not successful
1970 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1971 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ bid ’ ;
1972 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
1973 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t −1);
1974 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {4 , t } = 0 ;
1975 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {5 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1976 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {6 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1977 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1978 end
1979 end
1980
1981 %Store that ask of generator or demander i s not successful
1982 for r = 1 : 1 : s ize (OOB_ask, 1 )
1983
1984 %Store resu l t s for generator
1985 i f OOB_ask( r , 6 ) == 1
1986
1987 %Extract ID of generator
1988 ID_OOB = OOB_ask( r , 2 ) ;
1989
1990 %Store information that o f fe r i s not successful
1991 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1992 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ ask ’ ;
1993 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
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1994 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t −1);
1995 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {4 , t } = 0 ;
1996 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {5 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1997 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {6 , t } = ’−−− ’;
1998 GenData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
1999
2000 %Store information for demander
2001 e l s e i f OOB_ask( r , 6 ) == 2
2002
2003 %Extract ID of demander
2004 ID_OOB = OOB_ask( r , 2 ) ;
2005
2006 %Store information that o f fe r i s not successful
2007 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraOffers {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
2008 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {2 , t } = ’ ask ’ ;
2009 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t ) = . . .
2010 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions (3 , t −1);
2011 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {4 , t } = 0 ;
2012 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {5 , t } = ’−−− ’;
2013 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {6 , t } = ’−−− ’;
2014 DemData(ID_OOB) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } = ’not accepted ’ ;
2015 end
2016 end
2017
2018 %Store that CRM does not transact with generator or demander
2019 CRM_trading_costs_timestep (h , t ) = 0 ;
2020 CRM_quantity_timestep (h , t ) = 0 ;
2021 trans_value_timestep (h , t ) = 0 ;
2022 trans_volume_timestep (h , t ) = 0 ;
2023 ID_price_timestep (h , t ) = DA_price (h , 1 ) ;
2024 end
2025 end
2026 end
2027
2028 %−−−3.−−−Calculate hourly volume−weighted average intraday price−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
2029
2030 %Preal locate
2031 ID_price = nan(number_hours , 1 ) ;
2032 CRM_quantity_hour = nan(number_hours , 1 ) ;
2033 CRM_trading_costs_hour = nan(number_hours , 1 ) ;
2034 trans_value_hour = nan(number_hours , 1 ) ;
2035 trans_volume_hour = nan(number_hours , 1 ) ;
2036
2037 %Calculate ID_price for each hour
2038 for h = 1 : 1 : number_hours
2039
2040 %Calculate traded quantity for hour h
2041 CRM_quantity_hour (h , 1 ) = nansum(CRM_quantity_timestep (h , : ) ) ;
2042
2043 %Calculate trading costs for hour h
2044 CRM_trading_costs_hour (h , 1 ) = nansum(CRM_trading_costs_timestep (h , : ) ) ;
2045
2046 %Calculate transaction value for hour h
2047 trans_value_hour (h , 1 ) = nansum( trans_value_timestep (h , : ) ) ;
2048
2049 %Calculate transaction volume for hour h
2050 trans_volume_hour (h , 1 ) = nansum( trans_volume_timestep (h , : ) ) ;
2051
2052 %Consider that CRM may not trade in a given hour h
2053 i f trans_volume_hour (h , 1 ) > 0
2054
2055 ID_price (h , 1 ) = trans_value_hour (h, 1 ) / trans_volume_hour (h , 1 ) ;
2056
2057 else
2058
2059 ID_price (h , 1 ) = DA_price (h , 1 ) ;
2060 end
2061 end
2062
2063 %−−−4.−−−Perform some evaluations−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
2064
2065 %−−−4.1.−−−Evaluate CRM trading ac t iv i t y−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
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2066
2067 %Load data for calculat ions
2068 load ’DA_price_feed_in .mat ’ ;
2069 load ’ feed_in .mat ’ ;
2070
2071 %Preal locate
2072 CRM_results = nan(number_hours , 1 6 ) ;
2073
2074 for h = 1 : 1 : number_hours
2075
2076 %Store forecast error for hour h
2077 CRM_results (h , 1 ) = forecast_error (h , 1 ) ;
2078
2079 %Store feed−in from renewables
2080 CRM_results (h , 2 ) = feed_in (h , 1 ) ;
2081
2082 %Store residual load for hour h
2083 CRM_results (h , 3 ) = residual_load (h , 1 ) ;
2084
2085 %Store day−ahead clearing price
2086 CRM_results (h , 4 ) = DA_price (h , 1 ) ;
2087
2088 %Store day−ahead clearing price given feed−in (no forecast error )
2089 CRM_results (h , 5 ) = DA_price_feed_in (h , 1 ) ;
2090
2091 %Store intraday market price
2092 CRM_results (h , 6 ) = ID_price (h , 1 ) ;
2093
2094 %Store quantity traded by CRM
2095 CRM_results (h , 7 ) = CRM_quantity_hour (h , 1 ) ;
2096
2097 %Store trading costs (TC)
2098 CRM_results (h , 8 ) = CRM_trading_costs_hour (h , 1 ) ;
2099
2100 %Calculate trading costs per MWh of forecast error (TC_FE) for each hour
2101 CRM_results (h , 9 ) = CRM_trading_costs_hour (h, 1 ) / abs ( forecast_error (h , 1 ) ) ;
2102
2103 %Calculate trading costs per MWh of feed−in (TC_FI ) for each hour
2104 CRM_results (h,10) = CRM_trading_costs_hour (h, 1 ) / feed_in (h , 1 ) ;
2105
2106 %Calculate day−ahead e f f ec t s in the case of an underestimation (CRM se l l s )
2107 i f forecast_error (h , 1 ) < 0
2108
2109 %Calculate price e f f ec t
2110 CRM_results (h,11) = (DA_price (h,1)−DA_price_feed_in (h , 1 ) ) . . .
2111 * ( feed_in (h,1)−abs ( forecast_error (h , 1 ) ) ) ;
2112
2113 %Calculate quantity e f f ec t
2114 CRM_results (h,12) = −(DA_price_feed_in (h , 1 ) * abs ( forecast_error (h , 1 ) ) ) ;
2115
2116 %Calculate day−ahead e f f ec t s in the case of an overestimation (CRM buys )
2117 e l s e i f forecast_error (h , 1 ) > 0
2118
2119 %Calculate price e f f ec t
2120 CRM_results (h,11) = −((DA_price_feed_in (h,1)−DA_price (h , 1 ) ) * feed_in (h , 1 ) ) ;
2121
2122 %Calculate quantity e f f ec t
2123 CRM_results (h,12) = DA_price (h , 1 ) * abs ( forecast_error (h , 1 ) ) ;
2124 end
2125 %Calculate sum of price and quantity e f f ec t
2126 CRM_results (h,13) = CRM_results (h,11)+CRM_results (h , 1 2 ) ;
2127
2128 %Calculate market integrat ion costs
2129 CRM_results (h,14) = CRM_results (h,8)+(−CRM_results (h , 1 3 ) ) ;
2130
2131 %Calculate market integrat ion costs per MWh forecast error (MIC_FE) for each hour
2132 CRM_results (h,15) = CRM_results (h,14)/ abs ( forecast_error (h , 1 ) ) ;
2133
2134 %Calculate market integrat ion costs per MWh feed−in (MIC_FI) for each hour
2135 CRM_results (h,16) = CRM_results (h,14)/ feed_in (h , 1 ) ;
2136 end
2137
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2138 %Calculate TC_FE for a l l hours
2139 CRM_results (1 ,17) = (sum(CRM_trading_costs_hour ( : , 1 ) ) ) / (sum(abs ( forecast_error ( : , 1 ) ) ) ) ;
2140
2141 %Calculate TC_FI for a l l hours
2142 CRM_results (1 ,18) = (sum(CRM_trading_costs_hour ( : , 1 ) ) ) / (sum( feed_in ( : , 1 ) ) ) ;
2143
2144 %Calculate MIC_FE for a l l hours
2145 CRM_results (1 ,19) = (sum(CRM_results ( : , 1 4 ) ) ) / (sum(abs ( forecast_error ( : , 1 ) ) ) ) ;
2146
2147 %Calculate MIC_FI for a l l hours
2148 CRM_results (1 ,20) = (sum(CRM_results ( : , 1 4 ) ) ) / (sum( feed_in ( : , 1 ) ) ) ;
2149
2150 %−−−4.2.−−−Evaluate simulation resu l t s for each market participant−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
2151
2152 %Preal locate
2153 OfferEvaluationGen = ce l l ( s ize (GenData , 2 ) * ( number_time_steps+1) ,number_time_steps ) ;
2154 OfferEvaluationDem = ce l l ( s ize (DemData, 2 ) * ( number_time_steps+1) ,number_time_steps ) ;
2155
2156 for g = 1 : 1 : s ize (GenData , 2 )
2157
2158 for t = 1 : 1 : number_time_steps+1
2159
2160 row_g = g * ( number_time_steps+1)−(number_time_steps+1) ;
2161
2162 %Day−ahead auction resu l t s
2163
2164 %Store number of time step
2165 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t , 1 } = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {1 , t } ;
2166
2167 %Store ID of generator
2168 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t , 2 } = GenData(g ) . ID ;
2169
2170 %Store generator type
2171 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t , 3 } = GenData(g ) . type ;
2172
2173 %Store i f CHP plant or not
2174 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t , 4 } = GenData(g ) .CHP;
2175
2176 %Store rank in the merit order
2177 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t , 5 } = GenData(g ) . merit_order_rank (1 , 1 ) ;
2178
2179 %Store of fe r type ( ask )
2180 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t , 6 } = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers { 2 , 1 } ;
2181
2182 %Store offered quantity (G_t0 )
2183 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t , 7 } = GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions { 3 , 1 } ;
2184
2185 %Store optimal o f fe r price ( cda )
2186 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t , 8 } = GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions { 6 , 1 } ;
2187
2188 %Store i f dispatched or not
2189 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t , 9 } = GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions { 7 , 1 } ;
2190
2191 %Intraday resu l t s
2192
2193 i f t >= 2
2194
2195 %Store of fe r type for time step
2196 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t ,10 } = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } ;
2197
2198 %Store offered quantity
2199 i f strcmp(GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } , ’no offer ’ )
2200 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t ,11 } = ’−−− ’;
2201 else
2202 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t ,11 } = abs (GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {4 , t } ) ;
2203 end
2204
2205 %Store indif ference of fer price
2206 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t ,12 } = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {5 , t } ;
2207
2208 %Store optimal o f fe r price
2209 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t ,13 } = GenData(g ) . IntraOffers {6 , t } ;
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2210
2211 %Store accepted of fe r price
2212 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t ,14 } = GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {6 , t } ;
2213
2214 %Store i f o f fe r i s accepted for time step
2215 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t ,15 } = GenData(g ) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } ;
2216
2217 else
2218
2219 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t ,10 } = ’−−− ’;
2220 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t ,11 } = ’−−− ’;
2221 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t ,12 } = ’−−− ’;
2222 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t ,13 } = ’−−− ’;
2223 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t ,14 } = ’−−− ’;
2224 OfferEvaluationGen { row_g+t ,15 } = ’−−− ’;
2225 end
2226 end
2227 end
2228
2229 for d = 1 : 1 : s ize (DemData, 2 )
2230
2231 for t = 1 : 1 : number_time_steps+1
2232
2233 row_d = d* ( number_time_steps+1)−(number_time_steps+1) ;
2234
2235 %Day−ahead resu l t s
2236
2237 %Store number of time step
2238 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t , 1 } = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {1 , t } ;
2239
2240 %Store ID of demander
2241 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t , 2 } = DemData(d ) . ID ;
2242
2243 %Store of fe r type ( bid )
2244 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t , 3 } = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers { 2 , 1 } ;
2245
2246 %Store offered quantity (D_t0 )
2247 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t , 4 } = DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions { 3 , 1 } ;
2248
2249 %Store optimal o f fe r price (day−ahead clearing price )
2250 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t , 5 } = DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions { 6 , 1 } ;
2251
2252 %Store i f dispatched or not ( always dispatched )
2253 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t , 6 } = DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions { 7 , 1 } ;
2254
2255 %Intraday resu l t s
2256
2257 i f t >= 2
2258
2259 %Store of fe r type
2260 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t , 7 } = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {2 , t } ;
2261
2262 %Store offered quantity
2263 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t , 8 } = abs (DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {4 , t } ) ;
2264
2265 %Store indif ference of fe r price
2266 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t , 9 } = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {5 , t } ;
2267
2268 %Store optimal o f fe r price
2269 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t ,10 } = DemData(d ) . IntraOffers {6 , t } ;
2270
2271 %Store accepted of fe r price
2272 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t ,11 } = DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {6 , t } ;
2273
2274 %Store i f o f fe r i s accepted for time step
2275 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t ,12 } = DemData(d ) . IntraPosit ions {7 , t } ;
2276
2277 else
2278
2279 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t , 7 } = ’−−− ’;
2280 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t , 8 } = ’−−− ’;
2281 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t , 9 } = ’−−− ’;
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2282 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t ,10 } = ’−−− ’;
2283 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t ,11 } = ’−−− ’;
2284 OfferEvaluationDem {row_d+t ,12 } = ’−−− ’;
2285 end
2286 end
2287 end
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Kurzzusammenfassung 
This thesis develops and applies methodological approaches for the analysis of intraday 
markets for electricity which are organised as continuous double auctions. The focus is to 
improve the understanding of how balancing forecast errors from weather-dependent re-
newable energy sources influences the outcomes of continuous intraday markets. This is 
important as it helps to assess how large amounts of renewable capacity can be utilised 
cost-efficiently and without stressing security of supply. In a first step, the thesis proposes 
a (non-mathematical) model of a continuous intraday market to show how the direction of 
the forecast error determines transactions between market participants, how these trans-
actions relate to the formation of prices, and how the market integration of renewables can 
be improved. In a second step, the thesis provides a foundation for quantitative market 
analyses by modelling price-setting decisions for power generators and electricity de-
manders. This makes it possible to show that information on market participants’ technical 
characteristics enables informed predictions of their market behaviour. In a third step, the 
thesis presents a computer simulation of a continuous intraday market. Implementing the 
simulation approach for the German power system allows calculation of the costs associ-
ated with the uncertain feed-in from renewables. 
